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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. When employee dishonesty and resulting third-party claims are known to a
financial institution insured by a "discovery" bond, can the insured artificially postpone its
"discovery" of dishonesty for months until a new "discovery" bond, with higher coverage
limits, has been purchased, and then claim to have "discovered" the dishonesty within the
new bond period, all in violation of contract clauses that expressly define discovery and that
preclude coverage on the new bond as to the dishonest employee?
2. In admittedly rewriting terms in a fidelity bond which govern coverage, in
artificially restricting the parties' chosen definition of "discovery", and in rejecting universal
precedent regarding the bond's termination clause, did the Majority Opinion violate this
Court's established precedent for contract enforcement, generate important state law issues
that should be resolved by this Court, and create incentives that will adversely affect Utah
financial institutions.
REFERENCE TO THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The decision of the Utah Court of Appeals below, Home Savings and Loan
Association v. The Aetna Casualty and Surety Company. (Ct. App. Aug. 6, 1991), is
attached at tab 1.
JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment on August 6, 1991. This
Petition is timely, within the extension allowed by this Court. Jurisdiction to review by Writ
of Certiorari is proper under Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(5) (1953 as amended). Aetna's
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari is based on those grounds approved in Rules 46(b), (c), and
(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
The issues raised in this Petition are vital public policy questions of first impression
in this jurisdiction. Resolution of the issues will have profound, far-reaching impact on the
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financial institutions and insurance companies doing business in this state. The Majority
Opinion runs directly counter to better-reasoned opinions from other jurisdictions that have
addressed the specific fidelity bond at issue here, and it contradicts this Court's leading
precedents for contract enforcement in the State of Utah.
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS
No provisions of the Utah Constitution, Utah Code Annotated, or other regulations
are determinative of the issues in this case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. NATURE OF THE ACTION
This lawsuit concerns enforcement of standardized fidelity bond contracts that
indemnify Utah financial institutions for certain employee dishonesty losses that are
discovered within the effective period of the bond. Home Savings and Loan Association
("Home") seeks to recover on such a bond issued by The Aetna Casualty & Surety Company
("Aetna").
Home's bond claim is generally referred to as a "third-party" dishonesty claim,
meaning that Home's request for indemnity from Aetna arose from accusations of employee
dishonesty contained in a lawsuit by a third-party (here, Home's borrowers). Specifically,
customers sued Home (and recovered) for frauds in loan transactions that occurred between
November, 1981 and January, 1982. Home blamed the frauds on a single employee named
Larry Glad, and sought fidelity bond recovery. Although Home was bonded by Fidelity &
Deposit of Maryland (F&D) when the frauds occurred and when Home was sued by its
customers, Home's suit is for recovery on a larger bond that it later bought from Aetna,
seven months after it had fired the dishonest employee (Larry Glad), and months after it had
been sued by the customers.
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II.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE COURTS BELOW
In the case below, Home alleged that in a previous suit entitled Armitage v. Home
Savings and Loan Association, it had been adjudged guilty of various frauds on 36 separate
loans. Attributing all of its violations to the alleged dishonesty of its employee, Home
sought indemnity under Aetna's bond for the Armitage judgment and for Home's costs in
defending that consolidated case.
Aetna answered that the dishonesty had been discovered within the bond period prior
to Aetna's because the Armitage case, which was the key to Home's claim, had been filed
and served on Home in the period when Home was insured by F&D. Knowing that Aetna's
bond covered only dishonesty "discovered" within Aetna's bond period, and knowing that
F&D had insured Home under an identical Standard Form 22 bond for dishonesty
"discovered" within the prior F&D bond period, Aetna sought to join F&D as a party, but
was not allowed to do so. Aetna also answered that under Section 11, its bond had never
gone into effect for Larry Glad, because of his known dishonesty.
Although the jury answered special interrogatories confirming that Home had known
of Larry Glad's dishonesty prior to the inception of Aetna's bond, the trial court entered
judgment against Aetna on November 2, 1988 in a total amount of $1,977,505.27, plus court
costs and prejudgment interest. Timely appeal followed. On August 6, 1991, the Court of
Appeals issued a forty-one page Majority Opinion affirming the trial court. Court of Appeals
Judge Russell Bench wrote a thirty page Dissenting Opinion, extensively addressing the two
issues on which Aetna now petitions for review.
The Majority Opinion rejected Aetna's reliance on a bright line test in a Rider to the
bond, which defines "discovery" in third-party claim situations as occurring no later than the
date on which Home is sued by a third-party alleging any employee dishonesty. The
Majority Opinion also rejected Aetna's reliance on Section 11 (the "prior termination"
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clause) which voids the bond ab initio as to Larry Glad, about whom Home already had
knowledge of dishonesty at the inception of the Aetna bond.
The Dissent correctly urged judgment for Aetna as a matter of law on the "discovery"
and "prior termination" issues that are the basis for this Petition. Although other issues were
tried and appealed below, this Petition concerns only (1) whether coverage is triggered by the
per se_ "date-of-suit" definition of "discovery" contained in the bond (which places the loss in
the prior F&D bond period), or by the Majority's judicially created coverage trigger, which
relies on a date-of-verdict test that postpones discovery until Aetna's bond period; and (2)
whether Home's knowledge of Larry Glad's dishonesty, seven months before Aetna's bond
was purchased, precluded coverage under the "prior termination" clause.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Third-Party Dishonesty Claims
At the root of this case are 36 loan transactions in which Home violated state and
federal securities statutes and committed common law fraud between November, 1981 and
January, 1982. (See Special Verdict Form, Armitage v. Home Savings. R. at
210.70-210.76). Home's borrowers in those loans invested their loan proceeds in
interrelated companies ("AFCO") controlled by Grant Affleck, whose financial empire
quickly collapsed in March, 1982. These AFCO investors avoided their obligation to repay
their loans to Home, and actually recovered money from Home, by proving Home's illegal
loan practices, in multiple fraud suits that were consolidated as Armitage v. Home Savings.
Id. An employee involved in the loans, Larry Glad, was fired by Home on December 29,
1981, for dishonestly taking $15,000 from AFCO during these loan transactions. (See
Stipulated Pretrial Order, R. at 719-771 [copy attached at tab 2], and jury answer to Special
Interrogatory No. 8 [copy attached at tab 3]).
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The Timing Of The Third-Party Accusations
And Of The Aetna and F&D Bonds
The kinds of illegalities and irregularities that caused the loans to be voided became
extensively known to Home during the six months (January to June, 1982) after the loans
were made and when Home was insured by F&D. By June, 1982, the AFCO investor loans
were delinquent, loss reserves had been established by Home and noted by federal regulators,
borrowers had rescinded or sought to rescind the loans because of the illegalities, and certain
plaintiff AFCO investors who ultimately collected from Home in the Armitage judgment had
already filed their suits against Home. (R. at 200-200.20; and Stipulated Pretrial Order, R.
at 719-771). The F&D bond was in place throughout this intense activity to cover any
dishonesty discovered in that bond period. The F&D bond had standard clauses providing
that if a third-party dishonesty claim were received during the F&D bond period, that bond
would remain open for coverage as to that discovered dishonesty for as long as it took for
the third-party claim to be litigated.
On June 21, 1982, F&D's bond expired and was replaced by Aetna's bond, which
contained the same industry standardized terms but higher coverage limits. (R. at 725).
When the Aetna bond was purchased, Home did not tell Aetna about the suits pending since
April 1982 (consolidated as Armitage v. Home Savings) and for which Home later sought
recovery from Aetna. (R. at 726). Home did eventually give notice to Aetna and F&D in
December, 1982, six months after the Aetna bond had been purchased, but long before any
verdict was rendered in Armitage:. The jury verdict against Home (used below by the
Majority Opinion as the coverage trigger) was not rendered until almost two years later on
August 14, 1984. (R. at 727). Judgment was not entered on that verdict for another
eighteen months, on February 24, 1986 (R. at 727), by which time Aetna's bond had expired
(R. at 725) and Home had begun coverage under another standardized discovery bond from
yet a third bond carrier. Judgment for the Armitage plaintiffs' attorneys' fees was not
entered for yet another six months, until August 24, 1986 (R. 210.70-210.76).
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The Governing Contract Clauses
Both F&D and Aetna insured Home through industry standardized Form 22 Savings
and Loan Blanket Bonds, with identical language on all pertinent points. (Tr. Exs. 343 and
116 respectively. [Copy of Aetna's bond Ex. 343, attached at tab 4]). The preamble of each
bond limits the coverage to loss that is discovered within the bond period. The bond's Rider
SR 6091 (also attached as tab 4), defines an insured's "discovery" of loss objectively as
when the insured learns of "facts which would cause a reasonable person to assume a
loss . . . has been or will be incurred," but with particular regard to third-party claims such
as Armitage, Rider 6091 established per se discovery no later than when the insured receives
"notice ... of an actual or potential claim by a third-party" alleging employee dishonesty.
(Tr. Ex. 343, p. 25).
Section 11 of the F&D and Aetna bonds also each terminate coverage as to any
particular employee once the insured learns of any dishonesty by that employee. Section 11
of each bond terminates coverage for an employee such as Larry Glad "as soon as the
Insured shall learn of any dishonest or fraudulent act on the part of such Employee. ..."
(Tr. Ex. 343, p. 5, Dep. Ex. 116, p. 5).
ARGUMENT
I. THE COURT'S INVENTION OF, AND RELIANCE UPON, LANGUAGE THAT
IS NOT FOUND IN THE PARTIES' CONTRACT VIOLATES UTAH
PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT, IGNORES ACCEPTED
PRECEDENT FOR ALLOCATING FIDELITY RISKS BETWEEN
SUCCESSIVE BOND CARRIERS, AND WILL UNIQUELY PREJUDICE UTAH
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR DEPOSITORS
Before June, 1982, when Home contracted with Aetna, the financial community and
the surety industry had reached agreement about when "discovery" occurs in the context of
employee dishonesty losses involving third-party suits. Under their agreed Rider 6091 to
Standard Form 22, discovery occurs whenever an insured learns of dishonesty, and such
discovery is deemed to occur no later than when the insured has been sued by a third-party
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for an employee's allegedly dishonest conduct. Under the Majority Opinion, Utah now
stands alone in judicially replacing that agreed per se trigger for discovery and coverage of
third-party losses (the date-of-suit test) with a superficially appealing, but fatally flawed,
reference to the uncertain and irrelevant future date of a "verdict" in the third-party's
lawsuit. The Majority Opinion improperly rewrites the parties' agreed bright line trigger for
"discovery," ignores precedent, and commits Utah courts to repeated judicial rewriting of
commercial agreements that significantly affect Utah lenders and their depositors.
A. The Majority Opinion Judicially Rewrites This Discovery Bond
The financial community and its sureties have dealt with "discovery" bonds for years.
Their carefully refined agreements are now significantly and unexpectedly upset by the
Majority Opinion. Discovery bonds are neither "occurrence" policies (triggered by when the
act of dishonesty occurs) nor "claims made" policies (triggered only if and when a claim is
made against the insured). Standard Form 22 is a "discovery" bond, with coverage triggered
as soon as dishonesty is uncovered (or "discovered"), regardless of whether that is at the
moment when the dishonest act occurs, or at the first time when such dishonesty is later
brought to the insured's attention through any means, including a third-party's lawsuit.
1.) The Court Rewrote The Concept Of Loss
Acting as if it were writing on a clean slate to fashion a better contract, the Majority
Opinion hypothesized that the maturation of a fidelity loss proceeds from a point of
"possible" loss to a point of "actual" loss; that "possible" losses are not what fidelity bonds
are about, because they are not what is ultimately paid by the carrier; and that only discovery
of "actual" loss, and not discovery of "possible" loss, should place a third-party suit about
employee dishonesty into a particular bond period. To support this novel construction, the
Majority Opinion had to create a whole new vocabulary for fidelity bonds, because the
parties' written contract never discusses "possible" or "actual", and nowhere defines its
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coverage trigger in terms relating to when "possible" monetary consequences become
"actual" monetary consequences.
As Judge Bench recognized in his Dissent, the entire approach of the discover/ bond
is that once the insured peril of employee dishonesty surfaces, a loss occurs and the coverage
is triggered, no matter how it is discovered, and no matter how long the monetary
consequences take to develop. Under the judicial rewrite in the Majority Opinion, all third-
party employee dishonesty suits are now only "possible" losses until there is a verdict against
the insured, when the loss suddenly becomes "actual."1 Since no verdict occurred until the
Aetna bond period, the Majority Opinion declared that only a "possible" loss had been
"discovered" in the F&D period, and that coverage was not triggered until the suit matured
to a verdict during the Aetna bond and thus became an "actual" loss under the Majority
Opinion's new terminology.
2.) The Court Rewrote The Agreed Rider That Defined "Discovery"
The slate was not truly clean for judicial rewriting. The bond has a per se definition
in Rider 6091, establishing that discovery occurs no later than the date of any third-party suit
alleging dishonesty. That occurred in this case squarely within the F&D period.
The Majority Opinion circumvented the per se_ definition by artificially limiting the
Rider's "discovery" definition only to the clause in the contract that governs the giving of
notice, despite explicit bond language integrating all of the bond's terms and conditions. Just
as it had judicially created two kinds of loss ("actual" and "possible"), the Majority Opinion
had to judicially create and define two kinds of "discovery" to sustain its result. The
Majority Opinion has now created and distinguished discovery that only triggers notice, and
'Whether losses that have supposedly been "actuaT-ized by a verdict suddenly revert to
being only "possible" losses upon the grant of a new trial, the entry of judgment n.o.v., or
an intermediate appellate reversal, are but a few of the many questions the Majority Opinion
has left for future litigants and Utah courts as they finish the rewriting that the Majority
Opinion has begun.
discovery that triggers coverage, without any bond text to support the distinction. In Utah,
"discovery for notice purposes" is now the only issue governed by the parties' Rider 6091,
which defines a date-of-suit trigger. A new, judicially created "discovery for coverage
purposes" is now governed in Utah by the Majority Opinion's preferred tngger, the date of
verdict. A dishonesty loss can now be "discovered" for the purpose of giving notice to an
existing bond carrier, but for years it may remain un-discovered for the purpose of
establishing coverage, because it is only a "possible" loss until there is a verdict. The
Majority Opinion labels all such loss only "possible" until verdict, even though hundreds of
thousands of dollars of "actual" attorneys fees are being incurred prior to verdict, for which
fees the insured expects indemnity regardless of any verdict.
3.) The Rewriting Is Incomplete And Inconsistent On Its Face
The Majority Opinion overlooks a major flaw in its own rule: using the Rider's
definition to only trigger notice is a meaningless or impossible exercise if the same definition
does not also tell the insured to whom such notice should be given. That cannot be done
without simultaneously establishing which carrier's bond covers the loss. Under the Majority
Opinion's new rule, Home would have known it had to give notice to someone, when the
AFCO investor suits were filed in the F&D period, but such notice would be meaningless.
Notice to F&D, under the Majority Opinion's approach, does not trigger coverage. F&D
went off the risk before verdict. Aetna had not yet been identified as a future carrier when
the suits were filed. The consequence is that early notice - which is vital in financial frauds
- is given to a carrier who ultimately provides no coverage. This approach is especially
perverse here, where the courts below excused Home's complete failure to disclose the
pending suits to the new bond carrier (Aetna), on whom coverage responsibility was then
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imposed. Under the Majority Opinion, that carrier would be providing coverage
unknowingly and involuntarily for losses previously reported to its predecessor.2
The rewrite is also inconsistent with the industry norms reflected in Home's own
conduct. Home did not need a verdict to know it had discovered dishonesty. Even Home
recognized discovery no later than December, 1982, when it reported the Armitage matters
to both carriers, long before the 1984 verdict, which the Majority finds so essential to
"discovery."3 Knowing that it had discovered a loss long before the verdict, Home's actual
conduct more closely reflects the established understandings and agreements in this, industry
that are not keyed to verdicts, and which are now up-rooted by the Majority Opinion.
Perhaps most obviously, the Majority Opinion completely overlooks the hundreds of
thousands of dollars in attorneys fees, which were part of Home's "actual" loss long before
any verdict, and were never "possible" losses. These fees were being incurred by Home in
April, May, and June of 1982, before Aetna's bond was even issued. Coverage for these
fees, incurred from the outset of any third-party suit, undermines the entire premise of the
Majority Opinion that third-party situations present only "possible" losses until verdict is
rendered.
2If allowed to stand, the Opinion below affirmatively delays the normal process of
finding employee dishonesty and locking-in coverage for it. All the consequences that should
have been associated with Home's late notice have now been judicially removed; with
predictably unhealthy consequences. There was no sacrifice of coverage for Home's late
notice on the F&D bond, because the Majority Opinion redefined the loss as being
discovered only when the verdict was rendered in the Aetna period. The same Opinion,
however, excused Home's unfair non-disclosure of the suits to Aetna when Aetna's bond
began.
3Home cannot retroactively recharacterize its December, 1982 notice as compliance with
the Majority Opinion's newly announced approach. Even the new approach, interpreting
Rider 6091 as defining discovery only for notice, but not coverage, does not fit because it
would have required Home's notice to F&D in April, 1982 (instead of to Aetna in
December, 1982). Moreover, Home's own conduct and its notice letter (Tr. Ex. 119) were
wholly inconsistent with the Majority Opinion's hypothetical separation of "actual" and
"possible" loss when Home referred to the indemnifiable defense costs that it was already
incurring years before the Armitage verdict. Home's behavior did not follow the Majority
Opinion's imagined model of immediate notice to F&D, followed by actual loss and a
request for coverage only when a verdict arrives.
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Finally, verdicts are not inevitable products of litigation. They do not always remain
unchanged, and are not related to the ultimate timing of any payment. A date-of-verdict test
is in no sense inherently superior to the parties' chosen date-of-suit test for discovery. The
date-of-verdict test commits Utah courts to judicially struggling with innumerable questions
about settlements, verdict reversals, and other contingencies. All of these questions can only
be answered with more litigation and more impermissible judicial rewriting, always
substituting judicial invention for commercial agreement.
B. Under This Court's Precedents For Contract Enforcement, Utah Litigants
Are Entitled to Enforcement Of Their Agreements As Written, To
Accomplish The Central Purpose Of The "Discovery" Bonds
This case is simply a judicial substitution of "date of verdict," instead of the
contractually agreed "date of suit," as the trigger for coverage. As such, the Majority
Opinion violates this Court's admonitions against judicial rewriting. See Provo City Corp. v.
Neilsen Scott Co.. 603 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1979). It also undermines the fundamental
emphasis of financial institution bonds on early discovery and reporting in an industry where
the uncovering of dishonesty is crucial to the well-being of regulated institutions and their
depositors. It is no accident that "discovery" bonds were created for, and exist primarily in,
the financial community. The Majority Opinion's total rewrite of that "discovery"
orientation violates this Court's rule that "[a] construction which contradicts the general
purpose of the contract ... is presumed to be unintended by the parties." LPS Hospital v.
Capitol Life Ins. Co.. 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988).
The Majority Opinion's treatment of the parties' own per se definition of discovery
for third-party losses went beyond impermissible rewriting. It created disharmony between
different clauses that use the very same term "discovery," thus violating this Court's
directive to interpret a contract in a way that will "harmonize all of its provisions and all of
its terms ..." LPS Hospital. 765 P.2d at 858. This disharmony of having different
definitions for the same words was created entirely by the Majority Opinion.
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C. Discovery Was A Well-Negotiated, Well-Defined, And Well-Understood
Term Before The Majority Returned The Financial Community To The
Very Uncertainties That Had Led To A Bright Line Per §e_ Test For
Discovery
The trigger for insurance coverage should always be objectively ascertainable and
beyond the subjective manipulation ofeither the insured or insurer. Were it otherwise, every
claim would give rise to a challenge that the insurer (when the claim is denied) unfairly
manipulated the trigger event to fall outside the period of coverage or that the insured (when
the claim is allowed) unfairly caused the trigger event to fall inside the coverage. This is
exactly the uncertainty and unmanageability which the Majority Opinion creates with its
arbitrary adoption of the date-of-verdict trigger.4 It is that uncertainty and confusion which
the banking and surety industries laid to rest in drafting Standard Form 22, and in making its
definition of discovery precise and explicit in Rider 6091.
Utah's adoption of a date-of-verdict test, instead of the parties' agreed date-of suit test
returns the parties to a world in which there is no agreed, objective, and immediately
identifiable trigger that locks in coverage for a financial institution when it is sued for
employee dishonesty. There may never be a verdict, it may be reversed, and it is always
postponed until long after realization that employee dishonesty is being litigated at the
expense of immediate defense costs (for which the insured seeks indemnity regardless of any
verdict). Despite the Majority Opinion's preferences for the date of verdict, Home knew it
had discovery without regard to any verdict and it gave notice to F&D and to Aetna long
before that verdict. F&D's bond - if timely notice had been given ~ would have remained
open and susceptible to any verdict no matter how long it took to be rendered. But Aetna's
bond had higher coverage limits and notice to F&D was late. The consequences of
4Arbitrary is, indeed, an appropriate label. For example, the Dissent assumed that the
Majority Opinion's logic led to a date-of-judgment test. Date of confession by the employee,
or date of a guilty plea by the employee, or date of payment to a third-party claimant are all
other equally available options; but contract enforcement requires adhering to the term
chosen in the contract.
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individual choices by Home should not cause Utah to stand alone in contorting otherwise
well understood rules of contract enforcement and in ignoring agreed rules for fidelity bond
discovery.5
D. The Majority Opinion Uses Policy Terms Out Of Context To Create An
Ambiguity That Cannot Be Fairly Identified In The Contract As Written
The Majority Opinion cites the only use of the phrase "loss sustained" in the bond
preamble as if to imply that it had been used in contradistinction to "loss discovered but not
yet sustained" or "loss that is expected but not yet sustained". Quite to the contrary, the
bond uses the word "sustained" precisely to demonstrate that the timing of actual monetary
loss is an event totally unrelated to determining bond coverage. The actual context, as noted
by Judge Bench's Dissent, is completely consistent with Aetna's position: the bond states that
loss can be "sustained at any time", with no consequence to that timing, but the loss is
covered so long as discovery occurs within the bond period. Such "discovery" is clearly
defined as happening, for third-party claims, no later than when a third-party demand is
made or suit is filed.6
5It does not matter whether Home pursued Aetna as a gamble for Aetna's higher
coverage limits or because it had given such obviously late notice to F&D. This entire
litigation flows from Home not following Rider 6091 (failing to give notice to F&D "no later
than" the date of the third-party suit, and to then pursue F&D's indemnity). There was no
risk or adverse consequence to timely pursuit of F&D's policy since the bond expressly holds
F&D's coverage open as to a notified third party loss until two years after any judgment in
any third-party suit, such as Armitage. The Majority had no reason to worry that holding
the dishonesty peril to have been discovered in the F&D bond would have unfairly prejudiced
Home. It would have allocated the loss to F&D's period as agreed, and F&D's defense of
late notice would have succeeded or failed based on facts that Home alone had created.
^e Majority Opinion is at its weakest, when it attempts to distinguish Royal Trust Bank
v. National Union Fire Ins. Co.. 788 F.2d 719 (11th Cir. 1986), which rejected precisely the
Majority Opinion's distinction between discovery for "notice" purposes and discovery for
"coverage" purposes. The Majority praises the bond in Royal for being far more clear,
when Royal amounts to no more than the placement of Rider 609l's definition inside the
body of the bond, combined with a reaffirmation of the limitation (also already in the F&D
and Aetna bonds) that dishonesty must be discovered within the bond period to be covered.
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E. The Majority Opinion Will Uniquely Prejudice Utah Financial Institutions
This argument is not a suggestion that insurers will avoid Utah. Far worse, it is a
demonstration that financial institutions: nearing the end of a policy period will repeatedly be
left uncovered (and their depositors unprotected) against immature, but potentially
substantial, losses. Under Aetna's bond interpretation, notice and coverage travel together.
The "discovery" of a loss fixes the bond period in which it occurred (and thus the earner
responsible) and obligates the insured to give notice to that carrier, unlike the Majority
Opinion's rule that calls for notice, without knowing what carrier has the coverage. Under
the Majority Opinion rule, and as this case demonstrates, mid-suit changes in carriers will
often mean that the carrier at the time of "notice" will go off the risk before any verdict, as
F&D did here. When that happens, Utah financial institutions will not be able to find a
renewal market. F&D, for example, would have had every incentive not to renew, so as to
avoid the obviously "expected" (but still only "possible") loss when its bond expired. No
new carrier would knowingly walk into the likelihood of inheriting the still "possible" (but
soon to be "actual") loss, without excluding that impending loss by special endorsement, or
without charging a premium equal to the expected loss. This kind of commercial disruption
and damage, particularly when it flows from judicial rewriting, calls for review and
correction by this Court.
II. THIS COURT SHOULD REVIEW THE MAJORITY'S REFUSAL TO HOLD
THAT SECTION 11 OF THE BOND PRECLUDES COVERAGE FOR LOSS
FROM LARRY GLAD'S CONDUCT WHEN HOME SAVINGS HAD LEARNED
OF HIS DISHONESTY SEVEN MONTHS BEFORE THE AETNA BOND WAS
PURCHASED
Section 11 of the Standard Form 22 bond terminates fidelity coverage immediately
and automatically as to any particular employee as soon as the insured employer leanis of his
dishonesty. As the Dissent noted, courts have repeatedly found such provisions valid,
unambiguous, and enforceable. E.g.. Alfalfa Electric Cooperative. Inc. v. Travelers
Indemnity Co.. 376 F.Supp. 901, 912 (W.D. Okla. 1973); Ritchie Grocer Co. v. Aetna
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Casualty & Surety Co.. 426 F.2d 499, 500 (8th Cir. 1970), Verneco. Inc. v. Fidelitv &
Casualty Co.. 219 So. 2d 508, 510 (La. 1969).
Prior to the Majority Opinion, the universal rule was that a new carrier's coverage
never goes into effect for an employee about whom the insured had prior knowledge of
dishonesty, as Home did about Larry Glad in December, 1981. E.g.. St. Joe Paper Co. v.
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co.. 359 F.2d 579, 580 (5th Cir. 1966); Verneco. at 510.
Clear precedent had applied that rule specifically to a situation involving different successive
bond carriers such as the F&D and Aetna situation here. See C. Douglas Wilson & Co. v.
Ins. Co. of North America. 590 F.2d 1275, 1279 n.6 (4th Cir. 1979), cert denied. 444 U.S.
831 (1979). But the Majority dismissed Wilson as "unpersuasive."
The Majority Opinion disparaged the universal rule as based on "luck,"
apparently because it misapprehended that rule. Section 11 does not affect whether the
insured is covered, contrary to the Majority Opinion's expression of the rule. The rule
simply leaves all coverage with the particular carrier in whose bond period the dishonesty
was first discovered (here, F&D). Home would have had, and kept, whatever coverage it
perfected for loss on the AFCO loans through timely notice to F&D. It can acquire no
second bite at the apple by buying new coverage from Aetna for a known dishonest employee
to cover consequences of his past conduct. Such a result would allow regulated financial
institutions to postpone reporting losses in the hope of buying higher limits for known
problems, injecting dangerous speculation into Utah financial institutions, whose depositors
think of fidelity bonds as protection.
If properly applied and enforced, these bonds are unaffected by the "luck" to
which the Majority Opinion refers. The Majority Opinion's entire analysis makes coverage
depend upon the "luck" of court system delay and the timing of a future verdict. Properly
applied, these bonds given an insured immediate knowledge of how much coverage it has,
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and from whom, at the moment of discovery (which is date of suit for third-party claims).
Timely notice locks that coverage in, regardless of future verdicts, judgments, and bond
carrier charges. It also allocates any discovered loss to the then existing bond carrier and
prevents speculation by an insured as to what limits to buy, and when, for already known
dishonesty or for employees already known to be dishonest, such as Larry Glad was when
the Aetna bond was purchased.
CONCLUSION
This case represents the worst consequences of judicially rewriting a contract
that has been fine-tuned by the involved industries to serve important risk allocating
functions. "Discovery" is the touchstone of these "discovery" bonds; and parties are entitled
to freedom of contract in their definition of it. This case calls for enforcing, not rewriting,
the bright line per se. definition that the parties agreed to use to fix the date of discovery with
certainty, and to protect it from the kind of misadventure in judicial drafting that occurred
below. Utah contract precedent calls for no less.
"Discovery" and "prior termination" work together to provide seamless
coverage for a financial institution who buys from different bond carriers over consecutive
bond periods (as Home did from 3 carriers in 5 years). An insured need only lock-in
coverage through timely notice to its existing bond carrier whenever it is sued by third
parties over employee dishonesty. The ultimate date and amount of liability in such suits are
then details unrelated to fixing the date of discovery and to allocating the loss to a particular
bond. Any new carrier takes subsequent coverage only as of a certain date, only for matters
genuinely not yet "discovered," and only for employees not already known to be dishonest.
Utah's sureties and Utah's financial institutions are both best served by not reaching out to
create new uncertainties and new rules uniquely designed to save Home from having sent late
- 16-
notice to F&D, at the cost of undermining the very provisions that make consecutive bonds
work together for the benefit of both industries.
Aetna prays for this Court's grant of certiorari to review the "discovery" and
"prior termination" issues in the Majority Opinion below, to restore commercial stability in
the insurance of Utah financial institutions, and to avoid leaving Utah as the ony state where
subjective judicial preferences are substituted for the written coverage triggers chosen by the
parties.
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investor loans. Included in these acts was Glad's receipt of a
kickback on a loan made directly to AFCO, a loan that AFCO
eventually repaid. Glad was promptly terminated effective
December 29, 1981. Following Glad's departure, Home closed
several more second mortgage loans to AFCO investors.
On January 28, 1982, AFCO issued a check to Home, to be
applied toward the first monthly payments due on the AFCO
investor loans. Although it was contrary to Home's usual
policy to accept third-party repayments of its loans, AFCO and
its investors had apparently made this arrangement. However,
when Home attempted to cash the check, it was returned due to
insufficient funds in AFCO's account.
On February 26, 1982, Affleck sent a letter to Home
requesting additional time to bring the second mortgage loans
current. He informed Home that there were potential problems
with the loans because the loan documents had been backdated in
order to eliminate the right of the AFCO investors to rescind ~
the loans. He also informed Home that he had closed the loans
personally without any Home employee being present. Affleck
requested the extension in order to avoid "any direct legal
action from individuals that have taken out the above
referenced 2nd mortgage loans."
On March 8, 1982, AFCO filed for bankruptcy. At Home's
board of directors' meeting held on March 17, 1982, Home's
legal counsel indicated to the board that Home's position was
sound despite AFCO's bankruptcy because of the "documentation
of the loans."
In April 1982, approximately three hundred plaintiffs
filed a complaint in the United States Bankruptcy Court against
Affleck, AFCO, and numerous other defendants, including Home
and sixteen other lending institutions that had made similar
second mortgage loans to AFCO investors. The complaint,
designated as Alcorn, et al. v. Grant Affleck, et al.. was
served upon Home on April 13, 1982. The complaint listed
numerous irregularities in the loans and sought an order
declaring the notes and second mortgage trust deeds void, and
an order barring the financial institutions involved from
demanding repayment of loans made to the AFCO investors.1
1. Home also received other "" *" ifi'-^ t*vn . in the form of
lawsuits and letters from *tt'-rneys , of" alleged improprieties
in the AFCO investor loan processing and the investors' intent
to avoid repayment of those loans. This notification was
received in March and April 1982.
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uncovered the likelihood of dishonesty of Home employees in
processing the AFCO investor loans, creating the likelihood
that if Home lost the case, such loss would fall within the
bond's fidelity loss coverage. Aetna then began monitoring the
case .
On September 30, 1983, Aetna elected to not assume defense
of the Armitage litigation. Aetna gave three reasons for this
decision. First, Aetna claimed its bond would not cover losses
sustained during the coverage period of the F&D bond it
replaced, except to the extent that such losses exceeded the F
S< D coverage amount.3 Second, Aetna concluded that the
borrowers' claims in the various complaints were attributed to
acts of Home employees that were committed "at the direction of
and for the benefit of Home Savings." Such acts did not fall
within the bond's definition of employee dishonesty and,
therefore, even if proven, would not fall within the fidelity
coverage of the bond. Third, Aetna stated, "it appears that
many of the claims may have been discovered prior to 6-21-82, ~
the date on which this bond was issued."
Nearly a year later, on August 14, 1984, the Armitage jury
returned special verdicts against Home. Judgment in the case
was entered on February 24, 1986. Pursuant to the judgment,
Home was barred from foreclosing on the second mortgage trust
deeds and from seeking any recovery of its loans to the AFCO
investors. Home's Aetna bond was still in effect at that time.
for the
esult of
Aetna moved for summary judgment, claiming that the
Armitagg loss was not covered by the bond because it was
"discovered" prior to the period of coverage provided by the
bond. In response, Home moved for a court order construing the
"discovery" language of the bond to mean the discovery of an
actual loss sustained and not the discovery of a potential
3 . Aetna apparently assumed fha t H(o k--^ w=*s vus Hained when
the loans were made . As r] i^ci-^e'l t-i <-? fni jv mi our treatment
of Aetna's argument as to whet* ohe Imgs was discovered, this
assumption was not correct.
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argument.
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problems with the AFCO investor loans in the bond application
voids coverage; (4) because the loss was related to trading in
securities, it is excluded from the bond's coverage; (5) the
jury instructions improperly prevented the jury from finding
that Home *s loss was caused by its own mismanagement and poor
judgment rather than by Glad's dishonesty; (6) Home's loss was
improperly calculated, in that certain of the loan outlays were
returned to Home; and (7) Home should not recover the legal
costs awarded against it in the Armitage case, nor all of its
own legal costs incurred in defending that case.
STANDARD OF REVIEW—INSURANCE CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
The interpretation of a contract normally presents a
question of law. Village Inn Apartments v. State Farm Fire and
Casualty Co.. 790 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah App. 1990). We regard
the Aetna bond as a contract for insurance, and therefore give,
no particular deference to the trial court's interpretation of"
the bond. LPS Hospital v. Capitol Life Ins. Co.. 765 P.2d 857,
858 (Utah 1988).
Contract interpretation begins with an examination of the
contract itself to determine the intentions of the parties.
Icl. The document should be interpreted in a manner to
harmonize all of its provisions and terms, to the extent
poss ible. Id.
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5. In this case, Aetna pointr "mh Mini standard Form 22 is the
product of arms ' length nego tiation lie twoop hne Surety
Association of America and the United States League of Savings
and Loan Associations. S_eje_ Sharp v. Federal Savings S< Loan
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SECTION ELEVEN
Aetna's first contention
^all iearn of any di^one's^oTrlal^ T" " the Ins'Jred
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(Footnote 5 continued)
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Aetna and Home agree that once Glad's dishonesty became
known to Home in mid-December 1981, section eleven of the F S< D
bond terminated coverage for losses caused by any subsequent
dishonest conduct by Glad. Once an employer is on notice of an
employee's dishonesty, the fidelity insurer cannot be required
to indemnify losses resulting from similar subsequent conduct
by that same employee. It is quite proper to shift the risk of
loss due to employee dishonesty from the insurer to the insured
once the insured knows of the dishonesty, but elects to retain
the employee. 13 Couch on Insurance 2d § 46:247 (1982).
It is also proper to refuse coverage for losses caused by
an employee whose dishonesty is known to the employer even if
the conduct through which the dishonesty is revealed is
unrelated to subsequent conduct that actually causes a loss.
St. Joe Paper Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 376
F.2d 33, 35 (5th Cir. 1967) (modifying and affirming 359 F.2d
579 (1966)), cert, denied, 389 U.S. 828, 88 S. Ct. 91 (1967). __
Thus neither the F & D bond nor the Aetna bond would have
covered Home for any dishonest conduct by Glad, occurring after
mid-December 1981.
Aetna argues that because Glad was known to be dishonest
before the Aetna bond took effect, its bond was void ab initio
as to losses caused by ajry and all of Glad's dishonest conduct,
whether such conduct occurred before or after mid-December
1981. Aetna cites several cases in support of its position,
which we examine in some detail.
Three cases cited by Aetna involve employee fidelity
insurance that was void ab initio as to certain employees of
the insureds. Ritchie Grocer Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co..
426 F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 1970), and Verneco, Inc. v. Fidelity &
Casualty Co, of New York, 253 La. 721, 219 So. 2d 508 (1969),
involved fidelity loss insurance that contained section
eleven-type provisions. The insured in each case hired an
employee, knowing that the employee had a history of theft.
The employees then stole money from the insureds, who were
denied recovery for the losses under the insurance policies
because they knew of their employees' dishonesty from the
outset of the employment. Therefore, the policies had never
covered any loss caused by the employees' dishonesty.
Similarly, in St. Joe Paper, 37^ f .2d 3 "* , *n insured became
aware of its emplov°° 's M i',° jv -H-h^no^i- <••<>m'1moh before the
relevant fidelity i'?ss i.n;oi •.-im,-o -;r,~ j-:;MCyi. Losses
attributable to t-hat same oour--^ of dishonesty were therefore
not recoverable under the policies.
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under the renewal bond for various losses arising from the
dishonest conduct of the employee.
The Cgjitral Bank court held that the renewal bond did not
"reinstate coverage for an employee that had already been
terminated by a known dishonest act; it simply continuefdl
whatever coverage existed at the time of renewal." 672 S.W.2d
at 647 (emphasis added). It was therefore unnecessary for the
insurer to raise a void ab initio defense to coverage under the
renewal bond. Id. Thus the insurer was not liable for losses
caused by dishonest conduct of the employee that occurred after
his dishonesty became known. However, the insurer was liable
under the renewal bond for losses arising from the employee's
dishonest conduct that had occurred before he was found to be
dishonest. Id. at 650. This coverage had not terminated under
the prior bond and continued under the renewal bond.6
6. As acknowledged by the parties. Central Bank is rnnh.^ng *
to read at first. It appears to support Aetna's void ab initio
argument in that it states at one point that Central Bank's
loss coverage as to its dishonest employee terminated on
December 11, 1974, the date the renewal bond was issued. 672
S.W.2d at 650; see, icl. at 647. The jury in Central Bank is
described as having found that the bank employee's dishonesty
became known "before December 11, 1974," icl. at 644, then is
implicitly described as finding more precisely that the
dishonesty came to light on October 24, 1974. Icl. at 646. We
find the confusion to be resolved by reference to the court's
discussion holding the appellant insurer's void ab initio
argument to be unnecessary:
The jury's answer to special issue sixteen
did not absolve appellant of liability for
losses occurring after October. 1974
because the renewal bond which was issued
December 11, 1974 was void from its
inception. Rather, appellant is absolved
of liability for these [post-October 1974]
losses because a renewal policy does not
reinstate coverage for an employee that
had already been terminated by a known
dishonest act; it simply continues
whatever coverage existed at *"he ^ime of
renewal. . . . It v.^is unnecessary ^"or
appel lnnt- to r 'e^d \ v>m1 *\} ,„ jt- ;_,_,
defense. It mev >_ely '.mi its bond
termination defense
890101-CA 1X
Losses attributable ^olV^ ^7" 'M*'"-"^ induct.
engaged in before being 1 Q \7'"^ "^ the employee
covered under section -Ipven ~ln° •I t 0nest' however- remain
not become known until'after'the l^i SSeS themselves dodishonest. the emPloyee is found to be
dishonest. Such c LpL , learned that Glad was
terminated coveraqe b ? J n0t be a rei^tatement of
coverage. Ins^T^ren^ °f """ng
elected to replace it with l„ •* J D bond' howeve^ Home
argues that, as anew Usurer it^*1 ^ fr0ra Aetna' Aet™
coverage for losses re V - compelled to assume
dishonesty, even if e 1 9 ^ Pre-mid-December 1981
renewal of the F & D bond w??. 3Ve been covered by abond. Wij^cur supports Aetna's position..
(Footnote 6 continued)
cfver%ra7:^ ™» P««-ge indicates that
bond renpw^i «al„ .... °nest emPloyee did not terminal nermmate on the
n to De dishonest — ~*<= lhC employee was
nofdishorlest em^oyel con^occ^^V" ^^^n.
rthe employee ricame known" S^"™? b*fore —
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Wilson involved an original employee fidelity bond and a
pair of replacement bonds from different insurers, all of which
contained coverage termination provisions essentially identical
to section eleven of the bonds in this case. In Wilson, as
here, the insured's employee engaged in certain dishonest
conduct while the original bond was in effect, but the insured
did not, at that time, learn of the employee's dishonesty.
Later, while the original bond was still in effect, the insured
learned of other, unrelated dishonest conduct by the same
employee, but did not discharge him. Nine days after learning
that its employee was dishonest, the original bond expired and
the replacement bonds went into effect. One month later, the
insured learned of the earlier dishonest conduct of its
employee, whereupon the employee was discharged. As in the
present case, the loss for which the insured sought recovery
was caused by the earlier dishonest conduct, and not by the
conduct through which the employee's dishonesty first became
known.
The Wilson court held that because the insured knew of its
employee's dishonesty before the replacement bonds went into
effect, and because the insured did not disclose the dishonesty
to the issurers of the replacement bonds, those bonds never
went into effect as to any losses caused by that employee's
dishonesty. Wilson, 590 F.2d at 1279. Therefore, the losses
caused by the employee's dishonesty were not covered under the
replacement bonds, even though those losses arose from
dishonest behavior that had occurred before the insured learned
its employee was dishonest. In a footnote, the court indicated
that had the insured elected to extend the original bond, that
bond would have covered those losses. Icl- at 1279 n.6. The
court stated that the "unfortunate position in which Wilson
finds itself was occasioned in part by sheer bad luck in timing
as to the change in insurers . . . ." Icl. at 1280.
We do not find Wilson persuasive. Its analysis is
troublesome because of the reliance it places on sheer luck to
determine whether certain losses are covered under a
replacement fidelity bond, even where a renewal of the prior
bond would cover them. As stated by the Wilson dissent, the
analysis "defeat[sj the purpose of insurance and base[s]
recovery on chance." M- at 1291 (Hoffman, District Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). wo observe that a
fundament a1 purpos° "f a"v <•->?•> ^-n'-1- 's i- '•> ri^f ino t- he
relationship of the '"Mit r^ct i"-i nrH^; inri provide the maximum
possible stability and predict abi 1jty i-<> that relationship,
thereby minimizing the effect of chance or luck.
890101-CA 13
Our scrutiny of section eleven of the Aetna bond reveals
no language that mandates the result reached in Wilson A-
interpreted by the foregoing authorities, it clea7ly"bars °
recovery for any losses Glad might have caused subsequent to
mid-December 1981. had Home not fired him. However, by itself
the section simply does not address questions of ongoing "
coverage between successive insurers.7 Section eleven is
therefore, ambiguous on that question, and susceptible to'the
samerHdel H°Vhat ^ ^ "0t bar the continuation of thesame fidelity loss coverage under the Aetna bond that existed
under the F & D bond. Therefore, utilizing rules of
construction applicable to insurance contracts, we cons-rue
section eleven to provide coverage here. Such a construction
promotes predictability of bond coverage and minimizes the
mpact of luck or chance. Therefore, we hold that coverage for
losses caused by Glad's dishonest conduct, where that conduct
occurred before Home learned that he was dishonest, and where
the'To n^nd ^T^ W°Uld h3Ve c°"tinued under renewal of,
Dond 1S barled by secti°n eleven of the Aetna
Our holding is supported by the absence of any extrinsic
TIsue!dCetS,Ugge%tlng th3t' at thS time the Aetna bond wasissued, the parties intended that it would provide diminished
coverage compared to that provided under the F & D bond The
in oart "Tagent prepared fche Aetna bond proposal, which read
° att-. X Pr°P°^e a bond be issued effective June 21 to
cove age The6hond ^\ " "iU Pr°Vide ^ retroactive5'. The bond Wl11 be issued through Aetna Casualty 5,Surety Company." (Emphasis added.) There is no evidence of
processCasStonS "^u" thS PartieS durin9 the Cond appUc ionprocess as to any risks covered by the F & D bond that would
"^continue to be covered under the identically-worded Aetna
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provisions properly shift such increased fidelity loss risk to
the employer. On the other hand, firing the dishonest employee
does not affect the risk that some dishonest act commixed
before the employee was found to be dishonest will result in a
loss. Nor does changing insurers affect this risk. Absent a
clear agreement to the contrary, an insured who purchases
replacement employee fidelity coverage that appears t-0 be
identical to the prior coverage should be entitled to coverage
that is in fact identical with respect to section eleven
limitat ions.
In sum, section eleven does not bar Home's recovery from
Aetna. So long as the loss caused by Glad's dishonest behavior
was discovered within the effective period of the Aetna bond
that loss is recoverable. We turn to the question of when i-he
loss was discovered.
DISCOVERY OF LOSS S
Aetna argues that Home's loss was discovered before the
Aetna bond went into effect and, therefore, does not fall
within the coverage period of the bond. The bond provisions
relevant to this argument are found in the "Insuring
Agreements" and "Conditions and Limitations" portions of the
The preamble to the Insuring Agreements states the bond
will cover any "loss sustained by the Insured at any time but
discovered during the Bond Period ....*• The insuring
agreements define the losses that are covered under the bond
Among the covered losses are those related to employee fidelity
* f^Ti>U9! b°nd 4d8r number 6041 to the insuring agreements,
a fidelity loss is defined as "[l]oss resulting directly from
one or more dishonest or fraudulent acts of an Employee,
committed anywhere and whether committed alone or in collusion
with others . . . .*• "Dishonest or fraudulent acts" are
further defined as those committed "with the manifest intent-
fa) to cause the insured to sustain such loss; and (b) to
obtain financial benefit for the Employee . . . ."8
Coverage for all types -f losses defined in r-h- insuring
agreements is sxpc-s.lv ^iti-H .., h,q ;„,;,, r„,i •~ Reliance
8. The jury found that Gladys conduct "in processing ch» AFCO~~
investor loans met this definition of employee dishonesty, and
Aetna does not challenge this finding on appeal
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with the "Conditions and Limitations" portion of the bond
fn^rpS f°Ur-°f '^ C°nditions and Limitations requires th*insured to give prompt notice of loss to Aetna: "At the' "
earliest practicable moment after discovery of any los-
hereunder the Insured shall give the Underwriter written notice
hereof and shall also within six months after such 0
particulars "9 UnderWriter affirmative proof of loss with full
,ho *ider 6091 J!0 the section four notice requirement defines
the discovery of any loss hereunder," triggering the duty to
notif^the^nsurer, as the moment when the'LsurSd iLrnfcfa
Discovery occurs when the insured becomes
aware of facts which would cause a
reasonable person to assume that a loss
covered by the bond has been or will be
incurred even though the exact amount or *
details of loss may not be then known
Notice to the insured of an actual or
potential claim by a third party which
alleges that the Insured is liable under
circumstances, which, if true, would
create a loss under this bond constitutes
such discovery.
to compheen^ted tLTnllll?t'orlUlll^^Trk^^ '?"'the effective bond period, ^^eV^n™ tnltlT^T-^
actually occur. One such compensable loss is a fidelitv L-.
bond's notice re^irLent! '-These Lents includl IVAlllV ^
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February 1982 letter to Home relating the irregularities in the
AFCO investor loan processing, closely followed by
delinquencies in those loans; the well-publicized AFCO
bankruptcy petition of March 1982; and the service of
complaints by AFCO investors against Home beginning in April
1982. The AFCO investor complaints are of particular note in
that they alleged the mishandling of the investor loans which
ultimately resulted in the Armitage judgment against Home, and,
as such, may have met the "notice ... of an actual or
potential claim" definition of discovery applicable to Home's
prompt notice duty.
All these events occurred before the Aetna bond was issued
in June 1982. Arguably, many of these events alerted Home to
the possibility of a loss due to Glad's dishonesty.9
Therefore, Home's failure to notify Aetna of a possible
fidelity loss until December 9, 1982--nearly six months after
the Aetna bond was issued, and ten months after problems with i.
the investor loan processing came to light— arguably may have
been a breach of the bond's prompt notice requirement.
Aetna, however, does not argue that any breach of the
prompt notice requirement by Home should prevent recovery under
the bond. The trial court held that recovery could not be
denied for breach of the prompt notice requirement because
Aetna failed to show that it was prejudiced by any such
breach. Aetna does not challenge that holding on appeal.
Aetna's argument is limited to its contention that a loss is
discovered for the purpose of coverage at the same time it is
discovered for the purpose of notifying the insurer, that is,
when the possibility of the loss becomes known. If Aetna is
correct and the possibility of Home's fidelity loss was
discovered before the Aetna bond went into effect, Aetna cannot
be required to compensate Home for that loss. Aetna cites a
number of cases involving similar discovery bonds in support of
its contention.
The bulk of the cases cited by Aetna deal with arguments
that the insureds had breached the prompt notice requirements
of various bonds similar to the Aetna bond. See Perkins v.
9. Aetna also cites the revelation of Glad's loan kickback in
December 1981 as inf ^mat J,_,n "- '^ r- rr* vI'e'l Ho'no •^ duty to notify
Aetna of a "possib.l e i--ss ." -V; F-wind hy f-'>e iory, however, the
December 1981 discovery that '-lad w^s d *shenest involved
activities unrelated t^ the losses eventually incurred via the
AFCO investor loans.
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Clinton State Bank. 593 F.2d 327 (8th Cir. 1979); Federal
Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur, Corp.. 426 F.2d 729
Cir. 19 70); Alfalfa Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Travelers Injjernn^
376 F.Supp. 901 (W.D. Okla. 1973); National Newark h Essex
v. American InsT Co.. 76 N.J. 64, 385 A.2d 1216 (1978).
lecause Aetna is not arguing on appeal that Home breached its
prompt notice duty, these cases are not useful to its appeal.
We are also not persuaded by other authority cited by Aetna,
some of which, nevertheless, warrant closer attention.
We first examine those cases cited by Aetna, which,
because they focus on the question of when the employee
dishonesty element was discovered, all proceeded on an
assumption that the loss element of the fidelity loss had both
actually occurred and been discovered before the employee
dishonesty element was discovered.10 First Nat'1. Bank of
Bpwie v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York. 634 F.2d 1000
(5th Cir. 1981); Empire State Bank, 448 F.2d 360; Fleming. 581
P.2d 744. With discovery of the loss itself thus given, the ~
question of when the employee dishonesty element was discovered
was determinative of when the fidelity loss itself, was
discovered.li
10. This assumption is somewhat troublesome in First NatT7!
Bank of Fleming v. Maryland Casualty CoT. 581 P.2d 744, 745
(Colo. App. 1978), in that it refers to "probable" loss,
without analysis or explanation. A similar problem exists in
USUFE Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. National Sur. Corp.. 115 Cal.
App. 3d 336, 171 Cal. Rptr. 393, 398 (1981) (discussed more
fully in footnote 11) and its reference to loss "established by
the record." £££_ Pacific-Southern Mortgage Trust Co. v.
Insurance Co, q£ n, Am,, 166 cal. App. 3d, 212 cal. Rptr. 754
758 (1985) (criticizing UfiltlEE's failure to analyze whether
loss occurred at same time as fraud). United States Fidelity &
Guar, v, Empire State Bank. 448 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1971) at
least establishes the fact of loss in its recitation of the
insured's exercise of its repossession and liquidation remedy
upon its borrower's default.
11. But see. VSLIFE Savt , 171 Cal. Rptr. 393, which implicitly
adopted the fidelity coverage interpretation urged here by
Aetna. It did this by reference to the prompt notice
requirement of the bond in guest inn i-here, wh ioh appears
identical to that in Home's Aetna b"nd. 1.71 Cal. Rptr/'at
398. Apparently, the bond in fJSLIFE did not define "discovery
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The insurer's denial of recovery was affirmed on appeal.
The court noted that the employee improprieties that were known
before the bond was issued were, by themselves, dishonest and
fraudulent. The court rejected the insured's contention that
it did not know the improprieties amounted to dishonesty until
it learned, during the bond period, of the kickback
allegation. USLIFE, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 398. Accordingly, the
employee dishonesty element of the fidelity losses had been
discovered before the bond period commenced, and the losses
were not covered under the bond. Icl. The court seems to have
also held, in effect, that the alleged kickbacks had never
occurred, apparently based on the employees' submission of
affidavits denying the kickbacks. Icl. at 396-97. Therefore,
the insured had presented "no new facts" during the bond period
to show that its loss was caused by employee dishonesty. See
i_d. at 398.
Bowie states that discovery of loss "within the meaning o£
the loss provisions of the Bond [occurs] when the insured party
discovers facts sufficient to create a condition in which the
insured might be subjected to a claim against which it is
indemnified by the Bond." 634 F.2d at 1004. The disputed
provision in the Bowie bond, however, was not a "loss
provision." Rather, it was a provision indemnifying the
insured for legal costs incurred in defending itself against
claims which, if proven, would create a covered loss. In
Bowie, the insured successfully defended seven suits that
(Footnote 11 continued)
of loss" for purposes of the notice requirement as does the
bond in question here; however, the court applied a case
law-derived definition similar to the "reasonable person"
standard of the Aetna bond notice requirement. Like Aetna, the
insurer in USLIFE argued that the fidelity loss for which
compensation was sought was not discovered within the bond's
effective period. Like Fleming, however, the issue in USLIFE
was not when the losses themselves were discovered, but rather
when the dishonest employee conduct that made them fidelity
losses was discovered. That conduct consisted of improper
student loan processing, including failure to comply with
applicable federal regulations, granting the loans to
ineligible students, and hiding such act? fr^m the insured,
which became known *•" the ;nsnved before the N^nd in question
came into effect . A single additional, impropriety— alleged
kickbacks to the involved employees--came to light after the
bond' s effective date. The insured sought recovery for the
fidelity losses under the bond.
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contained such claims, thus Pj^bZejltinci a covered loss it
s."fx^.r:^Ti;i;? V":n.ir """'»• "--
K^X-jr!!^!' '"? 0°»* f" '!>• WW" »< lo»» oov.r,,, Sr„LJh.r
central to its holding nor supported by the cases cit^ 12
orAe^rporrt^ere1^ ^ ^^ Pe-Li^lupport
made woufdf '^aU^robnbfJitv"- det«r°ed that a ^an it had
^^t^P^^f.^a at 745. The loan had been made possible bv * hani, ~
Therefore, the fidelitv n after the bond had terminated.
effectiVe'PerLd:d:„dtno1^o-^or?hl^U--:iLh^?ndIl.
"hen the employee dishonesty that caused it ^r0'"* bUt °"
353 (Tex. 1968) As Telitr^H^H^9?* °£ M^1*"^ 431 S.W.2d
provision for such o in ^h I*1•exPense coverage, the
notice requirement, ° „V ^ ^ COntained ^s own
promptly notify the in , , ',. '"V re0 w^ -bligated to
successful, would -stabl^h , , , Pl0ceefJinc's th^t if
provisions. 634 F.ld aj to02 *" " ^ l0SS cov«"ge
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discovered. While Fle.nung is sparse on details, it appears
that the insured had neither knowledge nor suspicion of the
e:npiMyee dishonesty that caused its loss until'well after the
bond terminated. Therefore, even if the loss itself was
discovered within the bond period, the identity of that loss as
a fidelity loss was not discovered unti 1 later".
Empire State Bank dealt with losses sustained by an
insured bank after it had liquidated collateral securing
certain loans on which the borrowers had defaulted. As
occurred in Fleming, an employee of the insured had dishonestly
caused the loans to be made. Again, although framed as a
question of when the loss was discovered, the Empire State Bank
dispute actually concerned the discovery of the employee
dishonesty element of the fidelity loss. The insured had
suspicions as to the dishonesty before the bond in question
went into effect, but the suspicions were not confirmed until
the insured uncovered further evidence, after the bond went
into effect. The court deferred to the trial court's finding ~
that the discovery of the employee dishonesty causing the
insured's loss occurred when the suspicions were confirmed, and
not when the suspicions originally arose. Id. at 366. This
brought the discovery of the fidelity loss within the bond's
coverage period.
Fleming and Empire State Bank demonstrate that a
determination as to when the employee dishonesty element of a
fidelity loss is discovered is a relatively difficult,
subjective one. This is particularly true where, as in Empire
State BgnK, a distinction must be made between a suspicion that
this element exists, and confirmation of that suspicion.^-3
where reasonable people could disagree as to when suspicion
thus ripens into discovery, it is appropriate to defer to the
fact finder's determination as to when discovery of the
employee dishonesty element of a fidelity loss occurs. To aid
in this determination, it is appropriate to apply standards
similar to those found in notice requirements. The fact finder
can and should inquire into when a reasonable person in the
insured's position would have concluded, i.e., discovered, that
dishonest employee conduct had been the cause of a loss. ?4
13 . See also USLIFE . 115 r'a 1. a.pp . ;r* n &t m \ r^ i RPr-r . 393 .
14. Courts have m-h~h t-h =. t- ..i,.,, .,,, ,.,Ppi,.vee ,,^ -erved ably in
a position of trust . m19 hlsc^..Qrv ,1(_ ,,iqf_ erc j_^Voo •s
dishonesty cnmes hard ^0 Mie «^pL-y«i. 3_ej£, e.g'. ,' Perpetual
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.nves^rioanr^biscc^rerbn^ T^""* ^ the AFCO
resulting from those on s s ™h 1°" ^ aCtual J°"dishonest conduct was discovert , *llshed- Possibly, tha;
into effect. 15 However ^^ the Aetna bond went;•-„„, * . . """ever, the discovery nf fMari.,- ^;„, .
-"..>-.. «B succinctly put hv the i-r; = i T -"•"•••"' uuukl r.
loss, not dishonesty. 9l C0Urt' the bond covers
souglirbyUAetna" ^a^oot a^neS T^T *" """ the "^-equestion indicated a clear intent *an*ua?e of the bonds in
of when posslDle loss^a^^aV^Ilo^eT "' te™S
(Foot~™t^7i~c<o^^ — —— — —
^^H^^ lie
not ordinarily shattered in an L a ' COnfldence °f years i
*"*. 448 F.2d at 366. This hiohliohts'th -"Jl E*X^^^1Pinpointing the time whe L I ' S, he difficulty cf
fidelity loss is disc v e"4™ ^^ -'" ^^ °'"discovery may vary according ! he "P^ity of such
trustworthiness. accordln9 to an employee's perceived
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v t» , ,• , rc "^'-; not discovered
over ..no u* ,,;:7 ;• ° 'w'- ^^ »*d b;en
the employee dishonesty ,„ knort/ '\" ""*' ";-n^ -^gues thatforce. S'? "/ns Ln'JWI! i^t'-i- M,e bond went into
22
S
di scovered. The subject bonds in Royal Trust Bank v. Nat'l
Union Fire Ins. Co., 738 F.2d 7 19 (11th Cir. 1986), and Home
Life Ins• Co. v. Clay, 13 Kan. App. 2d 435, ^73 p.2d 666
( l')89) , each contained a section four provision that differs
substantially f rem section four of Home's Aetna bond. Section
four of the Royal Trust and Clay bonds each provided:
This bond applies to loss discovered by
the Insured during the bond period.
Discovery occurs when the Insured becomes
aware of facts which would cause a
reasonable person to assume that a loss
covered by the bond has been or will be
incurred, even though the exact amount or
details of loss may not then be known.
Royal Trust, 788 F.2d at 720; Clay, 773 P.2d at 676. This
language clearly ties coverage to discovery of possible loss,
because the definition of discovery is given in the context of*
the bonds' applicability, rather than in the context of notice
requirements. In contrast, the bond at issue here, by
promising coverage for "sustained" loss, indicates that
coverage turns on actual, rather than possible losses.6 Royal
Trust and Clay are instructive as to how Aetna might have
drafted its bond to obtain the result it now seeks. As
actually drafted, however, the Aetna bond does not limit
coverage in the fashion accomplished by the Royal Trust and
Clay bonds.
We cannot accept Aetna's contention that the loss element
of a fidelity loss means possible loss. A possible loss, no
matter how likely and no matter how closely tied to employee
dishonesty, is no more compensable under the bond than is
employee dishonesty standing alone. Indeed, a possible loss
may turn out to be no loss at all, for which no coverage is
available. Just as the employee dishonesty element must be
discovered beyond mere suspicion to create a fidelity loss, so
must the loss element be established, and not merely be deemed
16. Royal Trust also indicates that the bond in question there
contained a rider that provided, "there shall be no liability
in respect of any claim . . =* r is im out nf =>nv circumstance
or occurrence known ^ t'10 ".-:^"'^d pi i"> t-- l h^_ inception
hereof and not disclosed '" o^io r-.,-,, i-,:-,, .- ., r inoeption." 738
F.2d at 720. Home's Aetna bond ^'uitains no similar language
limiting coverage.
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possible. It makes no sense, without bond language clearlv
California Court of Appeals noted that in the case of '
^ttlame^ime^t^r^ud ^nd "^ ^ «™»""r occur'as me fraud, and might not occur at all:
[I]n the case of a secured loan made
because of fraudulent misrepresentations,
the fraud and the loss do not necessarily
occur at the same time. The loss may
occur much later Qijfii.^^n since the
debtor may eventually become creditworthy
or the underlying property may appreciate
suffered.30 that n° aCtUal l0SS ^ —
212 Cal. Rptr. at 757 (emphasis in original).
™ch UK.8thr&C.&nr£^ i-
processing by Glad diri ™£ ^ The dishonest loan
Possible losL The possibl.lTo^3,617 S3"36 al0SS' but »"ly a
that the AFCO investors we e elisMrTrV"9"^1^ thS "eWSloans, but this rP.i,t J! resisting repayment of their
action against Home stiu'd?dennrhen U devel°Ped into legal
The actual loss ro™ n ! t .1 amount to an actual loss.
subsequent julgmenTba^ed Home ?* ^^^ ^ verdict andthe loans. Vs ^^l^^^l^^^h^^r °"
already-known empl"i- di~h->np- <-•• ,,;_,, a" ^ hY
discovered within the ,ff=,,, ^ ^, ,/, ^ h '''7 "V"' ""] '° beto apply. Because the Armitaa- ,7 7 7 ^ond f, •• verage
rendered during the effe^77e77 ^t^*^ ^
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loss was both sustained and discovered, completing the
discovery of the fidelity loss, during the bond period.
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MISREPRESENTATION IN BOND APPLICATION
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for the bond. That provision reads, in relevant part
Misrepresentations, omissions, concealment
of facts, and incorrect statements [in an
insurance application] shall not prevent a
recovery under the policy or contract
unless:
(a) fraudulent ; or
(b) material either to the acceptance of
the risk, or to the hazard assumed by the
insurer; or
(c) the insurer in good faith either
would not have issued the policy or
contract . . . , or would not have
provided coverage with respect to the
hazard resulting in the loss, if the true
facts had been made known to the insurer
as required either by the application for
the policy or contract or otherwise.
y notes tha
ively, by t
y one subse
v. Minneso
Aetna correctl
listed disjunct
sfact ion of onl
policy. Berger
390 (Utah 1986). Here th
rrogatories, found that in
tentionally misrepresented
rial to the risk to be ass
disclosed, Aetna would ha
uded coverage for the cons
efore, while fraud was not
Id not have provided cover
established under the sta
are
sat i
the
188,
i nte
unin
mate
been
excl
Ther
"wou
were
t subsections (a)
he word "or," so
ction can prevent
ta Mut. Life Ins.
(c)
under
P. 2d
1
tion Home had
that were
d those facts
ued the bond or
s dishonesty,
eriality" and
nying recovery
, (b), and
that the
recovery
Co. , 723
e jury, by specia
the bond applica
or omitted facts
umed, and that ha
ve either not iss
equences of Glad'
proven, the "mat
age" bases for de
tute's subsections (b) and (c). 19
18. Section 31-19-8 was replaced by Utah Code Ann.
§ 31A-21-105 in 1986.
19. The trial court subsequently ruled that there was
insufficient competent evidence rn n^t-^hi ish *-he "w"ild not
have provided co vo raae " -i5t-^r"-i*-i--^; ,m; id^U'vj -•: h<? or; m '"• ris
(b) and (c) in th" com uncti"e , >iHio, ii,q,, M,e disjunctive,
held that the stat nto ry '. Qqu iremen ts for denial of coverage had
not been met. We do not, however, address the court's ruling,
as our analysis focuses on the fact that the omitted material
information was not requested in the bond application.
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The bond application in question is a standard form
furnished by Aetna. Among other inquiries, it asks the
applicant to list employees to be covered by the bond, and t0
list all losses sustained . . . during the last six years "
Home responded truthfully to these inquiries. Glad wis
loss from it. Nor were any other inquiries, by any reasona
reading of the bond application, answered incorrectlb Ho
20. IT^i:^™^1^
«gVu%rS;"t^ n\T ^ "" n-^ -ng tfie^mployees °i
whether aSartiruT«r ™V ^^ Under the bond" However,
^nni^L particular employee is listed on a fidelity bend
s" C;:?;:hl ^Possible importance, is not dllposr ive
period and there 7 „o '„„,, „7 7^7 ,777 ''7" the b""d
that the employee List is n^n^Ht. 7 delusive? '^^
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y by Home.
Aetna argues that S_um ltomo Bank of California v. Iwas aki,
"3 Cal. Rptr. 564, 447 p.2d 956 (1968), Phoenix Sav . S. Loan,
7nc^. v. Aetna Casualty S« Sur. Co., 266 F.Supp 465 (D.Md. 1966),
and West Am. Fin. Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co., 61 P.2d 963 (Cal.
App. 1936), establish a duty on the part of an insurance
applicant to volunteer information not requested in the
application. As noted by the trial court, none of those cases
clearly addresses such a duty in the context of whether or not
the insurer had ever requested the information in question.
However, in dictum, Sumitomo notes "an absolute duty upon the
obligee to volunteer disclosure of all facts materially
affecting the risk to the surety on a fidelity bond." 447 P.2d
at 960.^ To the extent that Sumitomo suggests that a surety
insurance applicant has a duty to disclose facts^about which no
inquiry is made, we decl ine to fo1 low that case.22
We believe the rule stated in Couch is more appropriate:
"It is an insurer's duty to ascertain the facts, and if nothing
21. Sumitomo did not involve a fidelity bond, but a "creditor
bond," guaranteeing repayment of loans. The case involved the
question of whether the insured had a continuing duty to
disclose adverse material information discovered during the
course of the insurance contract. 447 P.2d at 958. It
therefore did not address the question of whether an insurance
applicant has an initial duty to volunteer unrequested
information during the application process.
22• Wpptton v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 16 Utah 2d 52,
395 P.2d 724 (1964), the only Utah case to which we have been
directed on this issue, suggests a result contrary to that
urged by Aetna. In Wpptton, our supreme court held that the
fai lure to volunteer certain information on an insurance
application "cannot reasonably be considered as sufficient
evidence upon which to base a finding of intent to defraud."
395 P.2d at 726. Because intentional misrepresentation was the
issue in WoottoH/ and because the omitted information in that
case was not material to the risk for which recovery was
sought, that case is not on all fours with the present case.
The court did note, however, that the insurer had failed to
inquire about the omitted information, despite being aware of a
possible risk, and that the injure'- '-oi 1d n~. i- No por^h^ed to
thus "blind itself 7"1" -> -.:r-f-;. *- m m n-i m1q ' .•, *_ i, .,,-,,.] M-i^n claim
wilful misrepresentation i" •> *. de» >" -'v id payment under
a policy." Id.
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is concealed, and it makes no inauiHe^ if.
that the situation was not wh777 ' 7 cannot complain
OILinsuran^ 2d § 38-72 (1985) ThisT^ 7 t0 bS' " 9^^
applicable to fidelity bonds ^See 7 7^7}™le'* Pr°Perly
rii?H^s^S^^-^r^^
- ..^ =^ iu uur recitation of the standard „<= :rr"v-3Llu"'insurance applications, problems a ,1? rSVleW aP?ilerl to
failure to clearly make re evanf ariSlng from an insurer's
insurer. A contrary ru7 would iTeff1^ re3t "ith theinsurance applicant to77T7=7 7 effect- require anissue the applied7or policy 23tlVely con-^e an insurer not to
AetnaW771nc7ude7nqhuairies7n1?heabo7dbeen l"*"*1* -"« <°<leveal the omitted material inform^" aPPllcation desicned to.
could have been draf t^d regardnH h"' SlmplS ^stions
^d the pendency of a„su7ts or other ' f°rmer emPlc'^es
cause a covered loss.24 Contrarv to t7 ™tances that might
?o not ignore the statutory hlb H n nf1SSMtin9 opinion, weinsureds, but construe it fnpronit,ltlon of omissions by
an questions vosltTn the% i^Ln^omi11^ •^ ^ "8wer
-s^c^ateT^?:-i-aLurb: -\r--n-r--c-t
"«nt. with no reasonable means o^ 1?^^s^Ta^on.
in the^nrapp'u^LT TnaV.^ ^^^ was not as.ed for
withhold thatTnfoption TroTtTnt "weVJS T inte"tionaUy
under the bond cannot be denied u^ll T °ld that recovery§ 31-19-8. denied under former Utah Code Ann.
24. The Aetna underwrito, ....,,, ,oc., •,• ,
that, subsequent to "the Y>« • 1IjnI " "'" Ulal indicated
— aquestion about ^di„q' ^ i^'toVt^"aPP^t^.
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TRADING EXCLUSION
Aetna's fourth argument en appeal is that Home's loss
resulted from its trading in securities, and that the loss is
therefore excluded from coverage under rider 6030a of the
bond. b The relevant portion of rider 6030a states:
The Underwriter shall not be liable under
the attached bond for any loss resulting
directly or indirectly from trading, with
or without the knowledge of the Insured,
in the name of the Insured or otherwise,
whether or not represented by any
indebtedness or balance shown to be due
the Insured on any customer's account,
actual or fictitious, and notwithstanding
any act or omission on the part of any
Employee in connection with any account
relating to such trading, indebtedness, or z
balance.
The parties agree that "trading" in rider 6030a means
"trading in securities." Accord, Shearson/American Express.
Inc. v. First Continental Bank. 579 F.Supp. 1305, 1310-12 (W.D.
Mo. 1984) (because exclusion was adopted from stockbrokers'
blanket bond, term "trading" refers to trading in securities).
The dispute is whether, as a matter of law, Home's losses on
the AFCO investor loans resulted from trading in securities.
The Armitage verdict against Home was based on a finding
that Home had been a seller of securities for the purpose of
proving violations of section 12(2) of the Securities Act of
1933 and of section 61-1-22(1)(a) of the Utah Uniform
Securities Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1 to -30 (1989). The
securities involved were the promissory notes the AFCO
investors received from AFCO in return for their
investments. 6 The funds used to make those investments came
from the second mortgage loans Home made to the investors.
Home's status as a seller of securities arose from the grant of
25. Aetna's trading exclusion argument was presented to the
trial court in a motion for summary iudcrment, which was denied.
26 . The Armi taae iurv w^s ilp" inn t'u'-t-ed t-ipr n,e trust deeds
received by Home fo secure the AFCO investor l^ans^were not^
securities.
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nr.hJ0anS;,,Mit!!0i!t "hiCh thS Purchase of the AFCO promissorynotes would not have occurred.
The jury in the AimiUae case also found that Home had
engaged in fraudulent conduct in connection with the purchase
of the%e a.feCurit^ and ^ therefore violated section 0(b)
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule 10b-5
promulgated under that act.
with ThS ^i31 C°Urt hSld bhat Horae's conduct in connection
with securities sales and its status as a seller of securities
rnL ? purP°se of the securities acts violations did not
compel a conclusion that it had tended securities within the
meaning of the rider 6030a tradir, exclusion. Aetna poins out
"di ectl" 6030a.excl^s coverage of losses resulting' °Ut
„ ectly ox indiifictlsr" from trading in securities. Because
Home was indirectly involved in securities trading by vUtue ofits loans to the AFCO investors, Aetna argues tha? the trading
exclusion applies. Based on our understanding of the purpose *
of the trading exclusion, we disagree. purpose
tradin^"S?n/Amf'r7'-F,n FKBJcaaa relates the history of the
The = 9, °" ln b°ndS issued t0 financial institutionsThe exclusion was adopted from stockbrokers' bonds in the 1370s
because financial institutions were becoming increasing y
thin the ^ Th"'163 tlading' which Presents highe ?sksthan the usual business of these institutions. Insurers
believing that the extra risks involved in securities tradinn
the tradino" 'T^ WithOUt °harging "i^r premium .adopted
coverage 9^rrUr°n t0.eliminate such risks from standardcoverage. 579 F.Supp. at 1310 (citing Digest of Bank
Insurance, 35 (3d ed. 1977)). TOI "[ HapKl
that thent^HteS two,cases as authority for the proposition
more than 7? exclusi°" applies where the insured does no
invest ?n IT T67 t0 3 Custoraer wh° then uses that money toinvest in securities. Neither case, however supports the
acceptance of noncertifier) -hecks, , i, h„o,", "n„„"°o
payment for securities it ,.,,u] ,,, ,,: , ' Y Y ' ln
the trading exclusion barred UcoJery' ./"he insureds oTtheirsurety bonds. -n« msureas on their
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Shearson/Amer ican Express and Sutro Bros, involved actual
ownership interests in traded securities by the insured or an
insured's employee. The losses suffered by the insureds were
indirect, in that they did not result from the insured's own
securities speculation, but from unauthorized speculation by an
insured's employee and from the receipt of improper payment for
securities, rather than from market losses suffered by the
insureds. The history of the trading exclusion, related in
Shear son/American Express, indicates that it is intended to
exclude losses resulting from the insured's, or the insured's
employee's, actual investment in securities. It does not
indicate that losses resulting from an insured's customers'
investments are to be excluded.
Other courts have held that the trading exclusion applies
only to on insured's market losses in securities transactions
stemming from market fluctuations. See First Federal Sav. £<
Loan v. Fidelitv S< Deposit Co. of Maryland, 895 F.2d 254,
260-61 (6th Cir. 1990); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Gibralco, ~
Inc., 847 F.2d 530, 533 (9th Cir. 1988). Here, the securities
market losses accrued to Home's loan customers, the AFCO
investors. Home's loss arose only when those disappointed
investors were able to avoid their obligation to repay the
invested funds, as a result of the Armitage judgment.
Aetna points to no case holding the trading exclusion to
apply where the insured did not acguire at least an arguable
ownership interest in securities. Here, Home acquired an
interest only in real estate, by the trust deeds on the AFCO
investors' homes. As such, Home was assuming a routine risk of
a lending institution, not the high risk of securities
speculation to which the trading exclusion is directed.
Gibralco also expresses a sound approach to the trading
exclusion when employee fidelity coverage is implicated:
We do not agree with [the insurer] that
the trading loss exclusion precludes
coverage if a trade occurs anywhere in the
chain of events resulting in a loss to the
insured. The broad applicability of the
trading loss exclusion urged by [the
insurer] would evisoerat-e hhR omp iovee
dishonesty --->-•^ > -> --i ^ <-• • •-Y •Y >m> ^ ••(- '^ p- >i,-1
in every •" ase '"liri \ c ' *-t-i.^ -n Ydy ••>••-••>} r [ ••]
the course •Y '* n eni'1->y«e 's dishonest
scheme.
847 F.2d at 533 .
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Here, Glad's dishonest conduct was the ultimate cause of
Home's loss. Glad's conduct, however, included no
representation that either Glad or Home was engaging in
securities trading in a manner that the trading exclusion is
intended to discourage. The Aetna bond's fidelity loss
coverage should not be defeated by an expansive interpretation
of the trading exclusion. Therefore, we ho Id that Home's loss
is not excluded from coverage by the trading exclusion.
JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Aetna's fifth argument on appeal is that the instructions
given to the jury improperly failed to allow the jury to
consider Home's own mismanagement and poor business judgment as
the cause of its loss. At trial, Aetna elicited voluminous
testimony about Home's alleged mismanagement and bad judgment
in connection with the AFCO investor loans. Aetna argued ._
strenuously that mi smanagement and poor judgment, not employee
dishonesty, caused the AFCO investor loan fiasco.
It is incumbent upon the trial court to instruct the jury
on both parties' theories of the case, so long as competent
evidence has been presented in support of those theories.
Powers v. Gene's Bldq. Materials, Inc., 567 P.2d 174, 176 (Utah
1977); Pacific Chromalox Div. v. Irev, 787 P.2d 1319, 1328
(Utah App. 1990). Utah R. Civ. P. 51 permits appellate review
of jury instructions upon timely, specific objection, or at the
appellate court's discretion:
No party may assign as error the giving or
the failure to give an instruction unless
27. Much of Aetna's argument on this point is devoted to its
argument that Home's recovery under the bond, under an
"equitable apportionment" theory, should be reduced according
to the portion of its loss caused by mismanagement, as opposed
to Glad's dishonesty. Aetna did propose a jury instruction
allowing such apportionment, but the trial court refused to
give that instruction. Aetna did not object to the refusal to
so instruct the jury, nor does it appeal that refusal now. Nor
does Aetna's answer to Home's comcl^int. the stipulated
pretrial order in this ar-M-in, "' ^iivr-hin^ .jI-q ;n ihe record
to which we have been directed, Yi<)i',^|'i HirY "•.etna otherwise
presented its appor tionment then iy t<i the trial court.
Therefore, on appeal, we do not consider jury Instruction
errors related to that theory.
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he objects thereto. In objecting to the
giving of an instruction, a party must
state distinctly the matter to which he
objects and the grounds for his
objection. Notwithstanding the foregoing
requi rement, the appellate court, in its
discretion and in the interests of
justice, may review the giving of or
failure to give an instruction.
Under Rule 51, we first examine the claimed jury instruction
errors to which Aetna objected in the trial court.
Aetna objected to instruction number twenty-nine. In
substance, instruction twenty-nine told the jury that any
negligent failure by Home to prevent Glad's dishonest conduct
was not a defense to coverage under the bond.2^ We do not
perceive Aetna's point on appeal to be related to Home's __
failure to prevent Glad's dishonesty; rather, it is related to""
alleged general mismanagement and poor business judgment in
approving the AFCO investor loans. 9 The thrust of instruction
twenty-nine, however, is limited to Home's failure to prevent
G lad's dishonest conduct. So limited, the instruction properly
28. Instruction 29 reads:
You are instructed that negligence
resulting from the existence of inadequate
policies and procedures at Home Savings,
or the failure to follow policies and
procedures then in place at Home Savings,
is not a defense available to Aetna if the
conclusion drawn therefrom is that better
policies and procedures or adherence
thereto would have checked the dishonesty,
if any, of Larry Glad and prevented a loss
that would otherwise have occurred. A
surety company is not released from
liability by the absence of even ordinary
prudence on the part of the insured in
lessening the risk. The Aetna bond does
not contain any provision to this effect.
29. In its brief, Ae toa •^o >'<--• '>'". u, - f *;W1 'e^ y •"• oiv it used
to show Home 's a J i"ued i"i,.:PrVi-'M'j"i,ji'1 .mil p-" >t "isjn^ss
judgment, and characterizes M|ah Lestun^ny ^s dealing with
matters unrelated ^_o Glad's dishonesty.
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states the general rule that, absent a specific bond provision
to the contrary, an insured's negligent failure to prevent
employee dishonesty is not a defense to fidelity loss
coverage. 13 Couch on rn^urjjncja. 2d § 46:233 (1982); First
STr^T^ff^ 24rKan.576, 769 P.2d 1184, 1193 (1989). Instruction twenty-nine
properly limited Aetna's general mismanagement argument to
mismanagement unrelated to Glad's conduct, and, therefore, was
its DJnf?PrlJS° °^ected to the trial court's refusal to giveits proffered instructions number two and forty-two The
relevant portions of those instructions read as follows:
[Proposed instruction no. two]: If you
find that the losses sustained by Home
Savings were solely and proximately caused
by Home Savings' own mismanagement
misfeasance or other negligence and/or ~
failure to follow safe and sound lending
practices, then you must find there is no
coverage for Home Savings under the bond.
[Proposed instruction no. forty-two]- The
law does not necessarily recognize only
one cause of an injury, consisting of only
one factor, one act, or the conduct of
only one person. To the contrary, the
acts and omissions of two or more persons
may work concurrently as the efficient
cause of an event or loss, and in such a
case, each of the participating acts or
omissions is regarded in the law as a
cause.
In this case, the bond allows coverage
only if Home Savings' loss directly
resulted from the dishonest or fraudulent
acts, if any, of Larry Glad. A direct
result requires a connected sequence
between any act of Larry Glad and the loss
tnat ultimately occurred. if you find
,, - — •~-J«-'l-*i-4.1HJ
tnat a primary contributing r^,^ f-^ f-ho
rsicl Hnmo's I'OSS '.jw U- f-MT,M« ,Y l-}ie
officers ;md .iir.ecf'Ms ,,f n-.,n- snvjnr,s ,-,,
require compliance with appropriate J
lending practices and procedures, and that
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such failure was the primary cause of its
loss, then the loss was not the direct
result of dishonest or fraudulent acts, if
any.
Aetna's theory that Home's losses were caused by
mismanagement and poor business judgment was presented to the
jury in instruction twenty one, which provided in part: "Aetna
also claims . . . that the independent acts and decisions of
Home Savings' management constituted the cause of Home Savings'
loss." Instruction twenty-six similarly advised the jury of
Aetna's view that Home's loss was caused by factors independent
of Glad's dishonesty:
Aetna has asserted as a defense in
this action that the loss Home Savings
sustained in the Armitage litigation
resulted not from the dishonesty of Larry
Glad, but that it directly resulted from a ~
separate and independent cause.
For Aetna to prevail on this
defense, you are instructed that Aetna
must prove the existence of an alternative
cause of Home Savings' loss, i.e.[,] one
separate and independent from Larry Glad's
dishonesty, if any.
Taken together, instructions twenty-one and twenty-six
adequately apprised the jury of Aetna's theory that Home's loss
was caused by mismanagement and bad judgment independent of
Glad's conduct, and invited the jury to find in favor of Aetna
if it agreed with that theory. Instructions two and forty-two,
rejected by the trial court, to the extent they presented the
same theory, were unnecessary; and, in that they presented the
same theory in a longer and more confusing fashion, they were
undesirable. Therefore, it was not error, having given
instructions twenty-one and twenty-six, to refuse to give
instructions two and forty-two.
We now turn to jury instruction arguments presented on
appeal that were not made in the trial court. Aetna asks us to
exercise our discretion, as permitted under Rule 51, to
entertain the merits of these arouments on appeal. An
appellant making such a rouuest -mtc;h: r-^nvi'ice Mie appellate
court that the merits of Y— -Moomcnt- ^h'^ilri be heard. King v.
Feredav, 739 P.2d ^18. 6:.' ("f Y iriR7).
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specia^ra^for^ consistftfT C°ndenSed int° *jury answered in Home •s £avor \J questions, which the
verdict form was defective fn fh ar9USS that the sPecial
a manner that unfairly flvored h™ °neYuestlon »as Phrased i,
proposed by Aetna wa;impropIrly Te'ft"ut"of^ qUeStl°n
verdict form.30 F y iett out of the special
»^rsrPK"'Y "j-:~-.S'»r^:so„
verdict form to the r i °Wn Pr°P°se<3 special
acknowledges that if* C°Vrt' Additionally, Aetna
involvement in draftina tho » ,' Aetna's central
ample opportunity to pLserv^obiect^^1^ £0rm 93Ve Aet™
objections^ a^r -^ ^^^d £ &f22th°"
OFFSET OF DAMAGES
loan "i^ip^fsho2irbehoa!^^ &? ?^ ^ ^^
says „orae recouped on the loans. &leforftr7al™ ^Trt^s"'
30.
a^.-=s;s^
s any differently than
so we apply that
verdict argument
ru£ infr"Cti°^ "nder Utah R Civ. T Si"
rule and lts related case law to the special
the
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had agreed that the jury would decide which of the loans fell
within the bond's coverage, and that the trial court would then
calculate Home's loss accordingly. However, the factual
question of whether the return of certain loan outlays to Home
amounted to a recoupment was neither submitted to the jury nor
ieserved for the court .
Aetna's characterization 0£ the $237,760.77 as a
recoupment on the loans, and thus a reduction of the loss
sustained by Home, was not made until after the jury's verdict
on Aetna's liability was returned. The characterization is
based on an exhibit and testimony received by the jury, but the
jury was never asked to apply this evidence to determine
whether Aetna's characterization was factually correct.^^
Indeed, we are not directed to anything in the record
indicating that Aetna ever made sn offset-of-loss argument to
the jury.
The trial court noted that while some of the evidence may""
have supported Aetna's argument, it could not make a fact
finding based on that evidence, where Home had not waived its
right to have the jury consider it. We agree. "All questions
of fact, where the trial is by jury . . . are to be decided by
the jury, and all evidence is to be addressed to them, except
when otherwise provided." Utah Code. Ann. § 78-21-2 (1987).
Therefore, Aetna is not entitled to an offset of the damages
sustained by Home on the AFCO investor loans.
LEGAL FEES AND COSTS
Aetna finally argues that legal fees incurred by Home in
the Armitage litigation should not be recoverable under the
32. Home strenuously objects to Aetna's characterization of
the partial return of the loan outlays as an offset of Home's
loss, arguing that the $237,760.77 did not diminish that loss,
but simply averted other losses. Although we affirm the
refused offset on the basis of Aetna's failure to submit the
issue to the jury, we note that Home's characterization appears
to be correct. It does not appear that any of the loan outlays
returned to Home cons t ifM ted reravmenf nf Y° investors' debts,
wh ich won Id have <edu fed "• ,,re ' ' ' •"••-. 'o•• • <>-• •Y •"• ^ tn a '~ exhibit
reflects that fhp i»iii' •o the -..> h.,,,,<..ri '.,,,, '•i-w]s •_.,as applied
toward satisfaction of a d^b*- '"^'1 'U rec*- ly 'o Home by AFCO,
toward the recission of Y-/o Y>-/esfor- loans that did not become
the subject of litigation, and to certain refunds to AFCO.
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bond. The fooS fall • . ,
*<"-™-™.U" we Ser't^ tfof-f/^—-} "^ °
^na^rsT^ tnl* T^ot co^rV™^ P^tirrs,
exclusion. Because we have alread^f U"der the b°"d's trading
«c usion does not bar ci, 6 rHo^'fr that ^ *»* "|
fails. Next, Aetna argues that thl ^ ! S loss' this argument
or the Arrnitaae judgment against Home 0neSt 3CtS ^ponsioTebut statutory, ,nalum u^hlhllnm rrT^ Were n0t m-a-1^ in S£,
- bond's fidelity-i^f™ Th^ ^ lncl^edYitt n
^onesty, but ny-^ine K^n" cause,, not^Cla^T .
AFCO investors' Loan agreements dlshonest backdating of the*
Reese backdated the documents at r? h?USS °f evide«« that
argument is also unpersuasive » ^ S di^ction, this
egal fees that were awarded to the "a" ^f P3y the $"0,647.31
Home because these fees were part „>OV^f^ Plaintiffs against
a* a result of that lawsuit f the loss sustained by Home
Cof the'bonrrndem^ifie's Ho'e'fo? *7f^' General Agreement
attorneys' fees incurred on Utt C0Sts and reasonabledamage which, if establish ', ' account of any loss 1 !
rnn,HL„. KscaDlished against t-h= • ubs' claim or
constitute a valid and collerMhi2 , lnsured, would
Insured under the terms of th,sh i°SS sustained by the
one of the seven causes of action" 1 Aet"a 3^ues that only
covered loss under the bond and th" hjmii^^ represents a Y
under General Agreement C should "! ?' ltS obligationthe stipulated total, i.^ ^ s^To.^ *° °—enth
we disagree.
the armiaae Plaintiffs the am0Unt °"ginal]77St
3 3
"y the axm^p,^^"
SaV-s~ ^P^i---;:,-- -— as Home,
this %; "V 'J0US '"•'"' »'-""'^ d,lh 7 '°"'•"»•' M,= ,ight h,thlS am°unt. •'"' '" '=r;„,.or „ly portion of
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As noted by the trial court, Aetna 's "one-seventh" formula
is over 1y mechanistic and reflects no examination of the actual
allocation of attorney time and effort among the seven causes
of act ion. Add it ionally, Aetna"s formula turns on various
arguments, already rejected here and by the trial court, that
some of the seven causes of action are not covered by the
bond. These arguments cannot be resurrected to reduce the fees
due under Genera I Ag reement C.
Finally, the stipulated total reasonable defense fees,
$'43 7,500.00, was decided upon after the trial court rejected
's "one-seventh" formula. In the stipulation, Aetna
ifically reserve[d] the right to appeal the issue of
er Home Savings is entitled to any attorneys' fees, if it
termined that Aetna owed no obligation to provide coverage
Aetna
" s pec
wheth
is de
under the Bond." (Emphasis added.) Because we have determined
fhat Aetna Ls_ obligated to provide coverage under the bond, it
appears that, under the stipulation, Aetna has waived its right
appeal whether any attorney fees are due.I- n
In sum, the legal fees awarded to the Armitage plaintiffs
against Home and the stipulated amount expended by Home in its
defense of the Armitage litigation are both covered under the
bond, and are to be reimbursed by Aetna.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's judgment in
favor of Home Savings is affirmed in all respects.
£^C 7~
Famela T. Greenwood, Judge
I CONCUR:
•Tudi th M . Pi 11 inus . t,
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HENCH, Presiding Judge (dissenting):
The majority holds that there i
phrase "discovery of loss" as it is
and "discovery of loss" as it used t
requirements. The majority thereby
totally novel, interpretation of dis
significant departure from current i
believe that, under the terms of the
to Home for any loss resulting from
the Armitage lawsuit. Any coverage
the Armitage lawsuit must be found u
Aetna bond. Home is simply seeking
insurer. r therefore respectful1yd
s a distinction between the
used to determine coverage
o t rigger notice
adopts a minority, if not a
covery bonds and demands a
ndustry practices. I
bond, Aetna is not liable
the dishonesty of Glad or
for the loss arising from
nder the F&D bond, not the
recovery from the wrong
issent.
The loss was not discovered during Aetna's bond period for
any one of three reasons: (1) Rider 6091 expressly provides
that discovery includes potential losses; (2) even without the
nder, a loss arising from liability created by the dishonesty*
of an employee may be discovered when the employee's dishonest
conduct is discovered, though the liability has not yet been
adjudicated; and, (3) under the majority's own rule that a loss
may not be discovered until it is sustained, the Armitage loss
could not have been discovered during the bond period because
it was not sustained until after the effective period of the
bond .
The loss also was not covered because it fell within the
exclusion found in Section 11 of the bond. Section 11 excludes
from coverage all employees previously known to have committed
a dishonest act.
Home also should be barred from seeking recovery for any
damages resulting from the Armitage lawsuit because it did not,
as required by statute, disclose in its application the pending
Arrrutaqe claim, a material fact regarding the hazard assumed by
Aetna. J
In view of the foregoing arguments, any one of which
should be dispositive, I dissent without opinion as to -he
other issues addressed by the majority with the exception of
the offset issue. Even if the loss were covered by the bond,
the majority errs in not remanding r-h i^ case for consideration
of the offset of damages f-:-no - <",-o Y
reserved the issu>-> <> f
court rather than the
determined without addressing any claimed offset.
r:""D "''"''"' '" bo iod'".^ load express
''•'in.vipc; r.. i -'•>( o,r„ ;M;n» Ymi by i- he trial
inr. y. n,ainauoo simply may not be
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I. CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
The majority either misapplies or ignores the following
recognized rules of contract interpretation.
"The cardinal rule is to give effect to the intentions of
the parties, and, if possible, to glean those intentions from
the contract itself." G.G.A., Inc. v. Leventis, 773 P.2d 841,
845 (Utah App. 1989). S_£e_ also LPS Hospital v. Capitol Life
Ins. Ccu, 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988) (applying the same
principle to an insurance contract). "A construction which
contradicts the general purpose of the contract ... is
presumed to be unintended by the parties." LPS Hospital. 765
P.2d at 859 (quoting Phil Schroeder, Inc. v. Royal Globe Ins.
Co_^, 99 Wash.2d 65, 659 P.2d 509, 511 (1983)).
"In interpreting a contract, we determine what the parties
intended by examining the entire contract and all of its oarts^
in relation to each other, giving an objective and reasonable
construction to the contract as a whole." G.G.A., 773 P.2d at
845 (citing Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1107-08 (Utah
1982)) (emphasis added). S_g_e also Western Surety Co. v.
Murupjhy., 754 P.2d 1237, 1240 (Utah App. 1988) (applying the same
rule to a surety bond). "Where questions arise in the
interpretation of an agreement, the first source of inquiry is
within the document itself. It should be looked at in its
entirety and in accordance with its purpose. All of its parts
should be given effect insofar as that is possible." Big
Cottonwood Tanner Pitch Co. v. Salt Lake City. 740 P.2d 1357,
1359 (Utah App. 1987) (citation omitted).
"[I]t is axiomatic that a contract should be interpreted
so as t0 harmonize all of its provisions and all of its terms,
which terms should be given effect if it is possible to do
so-" LPS Hospital/ 765 P.2d at 858 (emphasis added). Courts
may not view a subparagraph of a policy in isolation to
determine if it is ambiguous; all provisions of a policy must
be interpreted together as one contract. Village Inn
Apartments v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.. 790 P.2d 581, 583
(Utah App. 1990) (citing 2 G. Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance
Law § 15.29 (rev. ed. 1984)); c_f. Drauahon v. CUNA Mut. Ins.
SoCy, 771 P-2d 1105, 1108 n.3 (Utah App. 1989) (reviewing
particular provisions in their overall context often aids
interpretation).
"Unless there is some ambiguity '.it uncertainty in the
language of the policy, it should be enforced according to its
890101-CA 43
terms. We presume that the language used ... was included
for the purpose stated and [we will] give effect to its usual
and ordinary meaning." Bear River Mut. m,, Co. v. Wrinhi- '770
P.2d 1019, 1020 (Utah App. l^iTtcTTttions omit ted)
Contract language may be ambiguous if it
is unclear, omits terms, or if the terms
used to express the intention of the
parties may be understood to have two or
more plausible meanings. A policy term is
not ambiguous, however, merely because one
party assigns a different meaning to it in
accordance with his or her own interests.
Village Inn Apartments, 790 P.2d at 583 (citations omitted).
In determining whether a provision is capable
more plausible meanings, such interpretations must
upon the "usual and natural" meaning of the languaq
may not be the result of a "forced or strained cons
Buehrier. Block Co , v, HWr.Assag^, 752 P.2d 892, 896(gating AutQ lease Co, y. Central Mut. Tnr, m, 7
336, 325 P.2d 264 (1958)). "Contract terms are not
ambiguous simply because one party seeks to endow t
different meaning than that relied upon by the draf
Bjjefrner Block rn,, 752 P.2d at 895. £££ also
611 P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 1980) ("contract provisions
rendered ambiguous merely by the fact that the part
diverse interpretations.").
of two or
be based
e used and *
truction."
(Utah 1988)
Utah 2d
necessarily
hem with a
t e r . "
v. HinJjle.,
are not
ies urge
An insurance "policy should be interpreted in accordance
with the way it would be understood by the average person
purchasing insurance." W&Mn^iXAl, 765 P.2d a 859 ^
^Kf' 7?1 P-2d at l108- The test for determininf\he
iS^^oSrt'L^^Jo^T C°ntraCt haS ^ Stat6d ^ theVah
Would the meaning [of the language of the
insurance contract] be plain to a person
of ordinary intelligence and
understanding, viewing the matter fairly
and reasonably, in accordance with the
usual and natural meaning of the words,
and in_ light of the circumstances,
including the p" rprY^_Yf_ __L! ie vol icy.
Id. at 858-59 (quoting Auto Lease Co.. 325 P.2d at(emphasis added). S^ <Oz<l Wagner v. Farmar* r1ff
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266)
Exch 786
r.2d 763, 765 (Utah App. 1990) ("we examine the language from
the viewpoint of the average purchaser of insurance").
Farties to an insurance policy "are free to define the
exact scope of the policy's coverage and may specify the losses
or encumbrances the policy is intended to encompass." Valley
Bank S. Trust Co. v. U.S. Life Title Ins. Co.. 776 P.2d 933," 936
(Utah App. 1989) (quoting Brown v. St. Paul Title Ins. Corp..
634 F. 2d 1103, 1107 (8 th Cir. 1980)).
An insurer has the right to contract with
an insured as to the risks it will or will
not assume, as long as neither statutory
law nor public policy is violated. Thus
an insurer may include in a policy any
number or kind of exceptions and
limitations to 'which an insured will agree
unless contrary to statute or public
policy. »
Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call. 712 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1985).
Despite the liberal interpretations often afforded the
insured in insurance contracts, "[i]t is not the function of a
court to rewrite an unambiguous contract." Crowther v. Carter,
767 P.2d 129, 132 (Utah App. 1989) (citing Provo City Corp. v.
Neilsen Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1979)). "In
construing fidelity bonds, courts follow the liberal rules
applicable to insurance contracts. However, the bond cannot be
extended by implication or enlarged by construction beyond the
actual terms of the agreement entered into by the parties."
FDIC v. Aetna Casualty St Surety Co., 426 F.2d 729, 736 (5th
Cir. 1970).
These express contract provisions are not
rendered ambiguous merely because
appellant claims they should be
interpreted other than according to their
plain meaning. . . . [Wle will not iniect
ambiguity into a contract where none
exists in order to save fa party] from
what, in retrospect, seems an ill-advised
agreement.
Crowther . 767 F.;:d at ]:: '-mph io io udo.i). -^ ai~rj Valley
Bank & Trust Co . , 7 76 p .yi a t ,] ^7 .
The unambiguous language of the Aetna bond must therefore
be enforced as written, even if the result is that the loss is
not covered by the Aetna bond.
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r i. DISCOVERY OF LOSS
While this appears to be the first time Utah courts have
been called upon to interpret the effect hdVe
^ltn^es^^^15-n57^ "ot "°ve'l. ?f The^orH
of law that al?nores industry practice and adopts a novel£ law that a loss may not be discovered until the actual
damages resulting from the liability are determined
y
rule
The majority's interpretation of the bond is contrary to
di iew it as a part of the contract as a whole A n.rrh^pr
discov"yrya^^h:SUld reaS?nab1^ -terp.et the def? tl uiscovery, attached as new lanquaqe
definition of discovery as that t
on
in Section 4, as the
erm is used throughout the
1- "A discovery provision
losses discovered [during
enforceable. The contract
parties have plainly writt
Manufacturers Casualty Tns
19 59).
in a bond limiting liability to"
the termj of the bond is valid and
must be construed the way the
en lt-" Wachovia Rank s. Tm^'r^,
--XQ_u, 171 F.Supp. 369, 375 (M.D.N.C
A provision o
clearly limit
insurer to lo
certain speci
enforced acco
there can be
bond if the 1
within the ti
13 Couch on Insurance 2d,
f a fidelity bond which
s the liability of the
sses discovered within a
fied period must be
rding to its terms, so that
no recovery on a fidelity
oss is not discovered
me specified therein.
§ 46.191 (1982 ed.).
The Underwriter, in consideration of an
agreed premium, and subject to the
Declarations made a part hereof, the
General Agreements, Conditions and
Limitations and other terms of this Bond
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:-H th r^esp_ec t
-1 it •ll1y
_ _ _ H, ,nr]
'' harmless the
osses I .
bond. Even if Rider 6091 did not exist, the majority's
interpretation is a clear departure from the established case
law which is in fact consistent with the definition of
discovery found in Rider 6091.
If, on the other hand, a loss may not be discovered unt11
it is fully adjudicated, as held by the majority, then the loss
claimed by Home in this case still could not have been
discovered during the Aetna bond period because the Armitage
judgment was not entered until after the Aetna bond period had
expired. So the Armitage loss was discovered either before the
Aetna bond period, as I propose, or after the Aetna bond
period, as the majority's analysis dictates, but it was not
discovered during the Aetna bond period.
A. Rider 6091
The bond clearly states that both coverage and the
procedural requirements of Section 4 are triggered by the *
discovery of a loss. Discovery is defined in the bond by means
of Rider 6091, which states in relevant part:
The attached bond is further amended by
inserting the following as the final
paragraph of Section 4:
Discovery occurs when the
Insured becomes aware of facts which
would cause a reasonable person to
assume that a loss covered by the
bond has been or will be incurred
even though the exact amount or
details of loss may not be then
known. Notice to the insured of an
actual or potential claim by a third
party which alleges that the insured
is liable under circumstances,
which, if true, would create a loss
under this bond constitutes such
discovery.
I believe the foregoing definition of discovery applies
throughout the bond and is disdos it- ive of f-|Ys appeal. The
definition clearly permit--: ^ ^<? u ;<:f •,-•,- r-,- •' > p- *- oM t- ig1 Y_is s
that "will be inci rred e""n ';" ••' ••>h *ho !- " ~" 'l -'jm' -m nf •*• x. details
of loss may not then be kn"wn." th" >iHe r <1 so states that
mere notice from a third patty of a potentia 1 claim of
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liability, such as the ArmlUas lawsuit, would constitute
iscoyery. There can be no serious dispute, under the
definition found in Rider 6091, that Home had discovered i
I'-'Ss prior to the effective period of Aetna's bond ts
Thepffect of no I improperly strains to limit theCh ^fer r'°91 to only Section 4. It does so despite the£*f that thereis absolutely n° indication in the rider
the definition is m any way limited. Not only is the
.najonty'smterpretation contrary to the plain la
nder it is contrary to the rules of contract
and the language of the bond.
that
nguage of the
interpretation
rule re,e,rdlngriIVd^^hnlo^"^ ""'"^ t0 °Ur ™1
references, and other
contract of
sements, riders, marginal
writings which constitute a part of the
§ 15:30) .J
'he contract^i^386 (1984) Thi* ?« ? C0UCh on Tn.siirqnre. 2d, § 4:27
^iiv^iix ii i£\z%£ ^dr adds anew and
the majority. xd. at 386-87. '
Standard policy laws sometimes expressly
authorize the attachment of slips or
nr h ^° ^0ntracts of insurance in a formprovided thereby, so as to modify the
provisions in the body of the policy, and
where such a rider is properly
pursuant to sm--
part of t- [.,o
original
1 CQUCh on Insuranro 7,1 § 4 Q
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bank's claim, pointing out that the rider was merely a more
exp1icit restatement of the presumption that any losses
discovered prior to the bond period were not covered.
Similarly, the definition of discovery added by means of Rider
6091, like the rider in Royal Trust Bank, is a consistent, but
more explicit, statement of what constitutes discovery as it is
used throughout the whole bond.
Rider 6091 amends "[t]he attached bond" to include new and
additional language under Section 4. The majority erroneously
assumes that the rider is limited to the notice provision found
in Section 4 because the instructions on the bottom of the
rider indicate that the rider is to "revise sections 12 and
4." The fact that the rider "revises" Section 4 to add a new
paragraph, however, in no way indicates that the effect of the
new paragraph is limited to Section 4. The reference is merely
to the location, not to the effect. There is absolutely no
indication in Rider 6091 that the definition is a purely
procedural provision, as assumed by the majority. The
definition of discovery becomes a new and additional part of
the bond's Conditions and Limitations which, by the express
terms of the bond, determine the extent of coverage offered.4
Thus, by the bond's own consistent internal references to
applicability, the discovery definition added to Section 4
applies to both the procedural aspects of Section 4, and the
substantive aspects of coverage. S_e_£, e.g. , Home Life Ins. Co.
4. The bond's insuring claus
general applicability of the
Limitations, of which Section
insuring clause reads in part
Underwriter, in consideration
t3_the Declarations made a pa
Conditions and Limitations an
with the insured ....*'
The bond reiterates the
of page four which contains t
the bond. Page four reads, a
FOREGOING INSURING AGREEMENTS
SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING COND
Rider 5538 also provides
attached bond shall be subiec
limitations and condition'-; o r_
modi tied." The ma \ n i; \ * -.-
the discovery definition
it from applying fo t-h.e
e is explicit with regard to the
contract's Conditions and
4 is a key provision. The
, with my emphasis: "The
of an agreed premium, and subi ect
rt hereof, the General Agreements,
d other terms of this Bond- agrees
foregoing incorporation at the top
he conditions and limitations of
gain with my emphasis: "THE
AND GENERAL AGREEMENTS ARE
ITIONS AND LIMITATIONS."
, with my emphasis, that "the
f to all "hs agreements,
'" o O t" ;i '- h e '. e i. M o v- p |- a c; q
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•'- ''• :noiji f lea t i on" of
that wou Id prevent
v..-Clay, 13 Kan. App. 2d 435, 773 P. 2d 666, 677 (1989) ("The
definition pf discovery clearly acts as a limitation on
coverage")."
Given the fact the bond contains only one definition of
discovery, and there is no limitation of that definition, a
purchaser of the bond would reasonably interpret Rider 6091 as
providing the definition of "discovery" to be used throughout
the bond. The majority presents no other plausible
interpretation of the bond that would render Rider 6091 and its
application ambiguous. The definition of discovery found in
Rider 6091 should therefore be applied to questions of coverage
as an unambiguous term of the bond.
The languag
cone lusion. Fir
as a new and sep
severa 1 topics,
legal proceeding
represented by t
to these topics
example, the ins
of the loss as s
file a proof of
loss, and (3) br
months after the
e of Section 4 itself supports such a
st of all, the discovery definition was added
arate paragraph to Section 4 which covers
including notice of loss, proof of loss, and ^
s. It is not limited to notice provisions as
he majority. Each of the time periods .relating
begin when a loss is "discovered." For
ured must (1) provide the insurer with notice
oon as practicable after it is discovered, (2)
loss within six months of the discovery of
ing suit under the bond within twenty-four
loss is discovered. Section 4 also grants an
5. The majority attempts to distinguish Royal Trust Bank a
Home Life Insurance by claiming that the Section 4 in those
cases differed substantially from the Section 4 in the pres
bond. The language used in those cases, however, is virtua
identical to the language used in the present case if one 1
at the insuring clause and Section 4 together, as we must w
looking at the Aetna bond as a whole. The majority asserts
that the language regarding coverage immediately preceding
definition of discovery in the Royal Bank bond enlarged the
context in which the definition was given, whereas the ;oca
of the definition in the present case, i.e., in a section
discussing procedural aspects, limited the definition to it
immediate context. Section 4 in its entirety, however, by
express terms of the bond, must also be interpreted in the
greater context of what constitutes discovery for purposes
coverage. See note ?. 'Die 'bf j. ni|iot! t-ilt3, uf ,,, « applies
throughout the bond and is urY )irn it«d >o iis ;mmediate
context. See Draughpn, 77]. p.u] nt iins M. 3 (review
in overall context).
nd
ent
lly
ooks
hen
the
t ion
s
the
of
provisions
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extension of time to begin legal proceedings to recover under
the hond if the insured is attempting to recover on account of
a judgment against the insured. [f an insured seeks recovery
-_ n account of a judgment, as does Home, the insured has
twenty-four months following the final entry of the judgment
before it must begin legal proceedings against Aetna. If, as
the majority holds, a loss could not have been discovered prior
to the entry of the Armitaae judgment, then why does the bond
expressly provide an extension for claims arising on account of
such a judgment 7
In order to hold Aetna liable, the majority ignores our
obligation to enforce unambiguous terms and reads ambiguity
into the contract by adopting an unprecedented rule of contract
interpretation. For the first time in this state, a court has
held that if a definition is not contained in a specific
section outlining general definitions, the definition will only
affect the section of the contract where it is located. The ^
majority offers absolutely no support for this new and
obviously flawed rule. Such a rule will create disharmony in
contracts by reguiring more than one definition of key terms
that are used in more than one section of a contract, but which
are not defined in a general definition section. It would
create confusion in interpreting contracts if the contractual
definition agreed to by the parties would be effective only
within a single section while a different common-law definition
would be effective throughout the remainder of the contract.6
The correct rule is that a definition given to a term in
one section of a contract, even though it is not in the general
definition section, applies throughout the contract so that the
6. In the present case, "discovery of loss" means discovery of
a ^gss^ble JQ55 in Section 4, but by virtue of the majority's
holding, it means discovery of the actual damages throughout
the rest of the bond. The problem in this approach is readily
recognized when one considers that even as the majority
pronounces the rule, it violates it. Despite its express
rejection of the possibility of discovering a potential loss
under the case law, the majority interprets "discovery of loss"
to mean the discovery of a potential loss when considering
indemnification for attorney fees. But in tho present case,
the provision regarding afV1' n<>v f<><v: j- 1<><• »\ .>d j_n Sect ion C
of the Genera 1 Au re^men1- s, r"-f s— •*- Ymi i -. f 'he 'Yuidi tions and
Limitations whero *- he "p^en'-bTi ]*<•-,-•• riofiniM-m of discovery
is located.
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term will be interpreted consistently throughout. S_ej-, -^
Wagner,^- Farmers Ins_^^xcJY , 786 P. 2d at 765 (applying
definitions found in various sections of the insurance contract
;? 'Jther sections of the contract). Qf. Draughon. 771 P.2d at
1108 n.3 (reviewing particular provision in overall context
often aids interpretation); Western Surety Co.. 754 P Yj at
1240 ("the primary rule ... is to determine what the parties
intended by looking at the entire contract and all of its parts
,?n^eno^°n t0 Gach 0ther • • •" quoting S^aiS., 655 P.2d at
liU /- (Jo ) .
The usual and natural meaning of the term "discove- " s
it applies to the present case, is "to obtain for the fir
tirne_ sight or knowledge." Webster's Third New Internatmr
Dixii.^arj£__a[nabric^^) 647 (1986). The majority, however
concludes that the loss may be discovered twice, t-herebv
contradicting the plain meaning of the word "discover "'
Contrary to the majority's blanket assertion that it is
harmonizing the terms of the bond, it is clear that the
majority has created considerable disharmony and confusYn
where none had previously existed.
The majority errs in not applying to the question of
coverage the definition of discovery provided in Rider 6091
The clear intention of the parties as set forth in the insuring
hh , ?L ^Vlder' and throughout the remainder of the bond is
that the definition apply throughout the entire bond By
limiting the effect of Rider 6091 to Section 4, the majority
./a" t *CtL rrritten the b0nd in order t0 create coverageunder Aetna s bond when, by the express agreement of the
parties, none exists.'
• ,he majority also fails to acknowledge that Home has the
burden of proving that the himiXms. loss was discovered within
if n.1!^6^ °t Aetna's bond "ther than the F&D bond.
to APtn* Tf .er" u^ S mSt ltS bUrden th3t the bUrde" shifts
whPn ^n • „W1f S t0 raiSe any "Elusions as a defense.When an insured claims a right to recover under a policy The
insured must F y 1nH
bring himself within the field therein
defined .... He then has brought
himself within the policy, and the terms
thereof hav^ heen m^t . who,, h-
brings himself hi.Hmm »(><> in--:uYng <lanse
he has made his case . . . ^nd anv
exceptions or conditions which would tn«n
deny him relief, take him out of the
indemnity provisions, render them
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B. Majority's Departure From Established Case aw
rven in the absence
interpretation of ^Qh
of Pider 6091, the majority's
Aetna's bond is contrary to the
well-established case law holding that a loss is discovered on
"the date the fraud was discovered by the bank--not the date
the bank was called upon to make the loss good." FDIC v. Aetna
Casualty s< Surety Cg.. -426 F.2d 729, 739 (5th Cir. 1970)
1quoting Mount Ve rnon 3ank & Trust Co. v. Aetna Casualty s,
Surety Co., 224 F.Supp. 666, ^70 (E.D. Vir. 1963)). In
general, a loss is deemed discovered when "the insured acquires
knowledge of any fraudulent or dishonest act resulting in
loss. " USLIFE Sav, & Loan Ass'n v. National Surety Corn. , 115
Cal. App. 3d 336, 171 Cal. Rptr. 393, 399 (1981). See.
generally., American Surety Co. v. Pauly, 170 U.S. 133, 18 S.
Ct. r- 52, 557 (1898); American Surety Co. v. Pauly, 170 U.S.
160, 18 S. Ct. 563, 564 (1898); Perkins v. Clinton State Bank.
593 F.2d 327, 333-34 (8th Cir. 1979); United States Fidelity &
Gua.r^_Cc1. v. Empire State Bank. 448 F.2d 360, 366 (8th Cir.
1?71 >' Midden Splendor Mining Co. v. General Ins. Co. of
America, 370 F.2d 515, 517 (10th Cir. 1966); Alfalfa Elec.
COOP- v. Travelers Indem. e.g.. 376 F.Supp. 901, 906 (W.D. Okl.
1973); National Newark and Essex Bank v. American Ins. Co., 76
N.J. 64, 385 A.2d 1216, 1224 (19 78); Jefferson State Bank s.
Trust Co. v. Central Surety St Ins. Corp., 408 S.W.2d 825, 831
(Mo. 1966) .
The majority strains to distinguish the foregoing cases
without presenting any cases in support of its position. No
other case has taken the approach that a loss may be discovered
(Footnote 7 continued)
inoperative as to him, are matters of
defense, and the burden thereof rests on
the insurer.
LPS Hospital/ 765 P.2d at 859 (quoting Browning v. Eguit
Life Assurance Soc'y. 94 Utah 570, 573-75, 80 P.2d 348,
(1938) ) .
The language at issue is found in the insuring clau
itself which defines the field within which Home must es
its case. The majority nevertheless treaty (-he definiti
discovery as if it w»r <=> -^u ^yi'i^Mii. tn i.-,,-» »- he def i
of d isco very is paiYy -mom t:: r. -i y ri,u iMiniu,, ♦ h<M efo re lie
Home to show that the loss '••"n r" d is^-'-»r ed during Aetna 's
period. There is no pr esumpf i-ui against Aetna on that i
_ab_i_e_
3 5 0-51
se
tablish
o n o f
n 11 ion
s u p o n
b o n d
s sue.
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more than once. The majority must strain to distinguish the
case law because it misunderstands the term "loss."^
re two types of loss covered by fidelity bonds-
insured immediately parts with its property as a
t of employee dishonesty as in cases of theft or
; and (2) when an insured incurs liability due to
ty of an employee which eventually causes an
ay damages, such as the liability incurred by Home
' ^ Jefferson Bank &Trust Co. y. Central .g,,r04-Y
,408 S.W.2d 825, 830-31 (Mo. 1966). The Aetna
fies Home against both types of losses. £ee_ id
lsions regarding potential losses and provisions
of defense indicate that a bond covers liability).
The trial court and the majority treat this case as if the
oss were an immediate parting with property. In such cases
it is obvious that the parting must occur in order to be
parting^ n"" <=?**> *°«™* • ^oes not involve an immediate^liab t Property-it involves a loss arising out of Home's
' ty to *he borrowers created by Glad's dishonesty. The
Amitaofl court voided the trust deeds and promissory notes and
he' ruth tn tend" beC?USe H°me V1°lated the securities laws andIht ^th-in-lending laws. In other words, Home was liable t0
HoLbgrarnt:rt^rio^nsr9l0SS^ """" °f th" ~ ^^h°
th.h Ihl Taj°rity ZeemS Puzzled that the cases merely "assume"
estab ishedSS Th" sustained, even if damages were not yet
h!ln ^ . S Cases seem merely to assume that the loss has
rreateS'bv1^-^"118? *l0SS that ?riSeS fr0m l^biltty *created by a dishonest employee is, in fact, sustained when the
There a
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in this case
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L T1^ mal°^jY and the trial court repeatedly indicatl^^
the Aetna bond was intended to cover any »loss sustained"
bond Af-1055"' 3nd 7et those terms neJer eM a „a-
and the triaiaconrtnh ^ 'he insurin^ clause, the majestyfirst wnrHnf court have selectively combined "loss" with the
taken the word^ I*'*5* f°llowin* it, i.e., "sustained" and
sustained " ° context to create the term "loss
9. The bond itse If indicaf e-- 'hnf
the resulting legal damages, >b,Y
6041 provides that Aetna js ,>Miv i
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misconduct occurs, not when the actual damages are determined.
Seje_, e.g. , FDIC v. Aetna, 426 F.2d at 735 (FDIC disposed of
nonconforming notes after the termination of bond period and
suffered a net loss of $408,362.97). The loss is sustained
when the dishonest act is committed, not when a court makes the
factual and legal determination that the act was committed and
the insured is therefore liable for damages. The misconduct
that creates a covered loss is complete when it is performed,
not when the damages from such misconduct are adjudicated.
Liability is therefore "sustained" at the time of the
misconduct, not at the time of final judgment. The
loss/liability may therefore be "discovered" at any time
following the occurrence of the misconduct.
The receipt of a claim against the insured, or the
discovery of misconduct that may subject the insured to a
claim, constitutes discovery of a loss.
whether the Bank actually discovers
dishonesty or actually incurs a loss is,
however, completely irrelevant. A loss is
"discovered" within the meaning of the
loss provisions of the Bond when the
insured party discovers facts sufficient
to create a condition in which the insured
might be subjected to a claim against
which it is indemnified by the Bond.
FAxst Nat'l Bank of Bowie v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New
York, 634 F.2d 1000, 1005 (5th Cir. 1981).
The cases clearly establish that it is the receipt of a
claim against the insured based upon employee dishonesty, not
the adjudication of that claim, that constitutes discovery of
the loss. £££ Jefferson Bank. 408 S.W.2d at 831 ("the time of
discovery of loss mentioned in the bond is not intended to be
the time when a claim of the depositor or customer is
established ultimately by entry of judgment."); see also
Perkins v. Clinton State Bank. 593 F.2d 327, 336 (8th Cir.
1979) (bank discovered loss when served with complaint).
Once employee misconduct is discovered, or a claim is
presented against the insured based on th» mi^c^nduct, the loss
has been discovered. "bribe t;-no ,,f ^ Y-^-->--^' -,- <y Yi» risk
insured against is wben the b?.,k must re-iv^b'v have known and
recognized that fthe claimant 1 had suffered a Y-ss and that
[the claimant] apparently intended to attempt to hold the bank
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liable for such loss." Jefferson Bank, 408 S.W.2d at 832. See.
also FDIC v. Aetna, 426 F.2d at 739 (the well established rule
is that discovery occurs when the insured has "acquired
knowledge of some specific fraudulent or dishonest act which
might involve the [Insurer] in liability for the misconduct").
The majority correctly reasons that the loss element
cannot be satisfied by means of a "possible loss" and that a
possible loss is not compensable. What the majority fails to
realize, however, is that the two preconditions to coverage as
established in the insuring clause by the phrases "sustained at
any time" and "discovered during the bond period," each relate
to a separate and distinct condition of recovery. "Sustained
at any time" is the requirement that there must in fact be an
actual out-of-pocket loss before any compensation will be
paid. "Discovered during the bond period," on the other hand,
determines who out of the possible insurers will pay
compensation if an actual loss in fact occurs. The two
inquiries are totally separate and distinct. ""
The majority erroneously concludes that the issue of who
will indemnify an insured cannot be determined before the issue
of whether the insured is emtitled to indemnification is
decided. This is simply inconsistent with the insurance
industry practice that the policy in effect at the time the
event occurs provides coverage, even though the extent of that
coverage is still unsettled. For example, if a car driver
causes an accident and then changes to a new insurance company,
there would be no question that the insurance policy in effect
when the accident occurred would be the one to provide
coverage, even though liability had not been adjudicated when
the new policy was purchased.
A fidelity insurer whose policy is in place when a lawsuit
is filed has the right to step in and assume the defense
against the suit because it is that insurer who must indemnify
the insured for any actual damages resulting from the suit.
£££ generally First Nat'l Bank of Bowie. 634 F.2d 1000. If no
actual damages result from the lawsuit then the insured and the
insurer breathe a collective sigh of relief. See, e.g., iA-
The possibility that no damages may actually result from a
lawsuit simply does not prevent an earlier determination of
which of the possible insurers will indemni fy an insured for
those damages if and when they are ^wa rfled .
Coverage is triggered by receipt of a claim against the
insured or by discovery of dishonest conduct because such
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extent of the loss, i.e., the
unknown and required adjudication
new of the Armitage claim, as
st involvement, Home must be
10. The majority's characterization of this case as a
fraudulent/bad loan case is simply erroneous. The loss that
Home is seeking to recover is not the result of Glad's
dishonesty in falsifying the loan applications and causing Home
to lend more to the borrowers than they were able to repay.
The loss is the result of Glad's violations of the
truth-in-lending laws and the securities laws which created
liability for Home. The majority's reliance on
Pacific-Southern Mortgage Trust Co. v. Insurance Co. of North
America, 166 Cal. App. 3d 703, 212 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1985), is
therefore misplaced.
Even if this claim were the result of the issuance of bad
loans, the losses were "sustained" before the Aetna bond was
purchased. The Pacific-Southern court held that "the loss
occurred when the loan defan!fed."
this case had all ^f.-ol^^1 ""Y •:.->»•
foreclosed before Mi" <\e t;i a :" " •' o•'
as Home knew that '^ -ri'-; 0 i"!w'" «:-• •- y
the loans defaulted, one must 'gain
i.d. -
1 M
at ^^'1
•" 11 o r ,
3 , ,.,,,,-
-; n 5 rar*- •-
were discovered during the F^-D bond period.
890101-CA 5 7
The loans in
' • o s s of- b " 1 n g
a sod . I na srnuch
^ he reason why
nc iude that the bosses
£tlTbo^ before it purchased the
Eeri't *nd ™* Hie'AetiaSond prl'TTJ ^^ ^ F*D ^ondHome tor the Armii_ag.e_ loss. Period' Aefcna is not liable to
C.
'•'overage Under Majority's Approach
by becoming an aYuaY'lo^ aT^^ ""fcil lfc " "sustained
HI could be no recovery \ n th by the mai°rity, .....
damages were ascertained alteV the eft* b*Cause the actualbond The bond extension i^lf makes ^ ? PSri°d °f AetAimitaaa loss was not covered *fc °lear that th^
t^ ^.""e pLuLti^rcr t0 H°me in Secti- 12 oE
until August 20, ]986 This e^ "^ fr°m Au9ust 20, 1Q,lts scope and only covert h " ^°n' however, „as Um t^ 1;
i-ses sustained dunnTthe extension p*^. W*'"3* f°r
ea^LsFV-1^---"- »- ^^^r?6 "—"
«Sr=in"inHhne3;od^nt ^^^ i'^M £» " ^
^atement at oral argume^Tb^o^thL^rt •' f°U°Wln"
^^il^tvi^i reLurrd hverdict
s." «e.r«dawrs tr':--r •^s^-9"Cea ln the avoidance of the
to the^rovLio^^rthelect3"13 T^
Period of twelve month, t e Insured athe 20th day a S ^ " =01 a.m. of
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notes and trust deeds, establishing a less
to Home Savings. Now, all parties in this
litigation agree, in the briefs, in
writing, that that is the point at which
Home Saving's loss was established. At
that point it could not recover from the
borrowers, it could not collect from the
trust deeds, and that established the loss.
(Emphasis added.)
tender the majority's approach, the loss was sustained
after the termination of the original bond period. The loss
therefore, was not covered under the limited extension.
III. EFFECT OF GLAD'S DISHONESTY
UNDER SECTION 11 ^
Even if the loss was discovered within the bond period, it
fell under the exclusion provided in Section 11 of the bond
which provides: "This bond shall be deemed terminated or
cancelled as to any Employee--(a) as soon as the insured shall
learn of any dishonest or fraudulent act on the part of such
Employee . . . ." As is evident by the foregoing language, the
clear purpose of the bond is to insure only those employees not
known to be dishonest. At issue is whether the Aetna bond ever
covered Larry Glad.
The first question, which the majority totally ignores, is
whether this language is even ambiguous.12 A purchaser of a
fidelity bond would reasonably interpret the foregoing
provision to mean that the bond will not cover any employee
known to be dishonest at the time the bond takes effect.
Home's bond application supports this interpretation. Glad was
12. Those courts which have considered provisions like Section
11 have all considered the provisions to be unambiguous in
their declarations that employees known to be dishonest at the
inception of the bond are not covered. See, e.g., St. Joe
Paper Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.. 376 F.2d 33, 35
(5th Cir.) cert. denied 38fJi f'.Y «2n, rr s. ': *- . ^1 (1967);
Ritchie Grocer Co. -; ._p__j tyy '" -""^i al_ty _r s-irofy <•,, x_2^ F 2d
499, 502-03 (0th Cir". ryin ) : """rne^Q , rt"-.' Fidelity V"
Casualty Co. of Npw v^vrk . j33 ;,^. '.: 1, ,M 9 s„ v]"~so8 ^10
(1969).
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employee. A contrary view of ?he
"™"°\^:use.such.as th« Plaintiff
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. a 1though the exclusion clause
plainly indicates there can be no coverage
after the insured "shall have knowledge"
of dishonesty of his employees.
Id. at 510-11.
Not only can an individual be excluded by Section II, but
whole transactions night not be covered. when an insured knows
prior to the purchase of a bond that a transaction previously
entered into by the insured is tainted with dishonesty, the
entire transaction is not covered. See St. Joe Paper Co.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. , 359 F.2d 579 (5th Cir.) ce. rt •
denied 389 U.S. 828, 88 S. Ct. 91 (1966).
The proper inquiry to be derived from these cases is
whether an employee is known to be dishonest at the time the
bond is supposed to cover the employee. If any dishonesty is ^
known, the bond never covers the employee. Because Glad was
known to be dishonest at the time Home desired Aetna's bond to
apply to Glad, Aetna's bond did not cover Glad.
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14. The majority is apparently attempting to prevent the risk
of coverage lapsing if an insured changes insurance carriers
after an employee's dishonesty is discovered and the insured
knows it may be liable, but before there is a final judgment
establishing any actual loss due tn that dishonesty. That risk
only arises, howp-.-o r , i^r n11 - <- >t>'j m^ Y' r <tv >^ ,m --, o^ ho rpformize
that discovery "f fhe -t isho,wjt-;f- v , ••> noti''<j • a claim,
triggers coveraae. ru ^M-ier '•-vis, 'he -nai'-ri^v is seeking to
abate a risk that it has ^rt i r \ oi a I1v created .
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America (INA) and Hartford.'- After the INA and Hartford bonds
became effective, the insured discovered that the same vice
president had not secured letters of credit which the insured
was required to secure. The vice president had nevertheless
falsely certified that he had secured the letters of credit.
The court held that since the insured had known of the vice
president's dishonesty in falsifying the HUD forms "before the
inception" of the INA and Hartford policies, and since the
insured did not notify INA and Hartford of the vice president's
previous dishonesty, INA and Hartford could not be held liable
for the losses caused by the vice president's failure to secure
the Letters of credit.
The Wilson court directly addressed the argument accepted
by the majority in this case and rejected it. "[T]he dissent
would have INA and Hartford assume liability for losses
resulting from acts committed before the inception of their
respective policies by an employee who was never within the
coverage of the policies. This is an untenable result.'' Icl. ~
at 1279 n.6 (emphasis in original).
rn refusing to follow Wilson, the majority selectively
quotes parts of the Wilson court's regrets as if that court
felt it had rendered a poor decision. The full text reveals
otherwise.
The unfortunate position in which Wilson
finds itself was occasioned in part by
sheer bad luck in timing as to the change
in insurers and in part by the poor
judgment of its own officers. However,
mindful of Justice Holmes' admonition, we
cannot use this hard case as a vehicle to
make bad law.
Icl. at 1280.
The Wilson court did not rely upon "sheer luck" as
asserted by the majority. It simply recognized that the timing
of the change in insurers, along with poor business judgment.
rendered the insured uninsured. Had the insured simply
revealed its knowledge of the vice president's dishonesty to
INA and Hartford when applying for t-ne now bonds, it could have
still been covered.
15. The IMA bond contained the same language as cont aTn~ed~~in"~~
the Aetna bond at issue.
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In order for Aetna to be liable for Glad's dishonest acts,
Aetna would have had to expressly agree to continue F&D's
coverage of Glad as it existed during the F&D bond period.17
There simply was no such assumption of coverage by the Aetna
bond. In fact, Aetna's bond clearly states in Rider 6059 that
"coverage under this policy or bond shall not become effective
until such other coverage [as provided by the F&D bond] has
terminated." Contrary to the majority's assertion that there
is no evidence as to the issue of continuation, Rider 6059
shows that the parties expressly agreed that the Aetna bond was
not a continuation of the coverage provided under the F&D
bond. The majority's holding is therefore directly contrary to
the express agreement of the parties.
The insurance policy in the present case clearly states
that it only provides fidelity coverage for employees not known
to have previously been dishonest and it expressly provides
that there is no continuation of coverage provided by the F&D -
bond. Since Home knew on the effective date of the Aetna bond
that Glad had performed a dishonest act, Glad was never insured
under the Aetna bond.
17. This court recently held in Perkins v. Great-West Life
Assurance Co.. 163 Utah Adv. Rep. 68 (Utah App. 1991), that a
new insurer does not automatically cover all employees that may
have been insured under a predecessor policy. In that case,,
Mrs. Perkins was an employee of Southwest Health Management!,
Inc. when she became disabled and was no longer able to work
full time. Southwest kept her on its records as a full-time
employee, awarding her sick leave, vacation time, and sc
forth. After she became disabled. Southwest negotiated a new
group insurance policy with Great-West Life Assurance Co.
Great-West's policy expressly limited coverage to full-time
employees and defined full-time employment. When Mrs. Ferkins
passed away, her husband sought to recover on Great-West's life
insurance policy. Great-West then discovered that Mrs. Perkins
was not a full-time employee at the inception of the policy and
had never returned to full-time employment. Her premiums were
returned and her husband's claim against the policy was
denied . This ecu rt nphe Id the deni .--Y. >- f <-o*-Dr ^qe , reasoning
that "[s]ince Mrs. Perkins was ?vt ^" active employee on the
effective date of the Great-West pel icy, or any time
thereafter, she was not insured under that policy." Icl. at 70
(emphasis added).
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The facts in this case indicate that Home knew prior to
the application for insurance that Elaine Reese, one of the
employees listed in the application, had committed dishonest
acts by backdating the loan documents at Glad's direction. "A
fraudulent misrepresentation in such an application that the
insured's employees have been faithful is deemed material to
the risk undertaken by the insurer and renders that bond void
ab initio." Phoenix Sav. & Loan ,_tnc. v. Aef n_a Casualty _&
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The majority, however, reiects Aetna's claim by
effect iveiy rewrit ing Utah Code Ann. § 31-19-8(1) (19 74) which
p ro v ides:
Misrepresentations, omissions, concealment
of facts, and incorrect statements shall
not prevent a recovery under the policy or
contract unless:
(a) fraudulent; or
(b) material either to the
acceptance of the risk, or to the hazard
assumed by the insurer; or
(c) the insurer in good faith
either would not have issued the policy or
contract, or would not have issued,
reinstated, or renewed it at the same
premium rate, or would not have issued,
reinstated, or renewed a policy or
contract in as large an amount, or would
not have provided coverage with respect to
the hazard resulting in the loss, if the
true facts had been made known to the
insurer as required either by the
application for the policy or contract or
otherwise.
As the majority correctly indicates, the issue is whether
Home had a duty under the statute to disclose in its
application for the Aetna bond the material fact that it was
being sued for over one million dollars because of the
dishonest conduct of an employee. The majority erroneously
concludes that Home had no such duty because Aetna failed to
explicitly inquire about pending cases.
By focusing only on the duty to provide information
specifically requested in the application, the majority only
considers "misrepresentations," "concealments of fact," and
"incorrect statements." These are the possible types of
affirmative responses to inquiries in an application covered by
the statute. The majority, however, totally ignores
"omissions" which th" Y,^ni-^ a i-" «•,,-.<=> ro. Py including
omissions , the statute indicates iha' an ;»pp Jicant lias a duty
to disclose more than wh=> t i-(,^ npp 1[ >_-n tion specifically
requests. The statute clearly provides that Home may be barred
from recovery if it omits facts that are "material . . . to the
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hazard assumed by the insured." The majority today holds,
however, that an applicant for insurance may omit critical and
'bvi -us ly relevant info rma tion if the insurer fails to
explicitly request such information. In other words, the
•:M-ior ity removes the term "omission" from the statute by
holding that an omission is a lega1 impossibility. I believe
such rewriting of an unambiguous statute is contrary to the
!egis lative intent and outs ide of the ambit of our judicial
-• u t h o r 11 y .
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for fidelity insurance has a duty to provide
ion in its application, such as pending claims
ed, even if not directly requested to provide
It is true that, in general, the insurer is
k assessment and therefore has a duty to make
feels are relevant to the assessment of
not mean however, that a sophisticated
ranee, such as Home, may turn a blind eye to
s case is not in a gray area where the "
h_t have been relevant.
In interpreting section 31-19-8(1), the Utah Supreme Court
has indicated that a misrepresentation is "material if it
diminishes the insurer's opportunity to determine or estimate
1h- s risk." Berger v. Minnesota Mutual Life Ins. Co. , 723 P. 2d
388, 391 (Utah 1988). It is blatantly obvious that a potential
claim for over one million dollars, already known of by the
applicant, affects the "hazard assumed by the insured."
Insurance companies set their premiums based on the possibility
of an event occurring. One of the assumptions an insurer makes
when issuing a fidelity bond is that the applicant does not
already have claims pending against it. The fact that there is
already a million dollar claim pending against an applicant
obviously skews the probabilities of there being a claim
against the policy. Not knowing about the possible claim
prevents the insurer from accurately determining or estimating
its risk. Inasmuch as pending claims obviously affect the
hazard being assumed by the insurer and there is no need to
"speculate" whether a pending lawsuit is relevant, I would hold
that applicants for fidelity insurance have a duty under
section 31-19-8(a) to disclose any pending claims or be barred
from recovery on such claims.
The majority
1aw duty o f r] lso ]•
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principle of the law of fidelity guaranty
that if dishonesty of an agent, whose
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fidelity was guaranteed under a bond,
exists before or at the time the surety
bond becomes bound thereby, and the
principal conceals it from the surety at
the time of obtaining the fidelity bond,
the surety is not liable for the losses
resulting therefrom; . . . [T]he mere
nondisclosure of the circumstances
affecting the situation of the parties
which are material for the surety to be
acquainted with and are within the
knowledge of the person obtaining the
surety bond, is undue concealment even
though not willful or intentional or with
a view to any advantage to himself.
West Am. Fin. Co. Pacific Indemnity Co., 17 Cal. App,2d 225
m1 P.2 d 963, 968 (1936)
One who becomes surety for another must
ordinarily be presumed to do so upon the
belief that the transaction between the
principal parties is one occurring in the
usual course of business of that
description, subjecting him only to the
ordinary risks attending it; and the party
to whom he becomes a surety must be
presumed to know that such will be his
understanding, and that he will act upon
it, unless he is informed that there are
some extraordinary circumstances affecting
the risk. To receive a surety known to be
acting upon the belief that there are no
unusual circumstances by which his risk
will be materially increased, well knowing
that there are such circumstances, and
having a suitable opportunity to make them
known, and withholding them, must be
regarded as a legal fraud, by which the
surety will be relieved from his contract.
American Surety. 170 U.S. 133, 1
v. Cooper. 36 Me. 179, 197).
S. Ct . at 559 (quotinc B_ajik,
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surety on a fide 1ify bond. Irrespective
of motive or intent, mere non-disclosure
of facts known by the obligee which
materially affect the surety's risk, such
as a prior dishonesty of the principal on
the fidelity bond, therefore discharges
the surety.
Sjjmit_omo Bank of California.
d 956, 960 (1968) (citations omitted)
Iwa sak i, 73 Cal. Rptr. 447
The majority misinterprets the cases upon which it relies
in holding that Home had no duty to disclose the pending
lawsuit. In United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Howard, 67
F.2 d 382 (5th Cir. 1933) cert . denied 291 U.S. 663, 54 S. Ct.
439, i e.h^ denied 291 U.S. 648, '34 S. Ct . 457 (1934), the
insurer asked how much money a vice president owed the bank,
but did not ask whether the vice president had endorsed any
loans made by the bank. The bank later collapsed and it was ~
discovered that the vice president had systematically siphoned
off bank assets through bogus loans he had endorsed. It was
determined that at the time the bond was applied for the vice
president had endorsed over $42,000 worth of valueless loans.
The insurer claimed the bank could not recover because the bank
did not disclose the endorsements in the application. The
court rejected the argument, reasoning that the information
could not be deemed material by the insurer because no such
information was ever requested in the application. In the
HP_wa_rd case, however, there was no indication that the bank
knew of the dishonest conduct or knew of any pending loss when
it applied for the loan. The endorsements, in and of
themselves, were not dishonest on their face. At best, the
large amount of loans endorsed by the vice president was an
indication that there might have been an excessive amount of
risk attached to the bond that warranted additional
investigation. The holding of Howard is simply that neutral
information that might indicate something may be amiss and that
further inquiry might be necessary before issuing the bond,
must be expressly requested before its omission would bar
recovery. In the present case, however, Home knew of both the
alleged dishonesty and the Armitage lawsuit and that the
lawsuit could lead to a large claim against the bond.
In State v . Unite-.
P.2d 8 09 (1980), 'ho ;
that an employee h^d p
forgery as a result ••f
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no iden f .
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did not disclose
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Centra ry to the
majority's characterization of the holding in that case, the
Washington Court (Jf Appeals expressly refused to adopt an
absolute rule that there was no duty on the part of the
applicant to have provided the information. Instead, it: held
that the employee was covered despite the nondisclosure because
the insurance company had not relied on the application and
therefore had not been misled by the nondisclosure. (The
insurance company did not even require the application form to
be completed.) In the present case there is no serious
quest ron that Aetna was mis led by the nondisclosure of a major
potent ia 1 claim.
A duty to disclose pending claims simply ensures that
there will be a true meeting of the minds. If Home's
expectation was that the Armitage loss, if any, would be
covered by the policy, and if Aetna charged a premium bcsed on
a belief that there were no claims already pending that would
need to be covered under the policy, then there was no meeting.
of the minds. If there was no meeting of the minds, there *
could be no coverage.
I do not accept the majority's conclusion that a rule
requiring disclosure would "require an insurance applicant to
affirmatively convince an insurer to not issue the applied-for
ly
isk
an
By including the term "omissions," section 31-19-8(1)
merely codifies this contractual principal as a statutory
duty. I would therefore hold that Home's failure to disclose
the pending lawsuit violated its duty to disclose all facts
material to the hazard assumed by Aetna and therefore bars Home
from seeking recovery under the bond.
V. OFFSET OF DAMAGES
Before entering int-o m-,o i..,Mr. <y hh n)U i,,.,- rower s
had granted a loan t,, AfM.eck/YFrM ditecMy. Affleck', however,
was not repaying the loan. Home therefore instructed Affleck
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that once the borrowers gave the loan proceeds to him, he was
tn immediately return the proceeds to Home as payment against
his original loan. Home even went so far as to place
restrictive endorsements on the back of the loan proceed checks
thereby preventing Affleck from cashing the checks and
guaranteeing the return of the proceeds to Home. Aetna claims
that by requirinq Affleck to use the loan proceeds to pay off
his already defaulted loan, Home effectively shifted the loss
it was bound to incur under Affleck's loan to the borrowers'
loans. Since a loss under the Affleck loan would not have been
covered by this bond, Aetna claims it was entitled to offset
the amount of loss sought by Home by the amount of loan
proceeds actually returned to Home. Home therefore did not
suffer any actual loss when it had in fact received the very
loan proceeds it claimed were lost.
The majority erroneously dismisses Aetna's claim because
if mischaractenzes the offset issue as a question of liability
that the jury should have determined. The parties expressly -
reserved the determination of damages for the trial court.
Whether there is an offset relates directly to the issue'of the
amountof damages, not to the issue of liability. In order for
the trial court to make such a determination, it must consider
any claimed offsets. The trial court declined to hear the
claim, however, because it felt the issue involved questions of
fact properly reserved for the jury. The trial court, along
with Home and the majority, have failed to identify any
questions of fact that the jury needed to determine before the
trial court could have addressed the offset claim. In fact,
there is no factual dispute as to what happened with the
proceeds. The only issue was whether Aetna was entitled to an
offset as a matter of law. Since no jury findings were needed
to make such a legal ruling, it was perfectly logical and
acceptable for Aetna to wait and pursue the offset claim after
the jury had rendered its special verdicts and the trial court
had found Aetna liable. To have addressed the offset issue to
the jury would have been fruitless since there was no factual
dispute.
Inasmuch as the trial court refused to even address the
offset issue because it erroneously viewed it as the duty of
the jury, that issue should be remanded for consideration by
the trial court.
"T . '^riCLr,o ION
Any loss incurred by Home was discovered while the F&D
bond was in place. The Aetna bond was never intended to cover
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employees that were known at its inception to have been
dishonest. The Aetna bond also did not cover pending claims
known to Home before the inception of the bond, but not
disclosed to Aetna in the application. Aetna should not,
therefore, be requi red to indemnify Home for its loss in the
Armitage case.
ftuttc^g*^
Russell W. Bench,
Presiding Judge
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
******
HOME SAVINGS AND LOAN
ASSOCIATION, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs .
THE AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY
COMPANY,
Defendant.
STIPULATED PRETRIAL ORDER
Civil No. C36-2257
Judge Michael R. Murphy
*******
pretrial hearing on this matter was held October 20,
1987' lP*3uant t0 Rule 16 °f the Ut3h RUlGS °f ClVU
Proceed*. The plaintiff, Home Savings and Loan Association,
was represented at the hearing by its counsel Gary R. Howe, P.
Bryan Fishburn and Wallace R. Bennett, Of Counsel. The
defendant. The Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, was represented
c;..:
by its counsel Lynn S. Davies, and Russell C. Fericks and
Michael A. Peterson. The following determinations were made by
the Court:
I. JURISDICTION.
The jurisdiction of the Court is not disputed and is
hereby determined to be present.
II. VENUE.
Venue is proper in the Third Judicial Distric: Court of
Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
III. GENERAL NATURE OF THE CLAIMS OF THE PARTIES.
The following constitutes the parties' claims which have
not been stipulated by counsel.
A. Plaintiff's Claims:
Plaintiff claims that defendant, The Aetna Casualty and
Surety Company, should indemnify plaintiff under Aetna's
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M°
employee fidelity bond for losses which resulted directly from
one or more dishonest or fraudulent acts of its employees, in
particular, Larry Glad. The losses include, (i) the loss
sustained as a result of a jury verdict entered against Home on
the 14th day of August, 1984 in the case of Victor W. Armitage,
et al.. Plaintiffs v. Home Savings and Loan Association,
Defendant, Civil Action Nos. C82-0670K in the United States
District Court for the District of Utah, Central Division;
(ii) attorneys fees and costs incurred in defending, appealing
and settling the aforesaid action; (iii) prejudgment interest;
and (iv) court costs and attorneys fees incurred in the present
action.
B. Defendant's Claims:
Defendant claims: (i) the loss sustained by plaintiff is
not covered by the terms and conditions set forth in Aetna's
bond; (ii) the plaintiff has not complied with the condition
precedent to coverage under the bond of supplying defendant
with timely notice of its discovery of employee dishonesty or
fraud; (iii) plaintiff's own mismanagement, misfeasance,
misconduct, negligence and/or failure to follow safe and sound
lending practices directly resulted in plaintiff's losses; (iv)
- 3 -
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plaintiff's discovery in December, 1981, of a fee received by
its employee, Larry Glad, voids coverage under the bond for
loss resulting from dishonest or fraudulent conduct of Larry
Glad; (v) plaintiff's discovery just before or shortly after
hiring Larry Glad of Glad's embezzlement of funds at Sandy
State Bank voids coverage under the bond for any less resulting
from the fraudulent or dishonest conduct of Larry Glad;
(vi) plaintiff has failed to mitigate its damages;
(vii) plaintiff did not rely upon Larry Glad's knowledge of
Afco's financial circumstances in deciding to loan money either
directly to Afco or indirectly to Afco through second mortgage
loans to Afco investors; (viii) Home's losses in the Armitage
judgment resulted from the nature of the transaction --- a
security -- rather than from any dishonesty or fraud on the
part of Larry Glad; (ix) Home's losses in the Armitagje judgment
from the acts or misrepresentations of Home's officers, Board
of Directors, and/or General Counsel which constituted common
law fraud; and (x) Home's losses in the Armitage judgment
resulted from the acts of Home's employees which were not
dishonest or fraudulent as defined by the terms of the bond.
- 4 -
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IV. UNCONTRQVERTED FACTS.
The following iiczs are established by admissions in the
pleadings or by stipulations of counsel:
1. Home is a Utah corporation with its principal place
of business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
2. Aetna is a surety and casualty insurance company
licensed to issue savings and loan blanket bonds in the State
of Utah.
3. Larry Glad, was an employee of Home Savings & Loan
from April 30, 1981 until terminated effective December 29,
19 8 1.
4. From mid-November 1981 through the first week of
January 1982, Home made a total of 42 loans to individuals
("Afco investors"), who invested the proceeds in several
inter-related companies ("Afco") controlled by Grant C.
Affleck. The loans were secured by trust deeds en the
borrowers' homes.
- 5 -
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5. On November 25 and 30, 1981, Home obtained
commitments from Rocky Mtn. Federal Savings & Loan of Cheyenne
Wyoming, to purchase a total of $775,000 second mortgage loans
made by Home to Afco Investors.
6. On or about December 20, 1981 it became known to
the management of Home that Larry Glad had received a $15,000
payment from Robert Mitchell. The $15,000 payment was part of
a $31,000.00 fee received by Robert Mitchell from Afco.
7. On December 23, 1981, First Federal Savings & Loan
Associat ion of Great Falls, Montana committed to purchase
ninety-five percent (9 5%) of a $500,000 block of second
mortgage loans made by Home to Afco investors.
8. On February 26, 1982, First Federal Savings and
Loan purchased $388,399.00 worth of Afco investor second
mortgage loans and it purchased an additional $45,113.00 worth
of Afco investor second mortgage loans on March 3, 198 2.
9. On March 7, 1982, Afco filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Utah.
- 6 -
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10. On March 17, 1982, Rocky Mtn. Federal Savings &
Loan purchased the Afco investor second mortgage loans from
Home for the amounts of $455,448.00 and $288,386.00,
respectively.
11. On March 26, 1982, April 7, 1982, and April 29,
1982, Home was sued by Afco investors who had taken out second
mortgages with Home and invested the loan proceeds in Afco.
12. Home Savings repurchased the Afco investor's second
mortgage loans from Rocky Mtn. Federal Savings & Loan on April
20, 1982.
13. Aetna issued to Home on the 14th day of July, 1982
a Savings and Loan Blanket Bond, Standard Form 22, with
coverage made retroactive to June 21, 19 82. The Bond provided
for coverage in a principal amount of up to $1,135,000.00.
14. The term of the Bond was for three years, i.e.
running through June 20, 1985.
15. On July 22, 1982 a lawsuit was filed in Federal
Court (Abbott v. Shaffer, C32-0628K) in which several hundred
- 7 -
^
borrowers sought relief from 17 different local financial
institutions including Home Savings. The action was Later
severed for trial as to each financial institution. The
severed port ion relating to Home involved 36 husband-and-wife
borrowers and was designated Armitage vs. Home Savings,
(C82-0670K).
16. On December 9, 1982 and December 21, 1982 Home sent
letters to Aetna to inform Aetna of the pending Armitage v.
Home Savings litigation and other related cases involving the
Afco investor second mortgage loans.
17. Home Savings repurchased the Afco investor second
mortgage loans from First Federal Savings & Loan Association on
December 30, 1982.
18. On or about May 6, 1983, Aetna retained the law
firm of Suitter, Ax land, Armstrong & Hanson to represent
Aetna's interests with respect to Armitage v. Home Savings.
(Aetna concurs with this paragraph, subject to verification by
Home of the indicated date of retention.)
- 8 -
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19. On September 30, 1983 Aetna wrote to Home stating
that it elected not to assum.e defense of the Armitage v. Home
Savings litigation, as was its option under general Agreement C
of the Aetna 3ond.
20. On August 14, 1934 the jury in the Armitage v. Home
Savings trial rendered special verdicts against Home.
21. In August, 1985, and pursuant to Home's request,
Aetna extended coverage under the bond through August 20, 1986.
2 2. The court entered a final judgment in the Armitage
v. Home Savings case on February 24, 1986, except for a
judgment for attorneys fees which was rendered on March 21,
1986.
23. The Armitage judgment rescinded 36 separate loans
with a net principal amount (face value of loans minus di rect
benefit to borrowers) of $998,623.00. This net principal
amount includes $10,000.00 of punitive damages.
24. The March 21, 1986 judgment for the Armitage
plaintiff's attorneys fees and costs was $381,294.00. Home
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settled this claim for $190,647.00. (Aetna accepts the
representation of amounts indicated in the paragraph, subject
to reasonable proof and documentation by Home.)
25. Home paid attorneys fees and costs of $336,647.00
to the law firm of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker and $13,573.00 to the
law firm of Backman, Clark & Marsh for the primary defense of
the Armitage lawsuit. In addition. Home paid $45,464.00 to the
law firm of Callister, Duncan & Nebeker for the appeal and
settlement of the Armitage judgment, plus $9,728.00 to
Intermountain Court Reporters for the costs of trial
transcripts to support the appeal. (Aetna accepts the
representation of amounts indicated in this paragraph,, subject
to reasonable proof and documentation by Home.)
V. CONTESTED ISSUES OF FACT.
The contested issues of fact remaining for determination
are:
1. Did Larry Glad commit dishonest or fraudulent acts
or omissions relating to the Afco investor loans which are
covered by the Aetna Bond?
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2. Did Home Savings' repurchase of the Afco investor
second mortgage loans from Rocky Mtn. Savings & Loan and First
Federal Savings & Lean Association constitute a failure by Home
to mitigate its carnages?
3. Did Larry Glad cause the Afco investor second
mortgage loan documents to be backdated before closing so as to
deny to borrowers their three-day right to rescind?
4. Was the loss sustained by plaintiff covered by the
terms and conditions set forth in Aetna's bond?
5. Did the plaintiff comply with the condition
precedent to coverage under the bond by supplying defendant
with timely notice of "discovery" as such term is defined in
Rider 6091 of the bond.
6. Was plaintiff's own mismanagement, misfeasance, or
other negligence and/or failure to follow safe and sound
lending practices the &o le—.sufficient cause of plaintiff's
oTJtV
losses?
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7. Did plaintiff discovery just before or shortly
after hiring Larry Glad that he had embezzled funds at Sandy
State Bank?
8. Did plaintiff rely upon Larry Glad's know ledge of
Afco's financial circumstances in deciding to loan money either
directly to Afco or indirectly to Afco through second mortgage
loans to Afco investors?
9. Did Home's losses in the Armi tage judgment result
from the nature of the transaction -- a security -- rather than
from any dishonesty or fraud on the part of Larry Glad?
10. Did Home's losses in the Armitage judqment result
from acts or misrepresentations of Home's Board of Directors
and Genera 1 Counsel which constituted fraud?
12. Did Home's losses in the Armitage judgment result
from the acts of employees which were not dishonest or
fraudulent as defined, by the terms of the bond?
13. Was Aetna prejudiced by a failure to receive timely
notice of a potential loss covered under the bond?
- 12 -
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14. Did Larry Glad, or any other Heme employee,
manifestly intend 10 cause Home to lose m.oney by any action cr
conduct taken in the course of Home'5 lending to Afco investors?
VI. CONTESTED ISSUES OF LAW.
Contested issues of law, in addit ion to those imp 1ici t in
the foregoing issues of fact, are:
1. If causation from an act, event or procedure not
covered under the bond is alleged as a defense in an action on
a fidelity bond, must that act, event or procedure be a sole,
independent cause of loss or must the less only directly result
from the act, event or procedure in order to bar recovery?
2. Under the bond, must employee dishonesty or fraud
constitute the sole independent cause of the loss in order to
establish coverage?
3. Under the Aetna bond, is the plaintiff entitled to
attorneys fees and costs incurred in appealing the Armitaae
judgment?
- 13 -
4. Does prejudgment interest, if any, run from the
date of the jury verdicts in Armitage v. Home Savings (August
14, 198 4) or from the date of the judgment in Armitage v. Home
Savings (February 24, 1986)?
5. Under the Aetna bond, is Home entitled to recover
the punitive damages imposed on Home in the Armitage judgment?
6. Under the Aetna bond, are the attorneys fees
awarded to a party (i.e. the Armi tage plaintiffs) who prevails
against the insured a compensable loss?
7. Are plaintiffs entitled to their attorneys fees and
court costs incurred in the present action?
8. Is defendant estopped to assert lack of timely
notice as a defense to plaintiffs claim?
9. Is failure to provide information not requested on
a bond application form a bar to recovery in an action on the
bond?
- 14 -
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10. Is defendant estopped, by virtue of its failure to
accept Home's tender of the defense in the Armitage litigation
10 challenge the reasonaoleness of the attorneys fees incurred
by Home in that litigation?
11. The Court pursuant to a motion filed by the
plaintiff has previously addressed the evidentiary/burden of
proof issue regarding the subject matter of whether or not the
plaintiff must show dishonesty or fraud as defined under the
bond as to each individual Afco investor loan or whether
plaintiff can show a common scheme that perm.eated the entire
program of loans to borrowers who then invested in Afco. The
Court reserves determination of such issue until the evidence
has been presented tor the purpose of establishing plaintiff's
claim of "permeation".
12. Did plaintiff's discovery in December, 198 1, of a
fee received by its employee, Larry Glad, void coverage under
the bond for any loss resulting from dishonest or fraudulent
conducted of Larry Glad?
13. Did plaintiff's discovery just before or shortly
after hiring Larry Glad of Glad's embezzlement of funds at
- 15 -
3>
^3
i>
Sandy State Bank (assuming the jury answers Contested Issue of
Fact No. 8 in the affirmative) void coverage under the oond for
any loss resulting from any fraudulent or dishonest conduct of
Larry Glad. (Plaintiff does not stipulate that this is a
contested issue of law.)
14. Do forgeries of signatures and alterations to
information contained in loan applications and employer
verifications or di recti ions given to another to engoge in such
forgeries, or alterations relative to loans intended to be sold
on the secondary market, constitute dishonesty as covered by
the Bond as a matter of law?
VII- ISSUES RESERVED FOR COURT:
The parties reserve the following issues for
determination by the court after jury verdicts have been
returned.
1. Does the Aetna bond's $5,000 per loss deductible
provision apply separately to each Afco investor second
mortgage loan, or just once to the loss sustained by virtue of
the Armitage judgment?
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2. Is the amount of attorneys fees and costs expended
bv Home in defense of the A rm i13 g e lawsuit reasonable?
VI :I . MOTIONS IN LIMINE.
The Court denies plaintiff's first motion in limine. The
Court finds that the documents identified relative to
plaintiff's first mot ion are relevant, subject to the condition
that Defendant must shew that it would have interceded to halt
the repurchase from First Federal Savings & Loan of Great Falls
on or about Decemoer 30, 1982 of approximately $500,000 in Afco
investor second m.ortgage loans. In addition, the Court finds
that defendant's assertion of Section 11 of the bend as does
not provide an independent basis for the introduction of
"discovery" evidence.
The Court grants in part and denies in part plaintiff's
second motion in limine. The Court grants plaintiff's second
motion with respect to evidence offered to show: (1) that
because of inadequate procedures Home failed to discover
dishonest acts of Larry Glad; or (2) that Home's loss resulted
from its negligent supervision of Larry Glad. The Court denies
plaintiffs' second motion with respect to evidence offered to
- 17 -
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show that procedures in place at Home and/or acts or omissions
of Home's directors, officers or employees, apart from any
dishonesty of Larry Glad, resulted in the loss Home sustained
as a consequence of the Armitage verdict.
IX. EXHIBITS.
Exhibits have been designated separately by the parties.
The designations are attached hereto as Exhibits "A" and "3."
A. The parties are to prepare conformed sets o f
exhibits, premarked and numbered consecutively, and accepted as
to authenticity and foundation except with regard to those
specifically identified in Exhibit "B."
B. The parties may, by stipulation, prepare a one (1)
volume binders of copies of selected stipulated exhibits for
use by each of the jurors.
C. The parties stipulate that the transcripts of
testimony from the Armitage v. Home Savings trial are
admissible for use in this trial under the same standard
- 1
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[U.R.Civ.P. 32(a)(3)] which governs admissibility of
decositions taken in this case.
X. WITNESSES.
Witnesses have been designated separately by counsel.
The designations are attached hereto as Exhibits "C" and "D."
The parties shall prepare written lists of the order in which
they intend to call designated witnesses. At the close of each
day of trial, the parties shall designate which witnesses they
expect to call on the tellewing day of trial, and the order in
which they will ee called.
XI . REQUEST FOR INSTRUCTIONS.
Inasmuch as the case is to be tried to a jury, requests
for jury instructions and proposed Special Verdict forms shall
be submitted to the Court by 12:00 noon on Novem.ber 9, 1987.
However, this shall be without prejudice to modify or augm.ent
such instructions before the close of trial.
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XII. AMENDMENT TO PLEADINGS.
The Court has ordered that defendant shall be a liewed to
reassert the Twelfth and Thirteenth Defenses of its Answer.
The Court has also indicated that it will entertain a m.otion by
either party to amend to add a claim for attorneys fees
incurred in this action.
XIII. DISCOVERY.
1. Defendant may take the deposition of any emp loyee
of the Utah Department of Financial Institutions who is
designated by the plaintiff as a witness, so long as the
designation, if any, is made by 9:00 a.m. on Tuesday, October
27, 1987.
XIV. TRIAL SETTING.
This case is set for trial before a jury to commence on
the 27th day of October, 1987 at the hour of 9:00 o'clock a.m.
and to continue thereafter as needed on October 28, 29 and 30,
November 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 13, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23 and 24,
1987. Trial days shall begin at 9:00 o 'clock a.m. anc. recess
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at 12:00 o 'clock noon, ce reconvened at 1:10 o'clock p.m.. and
recess at 5:00 o'clock p.m. subject to modification by the
. r •-, l' r
'' XV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
• i
• i
11
,i
ii The parties shall stipulate to a concise statement of the
! case to be read to the iurv at the com.mencem.ent of the case.|l
!jXVI. POSSIBILITY OF SETTLEMENT.
jj
jj
•:! Possibility of settlement of this action is considered
'i
:i
,I poor.
27 .DATED: October ^ / , 19 87.
CDN9113H
3Y THE COURT
By YkujLP.
Michael R. Murphy !>
District Court Judge
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The foregoing Proposed Pretrial Order is hereby adopted
this AvJ' day of October, 1987.
CDN9113H
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SPECIAL JURY
INTERROGATORIES
CIVIL NO. C-86-2257
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY: You are to respond to these
special jury interrogatories only after you have reached
agreement on your answers to questions contained in the special
jury verdict. Put these aside until then.
We the jury, respond to the following special
interrogatories as follows:
INTERROGATORY NO. 1
In accordance with the standard of proof required in
numbered paragraph 1 of Jury Instruction No. 33, did Aetna prove
that there were intentional misrepresentations or nondisclosures
of facts known by Home Savings on the application questionnaire
which facts materially affected its risks under the bond and that
it would not have issued the bond or would have excluded the risk
disclosed if it had known these facts?
ANSWER: Yes No
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INTERROGATORY NO. 2
In accordance with the standard of proof required ir.
numbered paragraph 2 of Jury Instruction No. 33, did Aetna prove
that there were unintentional misrepresentations or
nondisclosures of facts known by Home Savings on the application
questionnaire which facts materially affected its risks under the
bond and that it would not have issued the bond or would have
excluded the risk disclosed if it had known these facts?
ANSWER: Yes \/ No
INTERROGATORY NO. 3
In accordance with the standard of proof required in
numbered paragraph 3 of Jury Instruction No. 33, did Aetna prove
that there were intentional failures to disclose facts known by
Home Savings beyond those inquired about on the application
questionnaire which facts materially affected its risks under the
bond and that it would not have issued the bond or would have
excluded the risk disclosed if it had known these facts?
ANSWER: Yes . No v
INTERROGATORY NO. 4
In accordance with the standard of proof required in
numbered paragraph 4 of Jury Instruction No. 33, did Aetna prove
that there were unintentional failures to disclose facts known by
Home Savings beyond those inquired about on the application
questionnaire, which facts materially affected its risks under
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the bond and that it would not have issued the bond or would have
excluded the risk disclosed if it had known these facts?
ANSWER: Yes S No
INTERROGATORY NO. 5
At any time prior to the termination of Larry Glad from the
employment of Home Savings, did Home Savings learn of any
dishonest or fraudulent act on his part?
ANSWER: YES r NO
INTERROGATORY NO. 6
If your answer to Interrogatory No. 5 above was "yes", state
whether the dishonest or fraudulent act occurred before Larry
Glad became employed by Home Savings, after Larry Glad became
employed by Home Savings, or both before and after such
employment?
ANSWER: BEFORE AFTER ^ BOTH
INTERROGATORY NO. 7
If your answer to Interrogatory No. 5 above was "yes", and
if you checked "After" or "Both" in response to Interrogatory No.
6 above, state whether the dishonest or fraudulent act occurring
during Larry Glad's employment was related or not related to the
Afco investor loans.
ANSWER: Related to Afco investor loans
Not related to Afco investor loans s,^
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INTERROGATORY NO. 8
If your answer to Interrogatory No. 5 was "yes," state the
date when Home Savings first learned of any dishonest or
fraudulent act by Larry Glad?
ANSWER: Date: A.^juT A^'Q Ptc£±*6£*. /<?? I
DATED this <?S~~ day of November, 1987.
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THE AETNA CASUALTY AND
SURETY COMPANY,
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SPECIAL VERDICT
CIVIL NO. C-86-2257
We, the jury, answer the questions propounded to us in the
Special Verdict as follows:
1. Did Larry Glad commit any dishonest or fraudulent acts,
related to the Afco investor loans, with the manifest intent to
cause Home Savings and Loan to sustain its loss and to obtain
personal benefit?
ANSWER: Yes y/" No
If your answer to Question No. 1 is "no," you have
completed this Special Verdict, and you need not answer questions
No. 2 and No. 3.
2. Did the verdict against Home Savings in the lawsuit of
Armitage, et al v. Home Savings & T,oan in whole or in part,
directly result from dishonest or fraudulent acts, if any, of
Larry Glad?
ANSWER: Yes )/ No
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If your answer to Question No. 2 is "no," you have
completed this Special Verdict, and you need not answer question
No. 3,
3. If you have answered "yes" to both question Nos. 1 and
2 above, itemize, by placing an "X" in the space provided, the
specific loans where a loss resulted directly from the dishonesty
or fraudulent act(s) of Larry Glad. If you find that plaintiff
has not proven that a loss on any specific loan resulted directly
from any such acts, mark the space provided "NONE."
BORROWER NAME
ROSENLOF, Dennis X
PENROD, Donald <
GLEED, Virgil yi
PHIPPEN, Arthur
•<
LOVELAND, Clinton x
MORRILL, Elvin ^
SORENSON, Newell x
FERRE, Shirl A/^£
MILLER, James fJo^C
WHITAKER, Mario xr
WITT, William x
WALTON, Russell *
FARNSWORTH, Orrin >c
LINFORD, Melvin ^_
PEHRSON, Reed x
HIND, Richard x.
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SCOVILLE, Steven X
BECKSTEAD, Quinn Merrill ^C
HANCOCK, Terry D. ^
DRUMMOND, Marvin x
CULLIMORE, 0. Stanley <_
LOVELAND, Ardel H. <
ROBERTS, Andrew <_
FISHER, Craig G. xc
PRATT, Leigh Burgess <-
MILES, Walter M. <_
FARNSWORTH, Orrin Fay ^_
ARMITAGE, Victor W. <_
TOBLER, Grant <
RICHARDS, Kenneth D. ^_
MICHAELIS, Owen A. ^
KIRK, Ronald ^_
CHANDLER, Jerome >£
REESE, LeRay <~
HOLMAN, Kathleen C. >^
DEVEY, Richard R. ^
4. Did Home Savings fail to mitigate its losses?
ANSWER: Yes No ><
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5. If you answered question No. 4 "yes," and you placed at
least one "x" in the space provided on question No. 3, state the
dollar amount by which the verdict to be calculated from your
verdict must be revised because of such failure to mitigate.
ANSWER: $_
DATED this «#S~~day of November, 1987.
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THE *TNA CASUALTY AND .SURETY COMPANY
Hartford, Connecticut 06115
(A Stock Company, herein called the Underwriter!
Bond No 19 F 3041 BCA
DECLARATIONS
Item 1. Name of Insured (herein called Insured): Home Savings & Loan
Principal Address: H6 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah
I,
Item 2. Bond Period: from noon on June 21, 1982
IMOHTM. t>*T. Villi
to noon on the effective date of the termination or cancellation of this bond, standard time at the Principal
Address as to each of said dates.
Item 3. Limit of Liability —
Subject to Section 7 hereof, the Limit of Liability is $ 1,135,000.00
Provided, however, that if any amounts are inserted below opposite specified Insuring Agreements or Coverage,
such amounts shall be part of and not in addition to such Limit of Liability.
Amount applicable to:
Audit Expense Coverage $ Nil
Insuring Agreement (D)—Forgery or Alteration $ 100,000. CC
Insuring Agreement (E)—Securities $ Nil
(Insert amount of Insuring Agreement or Coverage, or if an Insuring Agreement or Coverage is to be deleted, insert "Not Covered")
If '^ Not Covered" is inserted above opposite any specified Insuring Agreement or Coverage, such Insuring Agreement
or Coverage and any other reference thereto in this bond shall be deemed to be deleted therefrom.
'*?"' Iv, Jh,e ,ia '^I'XX, of the Underwriter is subject to the terms of the following riders attached hereto
bh 58/ob 5972a 60^2 6091
5884c 5973
5923b 6037
5936d 6041
6059(1)
6064a
6090
Item 5. The Insured by the acceptance of this bond gives notice to the Underwriter terminating or canceling prior
bond(s) or policy(ies) No.(s) Mil .(
such termination or cancellation to be effective as of the time this bond becomes effective.
Signed, sealed and dated (enter below)
8-20-82 ep
TSB 5064b
.IF-493-DI 9-70
THE /€TNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY
MArM
Thonas S. Carpenter, IV
CAT. 135747
PRINTED Ity U.S.A.
"-•> { -ide'wnter, m consideration of an agreed premium and subiect to the Declarations made a part hereof the Generai Agreements
Y- ' ""• -i"' - —itations ana other terms of this bond, agrees *'!" me insured, m accordance with the insuring Agreements hereof to which an
.•— ,-•* • -iJ'ar.ce s appucabie as set fortn in Item 3 cf the Deoaraticns aid with respect to loss sustained t\ me insured at any time but
• •_-,f---: -jring fe Ecnd Period, to indemnify and hold narmiess tne insured for
INSURING AGREEMENTS
FIDELITY IN TRANS'T
a ^-,-t mrough anv dishonest or fraudulent act of any of the 'O Loss of Property '.occurring with or without negligence or vto-
—.- •,•.•(-", committed anvwhere and whether committed alone or in leneei through robberv, common-law or statutory larceny, embezzlement
.,. i wi*n others, inciudmg loss, through any such act of any of theft, hold-up, misappropriation misplacement, mysterious unenpijm-
. ,. .".-• it?PS at property held by the Insured for anv purpose or in able disappearance, being lost cr otherwise made away with, damage
-. • ).•j;.f. j.nd whether so neld gratuitously cr not and whetner or thereto or destruction thereof, and icss of subscription, conversion, re-
• **-.- •••„-e^iS ame therefor. den-phon or deposit privileges through the displacement or ess cf
AUDIT EXPENSE P'Operty while the Property is in trans^f anvwhere in the custody of anv
-..-,;-- -;„"ed bv the Insured for that part of the cost cr audits or person cr persons acm-g as messenger, e-ceor wn.ie in the mail or w,th
. • •- T --s -ec_.red bv Mate or Federal supervisory author, nes re 0e d ca'ner 'or hire, other than an armored motor ven,cle company, for the
.. ._--,-.. t, :~e. Dv. SuCh aurhonties cr by independent accountants by purpose of transportation such transit to-egm immediately upon rece-pt
n •• me c sccverv of loss sustained by the Insured through dis- °f such prDPer,y b* 'he transporting person cr persons, and to end im-
•• -• / • - "aucuient acts of any of the Employees The total iiabintv of mediately upon delivery thereof at destination
--.. ^ - •e-v.n'cr for sucn eipense by reason of such acts of any Employee FORGERY OR ALTERATION
- .- .h.r.- vuch Employee is concerned or implicated or with respect to (D, Losi through FORGERY OR ALTERATION of on cr in anv
-. --: .... : • -r exam.njt.nn ,s limited to the amount stated opposite checKs, drafts, acceptances, withdrawal orders or receipts for the w,m-
•'•.:• c:--:e^cve-ace m item 3 of the Declarations it being unde-- drawal ot funds or Property certificates cf deposit letters c; ced-t »ai.
• ' - we.-' "-a- such expense snail be deemed to be loss sustained rant<. r^cney orders or orders -jpen public treasuries
.•-•-• -.--,: "-^rcugn o.snonest cr fraudulent acts ot one or mere ct f"e MechamcaY reproduced 'acsimile signatures are treated the same
_- ..>.-,-s 3--, "he • abm'v C the Underwriter under rms oaragrapn ct as handwritten signatures
-•..'-•:"-:'pe"-enriA'sha'lbeapartofandnotinadditiontofheLimif (.[:r| _ C(.
• -_ r .t, s'a'ed m .tern 3 of the Declarations r .-^--.
't' Loss through the insu'ed s having, m good faith and m the course
•J" of business, purchased or otherwise acquired, or sold cr delivered, or
" .-',s :t Pro-ertv (occurring with or without negligence cr vio- qiven any va|ue extended any credit or assumed any l.abnitv. on the
• —e thr-u-jh robber, burglary, common-law or statutory iarcenv, f,llth of< or otherwise acted upon, any securities, documents or other
•'- •• "- :-up or cthe' -raudulent means, misplacement, mysterious un- wntten instruments wtiich prove to ha.e been
• •:- ,i r.y c disappearance, damage thereto or destruction thereof and i(3. counterfeited or forged as to tne signature of any rra«r, d'awer,
•-, ' :-".:' :t''Cn conversion redemption or deposit privileges through issuer, endorser, assignor lessee, far-ster agent or -cgistrar ac-
'-•: ~ --;- .ice—enr cr ess cf Property, wnile the Property is ^cr is sup- ceptor, surety or guarantor cr as ro me signature ct any perscn
-• -. ' " :•-' "dgeo or deposited within any offices or premises ocated signing m any other capacity, or
--,--> m ••:•?:: .n 'np —a<i or with a carrier tor h:rP c'-e- 'han .D, raised or otherwise a'te-ea cr icst or stc'en
n ,.„ .„-. „„,;., '.enice company, for the purpose of transportation EXCLUDING m .my evem -ss tt--c„go YRGcRY OR ALTERAT.CN
• .-,-•, " 'he items o< property enumerated in the pa'ac/3nn of| on or in any checks, drafts acceptances withdrawal orders or re-
., .,..,„-. , ,. rcftVi m tne possession ot any customer ct the Insured or cdpts tor the withdrawal of funds or Property, certificates ot deposit.
'•• ,i". •!.•:;'esentative of such customer, whether or not the Insured is letters of credit, warrants money orders cr crders upon public treasuries
•at- e t ;t 'ne less tnereof, Securities, documents or other written mst-uments shall be deemed
.i ri-'-u^h any hazard specified in the preceding paragraph, while t0 mClln original Uncluding original COunte'Carts •• negotiaole or ncn-
•- " :"-re'''. 'S within any of the Insured's ottices. or neg"tiable agreements m writing having va'^e which va>ue is in tie
:.> ii--.-. j -n -ocoerv or hold-up while such customer or rep-e sen-at ive cdmiry course of business transferable bv de 'vrv ot such agreements
•s j;"_,j . :'3"<acim- business with the Insured at an cutside win- -.irn anv necessary endorse —ent or assign —e^t
: w "- ;t-e- s "-nar facisity offered to the public for mat purpose Actuai physical possession z' such secu-i'^s document z- ether
r. *"e ^surej. and attended bv an Employee c' tne Insured, at written instruments by ihe ntu-ed ,s a c:"C,!icri ;;'eceeenr io tne
A--. -.' "-e •"S'jied s offices cr Insurerl s having rent"-1 cr the 'aifh Y or c'^^rwise acted jpen, such
- .^.-^^.^ -ebbery or hcid-up during business hours »hi'f such CUS- seCur't'CS documents or -f-cr wit'en ms'^jry-e-ts
'""i« rr representative is in any building or on any driveway. The word "counter*eited as used in this Insjnng Ag-eemcnt shall
^jrMpg ct or s:r"iljr facility maintained bv the Insured as a con- be deemed to mean oniy ^n imitation of anv such security document cr
'•reence for such customers or representatives using motor ether written instrument which is intended to deceive and to be taken
• ^hic'es if such customer or represenjative is present in such for an original
be. Id eg or en such, facility for the purpose of transacting bus mess Mechanically reo reduced facsimile signatures are treated the same
„,.n .i-ie injured at any or its offices, as handwritten signatures
pm.idr: such :ss a' tne option of the Insured, is mcLded m --e R^EMPT'ON CF !'N TED STAGES SAVINGS BONDS
l.iSu'i' ; , ~'~e' ~> icss and excluding in any event, loss caused cv seenCuv;-, -r an. -cprcsentahve of such customer " L'"" througn me Insured s cavm- or redeem.no. cr guaranteeing
r-r »,!ni'<>,ing anv ^'gnatere ucc" any c-n'ed irates L'j-mgs CC_s,
C".ces ana Equipment Senp<. A ,^ K |nc ,JS,;e Lr,,ea c:jrc5 Sa,,nv;s Notes cr A-^ed Fe-:es
•a !_-.',•, e-. cr damage to, furnishings, fixtures, stationery supplies Lea^e Bends which shai. have beer, fe-ged ccunterte; ted, raised cr
or ct.ji; n-ent within ,iny of the Insured S offices caused by 'arcenv er ntne'w^e altered or lost o- stolen er en wheh the signa'ure to the
thru .n .;.- by ourg-ary, robbery or hold-up of such office, or aite-ot Request tor Payment sha.l ha.e been forged
there.!1, i - by vandalism or malicious mischief, or ih! loss throogn dam
age ' • ar-v such e'tice bv larceny or theft in, or by burglary r-bcery er COUNTERFEIT CURRENCY
he1 '. ur • ' -J„:n e-^ce or attempt thereat, or to iHc interior c' a"v ;uc" 'G' Loss through n-e 'ece ot bv f~e Insured in gced • nth, cf jny
of..- :•, ijnij ,sm or maiicious mischief, provided, m any event mat counter*e<ted or a.tered caper currencies cr cem c* •">> U-itcd S'J'es
the -.,"..: - -"e Owner of such etfices, furnishings, t i tu'CS if J" --€••• . C> A-^enca or Canada v,ij,'C or p_rpe't'-g 'o hav been ,^ued bv
sL,:-: .... . c-_..-.—ent or is liable for such loss or damage.—J.-a.i e>- the U"i'ed Sfa'es ;t An-e-;..5 jr Zi"aca z- iS^ed pu';u.j-.r •? a .„n,ted
crpt,-- - wee a, ess or damage through fire -ta'cs : ^nfijj cr Crj::'.ti j'jMp ':• -•.( js cu'r'.'":.
GENERAL AGREEMENTS
A:,;,'T ONAl. OFFICES CR EMPLOYEES—CONSGL'DAT.CN ,,-.,! re^-r.^.e af'e-ne..s J^es >rZ^'?-i ,md na.d bv --e 'nsjred -n
OR MERGER (]fifni,n ,inv suit r.r \rr..\\ pi'Tfedmg cr;-u ,ht aga n-.t the Insured to
A It 'ne |rsurcd shall, while this bend is m force, establish any addi- c-^rce the Insured s li.ibn.i. •t .)l eged h.ibi .tv .-n account ct any loss,
t.-n.ii •" c.' ''Offices such office or offices shall he autemar iC.i I.v t'.ir" rr iimjge which i' e'f.ibhshcd agj'n-.r tne Insure 1 would con-
C-,e-M n,-',-under '-cm tne dates of their establishment 'C -,pect' - e'v • VjT,. ,, ,,,,,,( 3n..i €••• iccf.-'e I .ss Susta -e < bv '"e ••• ..,rr : under me
N j i- • r.-. •-• --c L" :c writer of an increase du"n'i anv l''!.'"'"-*1 ce- d .... —r, -.i .i-,^ ecnd m mc event s^;h ics'- : Jim ' ' '.m- >:,. ,-, -,_oiecf
ln ,-.. „._.-,.,,r., .. -.- ,rc, cr ,n ;^e number of Empio.ees jt a", -_: mc . -, ., ^c^Cf :Je Am :u-i: ~r h .n e-.CSs c' '"'"• .-"-non--' c ..;'•(•'c u"ber
'n ,..'. • , '• :es need be g1 vfn and no additionji prem..j— n,-e ' be rjnJ .„r ,„rrf,s -lf ,„IS .r:nd ^'.h ccurt cos's ;md j't --n.". •, '.-.';.. -> -, | he Oro
*•-. >• ,, r„^.ir,:e- -t luCn o'emium penod, uotss i.;Cn \rzre:ic -."i '.•••:'. S^;n ."den-nty =,"!,' be m addition 'e mea"' u-t - • f-sbed
r(?,u . •• ~ .-e •r-u^rr i s cense-ida tion cr merger w.m or :j;:"J'.C . ' ,^ , n< uic.TtiCn ot such " le—n.tv tKe r-A„'ed s"i : ":-"Ct:v gi'C
asse* . "' an.-me' msfirution _ _ __ n -,,lCC, ,Q , hc (Jndc *r ,tr- -• the mst ituhcn -* any such .._, t or leg a I D'O-
CCCd'"" .It the reeucSf O1 '"C Underwriter S"JH furnish i- witn copies ofWARRANTY
E •-. , .'ven-cm made by or on behalf of the Insured wnethe-- c
, i, . j _,,,!,, ,..-,..-, a:! P eadmgs and ether e.ipcs me'em and a' me ;_"'. s'rwrniT s t-!t",'".j"
tamed ,n tr-e application cr otherwise, shall be deemed to bo a warranty . , , . , J . , , , ,i
_. ,_ .„ __ .... i~~ u„,. ~i .r,- i„„» n,. .o.-i -.,:,,.( she I ui-rmit the Ijnderwr,trr n conduct r^e defense c! such suitor legal
p c- th r in t Under iter eiectmn
o* an,th.ne except 'njt it is true to the best of tne knowledge and bencf '^ ' P('r
of *he -ers.-n rr-,Kln- me statement P'-ceedmg, ,n the Insureds na^e. th-eugn attorneys ,.t the Under-
•CC'JRT.COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES ^.,'e- s o-n selection in ,-c even- o* s^cn e;ecticn bv t-e ILode-write',
Aoo.icab'e 'o an Insunng Agreements now or hereafter me mured shall give ail reasonable infc'^ahon ar-.^ ass.stance, other
fo'rmng pjrt ot this bondi t"an pecuniary, which the Underwriter shall deem necessary Q. tne
C Thc 'Jndc.rjo. w,ll .nd'-mnily th. Insured *9'inii co^." co*t, p-UDr, ddtnie of such suit or legal proceeding*'.
THE FOREGOING INSURING AGREEMENTS AND GENERAL AGREEMENTS ARE SUBJECT TO THE
FOLLOWING CONDITIONS AND LIMITATIONS.
there'or,DEFINITIONS
Section ! The following terms, as used in this bond, shall have the
respective meanings stated in this Section1
\jj "Employee" means.
! ( i any officer or employee of the Insured and any officer or em
ployee Ot any predecessor of the Insured whose principal
assets are acquired by the Insured by consolidation or merger
with, or purchase ot assets of, such predecessor,
(2) anv employee of an executive officer cf the Insured,
(3i any duly elected or appointed attorney of the Insured or any
employee of such attorney;
(4) any natural person (sometimes known as conveyancer) duly
eiecfed or appointed by the Insured to draw deeds of con
veyances of lands, to investigate titles of real property or
otherwise to assist the Insured in the making (as distinguished
from the servicing or collection) of mortgage loans, while
performing such services,
(5) any natural person duly elected or appointed by the Insured
to collect rents for the account of the Insured while collecting
or having possession of such rents, and
(6) any natural person appointed by or with the approval of the
Insured to man.e collection of savings from persons who com
pose, or purport to compose, a group making systematic de
posits with the Insured while collecting or having possession
of anv such savings and such savings, while upon The prem
ises where collected and in the possession or custody of *he
said person collecting them, shall be deemed to be in "he
possession of the Insured
Each natural person, partnership or corporation authorized by written
agreement with the Insured to perform services as electronic data
processor of checks or other accounting records of the Insured, herein
called Processor, shall, while performing such services, be deemed
to be an Empiovee as defined in the preceding paragraph Eacn such
Processor and the partners, officers and employees of such Processor
sha I ceiled veiy, be deemed to be one Employee for all the purposes
of 'Or, b-nd. excepting, however, the third paragraph of Section I I
'b' "Property" means money (i e , currency, coin, bank nores, Fed
eral Reserve notes), postage and revenue stamps, U S Savinqs Stamps,
bullion, precious metals of all kinds and in any form and articles made
therefrom, jewelry, watches, necklaces, bracelets, gems, precious and
semi-orecicus stones, bonds, securities, evidences of debts, debentures,
scrip, passbooks held as collateral, certificates, income shares, prepaid
share., fuM paid shares, matured shares, receipts, warrants, rights, trans
fers, ecu pons, drafts, bills cf exchange, acceptances, notes, checks,
money •--:;:e-s trav elcs' letters of credit, warehouse receiots, bills cf
lad'o;;, w.-nerawal orders, abstracts of title, insurance policies, deeds.
m-rtoages upon real estate and, or upon chattels and upon interests
them n. and' assignments of such policies, m.ortgjges and instruments,
and other va'jabie papers, including books cf account and other records
used by the Insured in the conduct of its business, and all other instru
ments similar to or in the nature of the foregoinq, in which the nsu-ed
has an interest or in which the Insured acquired or should have acquired
an interest bv reason of a predecessor's declared financial ccndtion at
the time of the Insured's consolidation or merger with, or purchase of
the p-mcipal assets of, such predecessor or which are held by the insu-ed
for any ;-urpcse or m anv capacity and whether so held gratuitcusiy or
net aid wnemer or not the Insured is liable therefor
EXCLUSIONS
Section 2 THIS BOND DOES NOT COVER:
(a) loss ef'ected directly or indirectly by means of forgery or altera
tion of, on or in any instrument, except when covered by Insuring
Agreement (A), (D), (El, (F) or (G),
(b) loss due to military, naval or usurped power, war or insurrection
unless such loss occurs m transit in the circumstances recited in Insuring
Agreement iO, and unless, when such transit was initiated, there was
no k'l-'wiedge of such military, naval Or usurped power, war cr msur-
rcc'i^n .--n the cart of any person acting for tne Insured m mitiar eg
such -ransif
''c ' :css, n bme of peace or war, directly or indirectly caused bv or
resulting trom the effects of nuclear fission or fusion or radicactiv ty,
provided, however, that this paragraph shall not apply to loss resulting
from industrial uses of nuclear energy,
(d) loss resulting from any act or acts of any director or trustee of rhe
Insured orher rhan one employed as a salaried, pensioned or elected of
ficial cr an Employee of the Insured, except when performing acts com
ing within the scope ot the usual duties of an Employee, or while acting
as a member of any committee duly elected or appointed by resolution
of the board of directors or trustees of the Insured to perform specific.
as distinguished from general, directorial acts on beha'f of rhe Insured.
(e) loss resulting from the complete or partial non-payment of, or
defac !r upon,
(1 any ,oan or transaction in the nature of, or amounting to, a loan
made by or obtained from the Insured, or
(21 any note, account, agreement or ether evidence of debt assigned
or sold to, or discounted or otherwise acquired by, the Insured
whether procured in good faith or through trick, artifice, fraud or false
pretenses unless such loss is covered under Insuring Agreement <A),
(Dior .,Y
(f) loss of Property contained in customers' safe deposit boxes unless
such loss be sustained through any dishonest or fraudulent act of an
Empiovee m such circumstances as shall make the Insured legally liable
g) loss through cashing or paving forged or iltered travelers' checks
or traveie's' checks bearing 'orged endorsen-ents, in whatsoever form
drawn, unless fraud or dishonesty on the part of any of the Emp'cvees
is involved, or ioss of unsold travelers' checks placed m the Custody ot
the Insured with authority to sell, where no fraud or dishonesty en the
part of any of the Employees is involved, unless !a) the Insured is legally
liable for such ioss ot such checks and ibl such checks are later paid or
honored bv the drawer rhereof
(hi loss of Property or loss of privileges through the misplacement
or loss of Property as set forth in Insunnq Agreement (B1 or 'C< while
the Property is in the custody of any armored motor vehicle company,
unless such loss shal. be in excess cf the amount recovered or received
by the Insured under la) the Insured's contract with said armored motor
vehicle company, (b/ insurance earned bv said armored motor vehicle
company for the benefit of users of its service, and (ct all other insurance
and indemnity m force in whatsoever form carried by or for the benefit
of users of satd armored motor vehicle company's service, and then this
bond shall cover only such excess,
(i> loss resulting from the use of credit or charge cards. whether such
cards were issued, or purport to have been issued, bv me Insured or by
anyone other than the Insured, except when covered bv msunrg Agree
ment At,
i|i expense incurred by the Insured for any audit or examination
whether conducted by the insured, by independent accountants or by
State or Federal supervisory authorities and whether or not conducted
by reason of the discovery of loss sustained by the Insured through dis
honest or fraudulent acts of any of the Employees exceot when covered
by the second paragraph of Insuring Agreement (A),
(k) any person, who is a partner, officer or employee of anv Processor
covered under this bond, from and after the time that the Insured or any
partner or officer thereof not in collusion with such person shail have
knowledge Or information that such person has commrmd any fraudu
lent or dishonest act m the service of the lnsured or otherwise whether
such act be committed before or after tne time this brmd is et'echve
ill loss 'ai involving automated mechan cal devices wmch en beha.f
of fhe Insured, disburse money, accept deoesiM, cash checs. drafts or
Similar written instruments or make credit card loans umess such auto
mated mechanical devices are located wit^m an office ot the Insured
and access thereto is not available outside such office cr ib' resulting
from the mechanical failure of such devices to function properly
ASSIGNMENT OF RIGHTS
Section 3 This bend does not a'ford coverage in fav.or c' any Proc
essor, as aforesaid, and upon payment to the insured bv tne Lnderwnter
on account of anv loss through 'rauCu ent or dishonest acts comm.tfed
by anv of fhe partners, officers or employees ot such P-ccesscr whetner
acting alcne cr m col.usicn with others, ar assignment et such e' ,he
Insured's rights ana causes of action as if may h3. e against such
Processor by reason o' such acts so cemmitted shall, to the extent of
such payment, be given by the Insured to the Underwriter, and the
Insured shall execute ail papers necessary to secure to the Underwriter
the rights herein provided for
LOSS—NOTICE —PROOF—LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
Section 4 This bond is for me use and benefit en.',- ef tke l-sured
named m the Declarations and the Underwriter shall m-.t be 'ab'e here
under for less sustained bv anyone otne' than the lniLred unless me
Insured, in its sole disc'ct'O" 3nd at its option, shall mc u-!e such less m
the Insured's proof cf less At me earnes" practicable "-"mem a'ter dis
covery ot any ioss hereunder me insured s,*-ci:I give t-e ..>-ofwrter
written notice thereof and sna'l also withm six n-onms ,Ttc sucn dis
covery furnish to the Underwriter affirmative proof ;f less with iuil
particulars If claim is made under this bond for less of securities,
the Underwriter shall net be luble unless each of such securities is
identified in such proof of loss bv certificate or bon i numroer Legal
proceedings for recovery of any loss hereunder shah not be brought
poor to the exp.ration o' sixty days after such ; roof ot —ss is fi:ed with
the Underwriter nor after the expirat.OO cf tv-enty-t - or r~-ntns frbm
the discovery of such loss, except that any ac' en o- ; -oceeo "- to re
cover hereunder on account ot any judgment against the nsureG m
any suit mentioned m General Agreement C 3r re recover a'*ernevs'
fees paid m any such suit, shal.1 be begun withm twi n-v-tcur r-o-,ths
from tne date uocn which 'he ludgment m such suit mal! beccme
fmai If the Insured be a Federal Savings and Loan Assc-ciation or a
state-chartered association insured by the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation, but not subiect to state supervisory authority,
it is unoerstocd and agreed that in case of any loss hereunder discovered
either dy the Insured cr the Federal Home Loan Ban- ct w.mcn tne
Insured is a memrer. the said Federal Home Loan Biik is emoowemd
to give notice merecr to the Underwriter within tne period limited
therefor If any 'nutation embodied m this bend is prohibited bv any
law controlling fhe construction hereof, such limitation snail be deemed
to be amended so as to be equal to the minimum pened of limitation
permitted by such law VALUATION
Section 5 Securities
The Underwriter shall settle in kind its liability under this bond on
account of a loss of any securities, or at the option of the Insured shall
pay to the Insured the cost of replacing such securities, determined by
the market value thereof at the time of such settlement In case of a
loss of subscription, conversion, redemption or deposit pn.ileges, as
above set fortn, the amount of such loss shail be the value of. such
privileges immediately preceding the expiration thereof :f such se-
cunt.es cannot be replaced or have no quoted market value, cr if such
„nv. leges nave no quoted market value, their value shal; be determined
bv agreement or arbitration. Any loss under this bond cf currency or
funds of any country shall be paid in the currency or funds cf such
country o'. a' the option of the Insured, in the United States cf Amenta
cy.'ar equivalent thereof determined by the rate of exchange at tne time
of fee payment cf such loss. Any other loss sustained at any of rhe In
sured s e-fices and payable in money shall be paid in the currency or
(unds cf the country in which such office ts located or, at the option o<
the insured, in the United States of America dollar equivalent the-eof de-
term,nec by the --ate of exchange at the time of the payment of sucn loss
Loss of Securities
t me aopi.caole coveraqe of this bond is not sufficient m amount to
mder-n-m, rhe msurec m full for the loss of securities for wmch caim
•s mace n^eunde' 'he liability of the Underwriter under this bond is
i-t- -ed to the payment for, or the duplication of, so much of such secun-
hes as "as a -alue equal to the amount of such applicable coverage ard
m sucn event me Insured shall assian to the Underwriter 3\- its n-nrs
t.fle ang mte-est in and to those securities for which sue- payment o-
Cub'icahon .s made by the Underwriter
Bocks of Account and Other Records
In case or loss of, cr damage to, Property consisting of bocks cf ac
count or ;mer records used by the Insured in the cenduct of its business,
f-e Lnoerwnter sha.i be liable under this bond cr-iv if such books or
recces are ac'ua.iy 'eproduced and then for not more man the cost c
b arr. cocks b an* pages or ether materials plus the ccsr of iabc for the
ac'-a faoscriphon 0r copying of data which shall have been furnished
.y me .nsu'ed m order to reproduce such books and other records
Property ether than Securities or Records
In case cf less of, or damage to, any Properry orner rhan securities,
ccoxs o- account or other records as aforesaid cr damage to rhe mferi0,
er '-e nsuree s o'hees. or loss of cr damage to the 'urmsn.-g^ rixtures,
stahone', s-ppiies a"C\ equipment therein, the Underwriter snai. nor be
lisp e •-.' mere man the actual cash value of sucn Property or ot such
*u"- -~n n-s --xtures. stationery, supplies and equipment or 'or more
m3n -r-e ac'^al cost of repairing such Property or ot'.ces. furnishings.
• *r-m; statione-y. supples and equipment, or of repiacmq same w,m
C-roc-'. c matenai or hxe quality and value The Underwriter may. at
• i e cc* .r pa, such actuai cash value, or maise such reparrs or replace-
—c-- , •• me Underwriter and the 'nsured cannot agree upon sucn casn
•a „e -• -.jcn cost of repass or replacements, such cash vaiue or sucn
ccs' ;ha ' be dete"—inea by arbitration
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SALVAGE
-n 6 If the Insured shail sustain any loss covered bv this bond
-cceds fho amount or coverage provided by mis bong C'us t-e
; e A—runt " any, applicable to such loss, fhe Insured sna'i be
': a: mcc-enes made after payment by the Underw-iter of loss
"- m ; oond except recoveries on account o; loss of secu'ities
o"1- ,n the second paragraph ot Section 5 or -eccvenes 'rem
e ms^raoce, remsu-ance. security and indemn -y Mxen bv or
~c-p- - ot "••; e-ce'wntcr. by whomsoever n-1cie !ess the actual
=i-c;. ^~ -,uz-, -ccovenes. until reimbursed for such excess loss
•c~amder or .• f -here be no such excess loss, any sucn re-
ma i oe appi.ed first in reimbursement of the U.nde'wnter and
c .n -e mpur^emenf or ,hc Insured for rha' part c' such less
-i:n ^cductmle A-ount The Insured shall execute ail necessary
b secure to the Underwriter the rignts herein provided *0-
LIMiT Cr LIABILITY
n / Payment of loss under this bond sha I --ot reduce fhe
c- toe U.n.oc'wnrer under this bond for omer losses whenever
i PROVIDED, however, that the total
-ice- *ms bono on account of
"•• caused bv any one act of burglary, robbery or hold-up c-
'e~pf thereat, in which no Employee is ccnccned c m--li-
ifed or
•-. -,m respect to any one unintentional cr negligcnr ac' cr
•" :sicn en me part of any person (whether one o' me E—p levees
"C 'esurnng in damage to or destruction cr mi5p accent cf
:berty. or
ss -rner than those specified in (al and 'b' preceding caused
a ac's or emissions by any person 'whether one of th.- Em-
"•'"•CS cr n-r or 3l' acts or omissions in which Such person is
ss ;•"?• 'i-jn -nose soecibed m 'a;, (bi and (c p-cccdmg rcsu f-
d '-em anv one casus.tv cr event
: to 'ne L--if of L.abi.itv stated m Item 3 of me Dec 'arjti-.i?
"-•no z- amen-;.—ent thereof or to rhe amount et the ape. cab e
c- ti-.s oond r such amount pe smaller, irrespective of tne fetal
lability ot the Lnder-
SON.ACCUMULATION OF LIABILITY
^less ot the number of years this bond shal. con'mue
ibe- cf premiums which shail be cavable or paid, the
erwiter under this bond with 'espcer to any .oss
••v :DcD clause of Section 7 of this bond sna.l not be
TS from year to vear or from period to period
OF L'ABILITY UNDER TH^S BONO
AND PRIOR INSURANCE
esoect to anv ioss set forth ,n subsection -c< c< the
-ectien 7 of thiS bond which is recoveraole or
<eoai
"~e Und
L I V.: T
-ct.e- 9 vv
v}n w,j-nes5 whereof, the Underwriter has caU;,ed th
recovered in whole or in part under any ether bonds or policies issued
by the Underwriter to rhe insured or to any predecessor ,n interest of
rhe Insured and terminated or canceled or allowed to expire and in
wmch the penod for discovery has not expired at the time any such
loss thereunder is discovered, the total liability of the Underwriter under
rhis bond and under such other bonds or policies shall not exceed, in the
aggregate, the amount earned hereunder on such loss or the amount
available to the Insured under such other bonds or policies, as limited
by the terms and conditions thereof, for any such loss if the latter
amount be the larger
If tne coverage of this bond supersedes in whole or in part the cover
age of any other bond or policy of insurance issued by an Insurer other
than the Underwriter and terminated, canceled or allowed to expire, the
Underwriter, with rcspecf to any loss sustained prior to such termination,
cancellation or expiration and discovered withm the period permitted
under such other bond or pc'icv for the discovery of loss thereunder,
shah be iiable under this bong only for that part of such loss covered
by this bond as is in excess cf The amour: recoverable or recovered en
account of such ioss under such other Dond or policy, anything to the
contrary m such other bond or policy notwithstanding
OTHER INSURANCE OR INDEMNITY
Section 10. If the insured carries or holds any ctner insurance cr
indemnity covering any loss covered by this bond, the Underwriter sna'i
be liable hereunder cniy for that part cf sucn loss whicn is in e.cess cf
the amount recoverable or recovered 'rem such otner insurance 0' in
demnity In no event shail the Underwriter be habie tor more than --e
amount of the coverage of this bond applicable to such loss, subject,
nevertheless, to Section 7 cf this bond
TERMINATION OR CANCELLATION
Section 11 This bond shall be deeded terminated or canceled as an
entirety—iaJ thirty days after me receipt by the Insured of a written
notice from the Underwriter of its des.re to terminate or cancel this
bond, or (bJ immediately upon tne receipt bv fhe Underwriter of a written
-eguesf from the Insured to rermmare or cancel this bend, or ic1 imme
diately upon the taking over of fhe msu-ed by a receiver or other liqui
dator or by State or Federal offic-a s, or -a- immediately upon the taxing
o-er of the Insured by another institution The Underwriter snj.l, en
request, refund to the Insured the unearned premium, cemputed'pre
rafa, it this bond oe terminated or cance eo or reduced by notice f-om,
or at the instance of, the Lnderwr.ter. c- if terminated or canceled as
provided in sub-section c or 'd' ot this paragraph The Underwriter
shall refund to the Insured thC unearned premium computed at snet
rates if this bond be terminated or cancired or reduced by notice from
or at the instance of. me ms.jre--1
If the Insured be a Federal Savings and Loan Association or a state
chartered association insured bv the Federal Savings and Loan Insur
ance Corporation, no termmar.cn c cancel'at.en of "this bond m its
entirety, whether bv the Insured or the underwriter, snail take effect
prior to the expiration of ten days from the receipt by the Federal
Home Loan Bank of which me Insured is a member or written nctice
of such termination cr eancenaron Un ess an earlier date cf termination
or cancellation is approved by sa'd "ederal Home Loan Bank
This bond shall be deemed mm-maied o- cance ed as to any Employee
a1 as soon as rhe Injured s^al 'earn e< any drsnoncsf or fraudu.e"t
act on the part ot such EmCiCVec without prejud.ee to the loss of any
Property then in trans." t tne custody c< sucn Emp.ovc or 'br f,fmen
davs a-ter the receipt by me m^-cj rjf a wr,rren notice tmm the Under-
wnter cf its desire to ter-.narc -o-.cc m,s pond as to such Employee
RIGHTS AFTER TERMINATION OR CANCELLATION
Sect on 12 At any time prior 'o the termination or cancellation
of this bond as an entirety, whether bv fhe Insured cr the Under
writer, the Insured may give to the Underwriter notice that it desires
under this bond an additional period c* twelve months w.thin when
to discover loss sustained by tne Insured pnor to the effective dare cf
such termination or cancellahcn and shall pay an addit.onal premium
therefor If this bond is terminated or canceled as an entirety by
reason of the taking over of me Insured by a receiver or other liqui
dator or bv State cr Federal officials, such receiver or other liquidator
or State or Federal officials snail have the rights of the Insured ana
be sub.ect to the same limitations as set forth ,n this paragraph pro
vided mat such rights are exe'esed bv notice to the Underwriter witmn
thirty days after sucn Insured is taken over by such receiver or other
liquidator or State or Federal ctf.c als and provided, further that such
Insured has not previously e.emised such r,ghts Lpcn receipt cf sucn
notice 'rom the Insured or from such receiver or ether liquidator cr
State or Federal oft.ciais. me U-de-wnter s-a'l g.ve ,ts wntten censer-
thereto provided, however mat- Such additional penod of t.me shail
terminate forthwith on the effective date of any other insurance
(.-) obtained by the Insured or ,ts successors m business, other than
such receiver or other hguidato- or State or Federal officials,
replacing m wholr- or m part the msurance af'orded bv this bend,
whether or not sucn othc- insurance provides coverage tor loss
sustained prior to its effective date, cr
(bi obtained by such receiver. , guidator or State or Federal officials
replacing m whoie or ,n part the insurance afforded by this
bend but onlv d such other insurance provides coverage to
seme extent tor loss susta.ned prior to its eftectivo date, and
the event that such additior
he'em provided, the Underwriter snail refund any unearned premium
* *
is bond to be executed on th/? Declarations paoe
rjd of time
RIDER
To be attached to and form part of Blanket Bond, Standard Form No. 22 , No. 19 p 3041 BCA
in favor of Home Savings & Loan
It is agreed that.
1 The attached bond is amended
(a) by deleting the second paragraph of subsection (a) of Section 1;
(b) by deleting the exclusion from Section 2 which reads as follows:
"any person, who is a partner, officer or employee of any Processor covered under this bond,
from and after the time that the insured or any partner or officer thereof not in collusion
with such person shall have knowledge or information that such person has committed any
fraudulent or dishonest act in the service of the Insured or otherwise, whether such act be
committed before or after the time this bond is effective";
(c) by deleting Section 3.
2 This rider shall become effective as of noon on June 21, 1982
as specified tn fhe attached bond
Accepted' Signature Waived
DELETE ELECTRONIC DATA PROCESSING COVERAGE
FOR USE WITH BLANKET BONOS, STANDARD FORMS NOS 14 22 AND
?4 DISCOVERY" OR "LOSS SUSTAINED' FORMS AND STANDARD FORM
NO lb, TO DELETE ELECTRONIC DATA PROCESSING COVERAGE
RFVISED TO JUNE. 1974.
SR S87(.b Printed in U.S.A
standard time
RIDER
To be attached to and form part of Blanket Bond, Standard Form No. 22 , No. 19 F 3041 BCA
in favor of Home Savings & Loan
It is agreed that:
Dollars ($5,000.00
LiaebH^ Art°hUnn' ^^ thCn f°; SuUCh eXC6SS °n,y' but 'n no ev^ for ™* than the Limit of
^c^ - —d— —of or the amount of
2
writer not
The Insured shall in the time and in the manner prescribed in the attached bond give the Under
writer is llhlP th^ °SS ° 1 6kmducovered bV the terms of the attached bond, whether o^not the Unde -Cp^^ '«*«' °< ^ U"d-writer shal, f„e with ,t abnef statement^
standardS^ttS^ J™ 21' ^
Accepted; Signature Waived
EXCESS OR AGGREGATE DEDUCTIBLE — DISCOVERY fORM
f-,0R .'^Jt'™ 3|-ANKET BONDS. STANDARD FORMS NOS S M 22 AND
i v'-Y IZZX Ek7t"„„0?MS WHEN '"UED AS EXCESS OVER an LNDER-
•\ a ??L[^T 0R T0 PROVIDE A DEDUCTIBLE AMOUNT UNDER ALL
AN AGGREGATE BANTS W'™ ™E FOftGERY UEDUCT;BlE APpLY NG ON
REV'SED TO JANLARY 1975
SR S684c Pr,n(ecj in U S A
RIDER
To be attached to and form part of Blanket Bond, Standard Form No. 22, No. 19 F 3041 BCA
in favor of Home Savings & Loan
It is agreed that;
term,nated'ort^n?JuHhe attachfd *0nd to *he contrary notwithstanding, the attached bond shall be deemed
errn.nated or canceled as an entirety sixty days after the receipt by the Insured of a wntten not.re from the
Underwriter of .ts desire to terminate or cancel such bond
2. This nder shall become effective as of noon on June 21, 1932
CANCELATION RIDER
"nO*THL^s^N^ l£;WW*5WWoS?X?r £&
"°rtetV b°; xr^zN^tN ™e bond is cancePeVaYIn0^
NOTE NOT APPLICABLE TO STANDARD FORM NO 10
REVISFD TO APRIL 1974
iR "b923t> Printed in U S A
Tab 4
RIDER
To be attached to and form part of Blanket Bo~d Standard Form
in favor of Home Savings & Loan
It is aareec that:
22 Jo 19 F 3041 BCA
1. The Underwriter shall no: oe i so!
of Prccerty away frcm an oftice o; me Ins
'a) to go bodily harm to any oe-son exceot ;oss of Property m fa-s t m t-e custody cr any perse-
acting as messenger orovcea mat .•.•ne-. sucn transit was mi:ia:eo :here .'.as r,c knowledge bv tne
Insured of any sucn mreat. or a
(b) to do damage to prenrses cr orcoerty,
exceot when covered under Insuring Agreement;Clause (A).
Yer Ye attached bond or account of loss f
: as a resuit of a threat.
2. Th's nder shall become effective as cf 12 01 a m. on June 21. 19S2
•s scecified :n the attachea bond.
Accected: Signature Waived
EXTORTION EXCLUSION RIDER
Y" '--E '•'•"•T1- A'''<' ^LANKFT tiOND FORM '.OT ."TjTi'«jr
t.ln ;':l'_; c\ m excjee ^oss i-rojch si.h = =--'.d —
AA'iv -a-.,. AN OFFICE OF THE A'SJ^tD
" =: SEE! '0 3E"Ev-3EP. 1980
SR 5935C F-.-iteC in U S A.
i = ;:pehtt
T*?^--
:h the surrender
standard time
RIDER
To be attached to and form part of Blanket Bond. Standard Form No. 2Z No. 19 f "5041 BCA
in favor of Home Savings & Loan
It is agreed that
1. The attached bond is amended by deleting subsection (i) of Section 2 and by substituting in lieu
thereof the following;
"(i) loss resulting from:
the use of credit, debit, charge, access, convenience, identification or other cards
(a) in obtaining credit; or
(b) in gaining access to automated mechanical devices which, on behalf of the Insured, dis
burse money, accept deposits, cash checks, drafts or similar written instruments or make
credit card loans; or
(c) in gaining access to Point of Sale Terminals, Customer-Bank Communication Terminals,
or similar electronic terminals of Electronic Funds Transfer Systems,
whether such cards were issued, or purport ';o have been issued, by the Insured or by anyone other than the
Insured, except when such loss is covered by Insuring Agreement (A)".
2. This rider shall become effective as of 12:01 a.m. on June 21, 1982 standard time
as specified in the attached bond.
Accepted: Signature Waived
CREDIT, DEBIT, CHARGE, ACCESS, CONVENIENCE,
IDENTIFICATION OR OTHER CARD EXCLUSION
FOR USE WITH BLANKET BONDS, STANDARD FORMS NOS 5 AND 22.
•DISCOVERY" OR "LOSS SUSTAINED" FORM TO EXCLUDE LOSS RESULT
ING FROM THE USE OF CREDIT DEBIT. CHARGE ACCESS. CONVENIENCE
IDENTIFICATION OR OTHER CARDS IN OBTAINING CRED'T OR IN GAINING
ACCESS TO AUTOMATED MECHANICAL DEVICES OR ELECTRONIC TERMI
NALS OF ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER SYSTEMS
REVISED TO APRIL, 1977.
SR 5972a Printod in U.S.A.
RIDER
To be attached to and form part of Blanker Bond, Standard Form No 22, No 19 F 3041 BCA
in favor of Home Savings & Loan
It is agreed that
1 Subsection (I) of Section 2 of the attached bond is deleted
2 The Underwater shall not be liable under rhe attached bond on account of loss involving automated
mecnamca devices which, on behalf of the Insured, disburse money, accept deposits, cash checks, drafts or
Similar written instruments or make credit card loans unless
(a) such automated mechanical devices are situated withm an office of the Insured which is
permanently staffed bv an Employee whose duties are those usually assigned to an association
teller whe-ner or not public access to such devices is from outside tneconfines of such office, or
fb) such automated mecnamcal devices are not situated withm an office covered under (a) above
but are situated on premises at a location listed in the Schedule in paragraph numbered 3 beiow!
but in no event shall the Underwriter be liable under the attached bond for loss (including loss of Property)
d) as a result of damage to such automated mechanical devices situated within any office
referred to m (a) above resulting from vandalism or mancious mischief perpetrated from
outside such office, or
(ii) as a result of damage to such automated mechanical devices situated on any premises
referred to in (o! above resulting from vandalism or malicious mischief, or
(in! as a result of damage to the interior of that portion of a building on any premises referred
to m fb) above to wh,ch the public has access resulting from vandalism or malicious mis
chief, cr
(iv) as a result o* mechanical breakdown or failure of such automated mechanical devices to
function properlv. or
Iv) through r-usolacement or mysterious unexpia.nable disaooearance while such Property is(or is supposed to be.1 located withm anv sucn automated mechanical devices, or
(vi) to any customer of the Insured or to anv representative of such customer while such person
is on anv premises referred to in lb) aoove. or
(vn) as a result of the use of credit, charge, access convenience, identification or other cards
m gam.ing access to such automated mecnamcal devices wnerner sucn cares were issued or
purport tc have been issued, by the Insured or bv anyone other than the Insured,
except when such loss is covered under Insuring Agreement (A)
3 Schedule of Device Locations-
DEviCE
LOCAT.O'
Nil
Limit qf ^.AS i jv
* T E ' C H
DEVICE lCCaT'CN
Nil
JEDUC'BLE AMOUNT
AT EACH
DEVICE LOCATION
Nil
4 The liability c< the Underwriter under the Schedule ser forth ,n oa'aa-aoh numoered 3 ,s limited
to tne sum set forth cppcs.te each dev.ee location, after the application of rhe deductible amount ,t any .fbeing understood however 'hat such liability shail be apart of and no. ,n add,.,on to the Limit of Liability
stated ,n item 3 of tr,e Declarat.ons of the attached bond
5 This rider shall become effecti
as specified m the attached bond
Accepted Signature Waived
•e as of noon on June 21. 1952
AUTOMATIC T[IL(« MACHlMI
tXCLUJIOM L1M1TIO Sn rilKilli COVie*S[ ICMIOULf Ot
CO.[»lD LOCATION! OF U-iUINOICI OIV1CIS
'S" V.1£ •!""" SAVINGS AND LO*N BLANKET ST-D SFAMDABO E.-BM
,7 , :V5°" . Y „„VSS ---I"A.'.iC CQB« TO PBOVIDF. AN
!**Cr AND A SCHmULE 01
It. '.1% — -• CiJNNECT'ON
,'i'D 'OB DI'.BUHSING MONEY
C"El«5 3BACS CB OTntfl ',i«lLAB
UNC CSEOIT CABD LOASlS
E«CLLi:;
CO/fBEO LOCAT.CNS 6r ,N,--|.
ACCEfT ng ^rsc^iTS Caw ;r, r,
WBirrEN in^-^mEn-s OB
ADOPTED
standard time
RIDER
To be attached to and torm part ol Blanket Bond, Standard Form No 22 . No 19 F 30^1 BCA
in favor of Hotie Savings & Loan
It is agreed thai:
1. The attached bond is amended bv deleting the General Agreemeni captoned ADDITIONAL OFF'CE:
OR EMPLOYEES—CONSOLIDATION OR MERGER and by substituting in the p:ace thereof the loiiowmg
ADDITIONAL OFFICES OR EMPLOYEES-
CONSOLIDATION. MERGER OR PURCHASE OF ASSETS—NOTICE
If the Insured shall while this bond is in lorce. establish any additional otlice or offices cher
than by consolidation or merger with, or purchase ot assets ot, another institution sucn ci^ce or
offices shall be automatically covered hereunder from the dates of their esiaolisnmeni. lescec-
tiveiy, and without the requirement of notice to the Underwriter ol an increase a unrig any
premium period in the number of offices or Employees at any of the otlices covered hereunae
or the payment of additional premium tor the remainder ot such premium period
If the Insured shall, while this bond is in force, merge or consolidate with or Purchase the
assets of, another institution, the Insured shall not have such coverage as is ancrded unoer
this boid for loss which:
(a) has occurred or will occur in offices or premises,
(b) has been caused or will be caused by an employee or employees, or
(c) has arisen or will arise out of the assets
acquired by the Insured as a result of such merger, consolidation or purchase ol assets; unless
the Insured shall.
n) cause to be delivered to the Underwriter written notice ot the proposed merger ccnsclida-
lion or purchase of assets at least 60 days prior to tne propcsea effective cale ot the merger,
consolidation or purchase of assets,
(ii) obtain the written consent of the Underwriter lo extend the coverage provided Cy this
bone to such additional offices, Employees and other exposures and
(ni) oay to the Underwriter an additional premium computed pro rata f-om tre date ot such
consolidation, merger or purchase of assets to the end of tne CLrrem premium penoa
2. The attached bond is further amended by inserting alter the phrase
" any olficer or employee of any predecessor of the lnsurec whose principal assets are accuired
by rhe Insured by consolidation or merger with o- purchase of assets of. such predecessor
in the definition of "Employee." the following words'
" , if coverage is extended to such persons under the terms of this bond"'
3 The attached bond is further amended by inserting a'ter the phrase "in which the Insj-ed has an
interest or" in ne definition of "Property', the following words.
" . if coverage is extended under the terms of this bond,"
4 This rider shall become effective as of noon on June 21, 1982
as specified in the attached bond.
Accepted. Signature Waived
NOTICE OF MEHGE*. CONSOLIDATION OB PURCHASE
OF ASSETS BIOEB
FOP USF WITH Bl*N<cT EHUD il"*D»°0 IC»"S NOS •> *"-0 2> D'S
COVFHY OH '.OSS SuSTAisEO FC-*M 10 Hi QUI"1: '-'.'iCE ro '»£
UNIlPwHiIER 0' THE Nonius UFBGER CON5QL <D" lON OP PUR
CHA5E (jF ASSETS OF «WT"EP iiMiTuTICN
ADOPTED JANUARY 1977
SP 603? PrinHd in U !• A
standard
RIDER
To be attached to and form part of BlanKet Bond, Standard Form 22, No. 19 F 3041 BCA
in favor of Home Savings & Loan
It is agreed that:
1. The attached bond is hereby amended by deleting the first paragraph of insuring Agreement (A)
anc by substituting in lieu thereof the following:
"(A) Loss resulting directly from one or more dishonest or fraudulent acts of an Employee, committed
anywnere and whether committed alone cr in collusion with others, including loss of Property resulting from
sucn acts of an Employee, which Property is held by the Insured for any purpose or m any capacity and
whether so held gratuitously or not and whether or not the Insured is liable therefor
Dishonest or fraudulent acts as used mthis Insuring Agreement shall mean only dishonest or fraudulent
acts committed by such Employee with the manifest intent:
(a) to cause the Insured to sustain such loss; and
(to) to obtain financial benefit for the Employee, or for any other person or organization intended by
the Employee to receive such benefit, other than salaries, commissions, fees, bonuses, promotions,
awards, profit sharing, pensions or other employee benefits earned in the normal course of employ
ment."
2. In addition to the existing Exclusions in the attached bond, the Underwriter snail not be liable under
any Insuring Agreement for:
(i) Potential income, including but not limited to interest and dividends, not realized by the Insured
because of a loss covered under this bond.
(ii) All damages of any type for which the Insured is legally liable except direct compensatory damaoes
arising from a loss covered under this oond.
(iii) Less resulting from payments made or withdrawals from a deooslor's account involving funds
erroneously credited to such account, unless such payments are mace to or withdrawn by such
depositor or representative of such depositor who is within the offxe of the Insured at the time of
such payment or withdrawal, cr un.!ess such loss is covered under Insuring Agreement (A).
3. This rider shall become effective as of noon on June 21, 1932 standard time
as specified in the attached bend.
Accepted: Signature Waived
DEFINITION OF DISHONESTY - EXCLUSIONS
rOR JSE ATh 9LANKE7 BOND STANDARD cORM SO. 22 ' DISCOVERY"
AS„' LOSS SUSTAISED' FORMS TO REVISE INSJRING ASREEVEST Al
ASD A2Z CE.RTA'N EXCLUSIONS.
AZCP7Z2 JULY, 1976.
SR 604: p- red ,n U.S.A.
RIDER
To be attached to and form part of Blanket Bond, Standard Form No. 22, No. 19 F 3041 BCA
in favor of Home Savings & Loan
It is agreed that:
1. The attached bond is amended by the addition of General Agreement A.2 in the General Agreements
section of the bond as follows:
NOTICE OF CHANGE OF CONTROL
A.2 Upon the Insured's obtaining knowledge of a transfer of its outstanding voting stock or voting
rights (including rights with respect to withdrawable accounts) which resu ts in a change in
control of the Insured, the Insured shall within thirty days of such knowledge give written
notice to the Underwriter setting forth,
1. the names of the transferors and transferees (or the names of the benelicial owners if the
shares or voting rights are registered in another name),
2. the total number of shares or voting rights owned by the transferors and the transferees(or the beneficial owners), both immediately before and after the transfei, and
3. the total number of outstanding shares of voting stock or voting rights.
As used in this General Agreement, control means the power to determine the management
or policy of the Insured by virtue of voting stock or voting rights ownersmp Achange in
ownership of voting stock or voting rights which results in direct or indirect ownership by a
stockholder or an affiliated group of stockholders of ten per cent (10%) or more of the
outstanding voting stock or voting rights of the Insured shall be presumed to result in a chanoe
of control for the purpose of the reguired notice.
Failure to give the required not ce shall result in termination of coverage of this bond effective
upon the date of stock transfer or voting rights transfer for any loss mwhich any transferee is
concerned or implicated. y "dnb,eree IS
2. This rider shall become effective as of noon on June 21, 1982 c,,:nH,fH t
,. , ' standard time
as specified in the attached bond.
Accepted; Signature Waived
NOTICE OF CHANGE OF CONTROL. RIDER
FOR USE WITH BLANKET BOND. STANDARD FORM NO 12 PIsmvFRV
OR LOSS SUSTAINED" TO REQUIRE NOTICE TO THE UNDERWRITER OF ACHANGE OF CONTROL OF THE INSURED. un^hwhiil-h o A
ADOPTED JULY, 1976,
SR 6042 Printed In U.S.A.
EFFECTIVE TIME RIDER ™m«B-««„
ENDORSEMENT 203
(Edition ol January, 1977)
To be attached to and form part of Policy or Bond No. 19 F 3041 BCA
issued to or in favor of Home Savings & Loan
The time of inception and the time of expiration, termination or cancelation of this policy or bond anrt
of any schedule, endorsement or nder attached or to be attached shall be 12:01 a m standard time
To the extent that coverage in this policy or bond replaces coverage in other policies or bonds terminal
mg at noon standard time on the inception date of this policy or bond, coverage under this policy rrbSnd
shall not become efleclive until such other coverage has terminated. y
Effective as of June 21, 1982
r^.,-^!."! AHY B0ND *ND ™E COMPREHENSIVE 3-D AND BLANKET
Ffln0M\0OOLNClTE0S/?°0,CHA':G£ ™E ''^ °F INCEPII°* °" TERM,NATO,
ADOPTED JANUARY 1977
SR 8059 [1) Prmua in USA.
RIDER
To be attached to and form part of Blanket Bond, Standard Form No.22 , No. 19 r 3041 BCA
in favor of Home Savings & Loan
It is agreed that:
1. The Underwriter shall not be liable under the attached bond for:
Loss resulting directly or indirectly from payments made or withdrawals from a depositor's account
involving items of deposit which are not finally paid for any reason, including but not limited to Forgery
or any other fraud, unless such payments or withdrawals are physically received by such depositor or
representative of such depositor who is within the office of the Insured at the time of such payment or
withdrawal, or except when covered under Insuring Agreement/Clause (A).
2. If this rider is attached to Standard Form No. 5, then the following language of Exclusion (e) is deleted:
". . . or loss resulting from payments made or withdrawals from any depositor's account by reason of
uncollected items of deposit having been credited by the Insured to such account, unless such payments
are made to, or withdrawn by, such depositor or representative of such depositor who is within the office
of the Insured at the time of such payment or withdrawal, or unless such loss is covered under Insuring
Agreement (A)."
3. This rider shall become effective as of 12:01 a.m. on June 21, 1982 standard time
as specified in the attached bond.
Accepted: Signature Waived
UNCOLLECTED FUNDS EXCLUSION
FOR USE WITH BLANKET BONDS, STANOARD FORMS NOS 5 AND 22
"DISCOVERY" OR "LOSS SUSTAINED'' FORMS AND FORM NO 23 TO EX
CLUDE ANY LOSS RESULTING FROM THE PAYOUT OR WITHDRAWAL OF
UNCOLLECTED ITEMS OF DEPOSIT.
REVISED TO DECEMBER. 19B0.
SR 6064a Primed In U.S.A.
RIDER
To be attached to and form part of Bond No 19 F 3041 BCA
in favor of HOME SAVINGS & LOAN, ET AL
It is agreed that:
1. The Deductible Amount applicable under the attached bond to loss
sustained through acts or defaults committed by Employees shall not apply
to loss sustained by any Employee Welfare Benefit Plan or Employee Pension
Benefit Plan covered under such bond through acts or defaults committed by
any Employee of any such Plan.
2. This rider is effective as of 12-3-82
Signed, sealed and dated
January 3, 1983
SR 5817a
THE ,CTNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY
BYj
Sheila Diggins, Attorney-in-facit
RIDER
To be attached to and form part of Bond No. 19 F 3041 BCA
in favor of Home Savings & Loan, et al
It is agreed that:
1. If the attached bond, in accordance with its agreements, limitations and conditions covers loss
sustained by two or more Employee Welfare or Pension Benefit Plans or sustained by any such Plan in addi
tion to loss sustained by an Insured other than such Plan, it is the obligation of the Insured or the Plan Ad-
mmistrator(s) of such Plans under Regulations published by the Secretary of Labor implementing Section 13
of the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958 to obtain under one or more bonds or policies
issued by one or more Insurers an amount of coverage for each such Plan at least equal to that which would
be required if such Plans were bonded separately.
2. In compliance with the foregoing, payment by the Underwriter in accordance with the agreements
limitations and conditions of the attached bond shall be held by the Insured or if more than one by the
Insured first named therein for the use and benefit of any Employee Welfare or Pension Benefit plan sus
taining loss covered by the attached bond and to the extent that such payment is in excess of the amount of
coverage required by such Regulations to be carried by said Plan sustaining such loss, such excess shall be
held for the use and benefit of any other such Plan also covered under the attached bond in the event that
such other Plan discovers that it has sustained loss covered thereunder.
3. If money or other property of two or more Employee Welfare or Pension Benefit P ans covered under
the attached bond is co-mingled, recovery under the attached bond for loss of such money or other prop
erty through fraudulent or dishonest acts of Employees shall be shared by such Plans en a pro rata basis
in accordance with the amount for which each such Plan is required to carry bonding coverage in accordance
with the applicable provisions of said Regulations.
4. Nothing herein contained shall vary, alter or extend any of the agreements, limitations and condi
tions of the attached bond.
5. This rider is effective as of noon on 12-3-82
Signed, sealed and dated {enter below)
1-5-83
THE /ETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY
HOME SAVINGS & LOAN, ET AL
Accepted:
BY:
PAY-OVER RIDER
FOR USE WITH ALL FORMS OF STANDARD BONDS, WHEN TWO OR MORE
EMPLOYFE WELFARE OR PENSION BENEFIT PLANS ARE COVf'REO THERE
UNDER CR WHEN ANY SUCH PLAN IS COVERED THEREUNDER IN AD
DITION TO ANOTHER INSURED, TO COMPLY WITH THE REGULATIONS
OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AS TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF LOSS
PAYMENTS.
REVISED TO JANUARY, 1963.
SR 5796a Printed in U.S A.
(F-101 1) Ed. 1-63
By^<U^..L..C-C^-r^< C^.^lffi.
Sheila Diggins, Attorney-ityf/ct
(SEAL)
J >
RIDER
To be attached to and form part of Bond No 19 F 3041 BCA
in favor of Home Savings & Loan
effective as of June 21, 1982
In consideration of the premium charged for the attached bond, it is hereby agreed that
1 From and after the time this Rider becomes effective the Insured under the attached bond
are
Home Savings & Loan
Home Savings & Loan Profit Sharing Plan
2. The first named Insured shall act for itself and for each and all of the Insured for all the
purposes of the attached bond.
3 Knowledge possessed or discovery made by any Insured or by any partner or officer thereof
snail for all the purposes of the attached bond constitute knowledge or discovery by all the Insured.
4 If, prior to the termination of the attached bond in its entirety, the attached bond is ter
minated as to any Insured, there shall be no liability for any loss sustained by such Insured unless
discovered before the time such termination as to such Insured becomes effective.
5. The liability of the Underwriter for loss or losses sustained by any or all of the Insured shall
not exceed the amount for which the Underwriter would be liable had all such loss or losses
been sustained by any one of the Insured. Payment by the Underwriter to the first named Insured of
loss sustained by any Insured shall fully release tne Underwriter on account of such loss.
6. If the first named Insured ceases for any reason to be covered under the attached bond
then the Insured next named shall thereafter be considered as the first named Insured for all the '
purposes of the attached bond.
7. The attached bond shall be subject to all us agreements, limitations and conditions exceot
as herein expressly modified.
8. This Rider shall become effective as of ^SKX Qf thg
of December ,1982 the beginning
3rd
day
Signed, sealed and dated (enter below)
January 5, 1983
THE /ETNA CASUALTY ANDSURETY COMPANY
Accented
HOME SAVINGS & LOAN
BY:
JOINT INSURED RIOER — DISCOVERY FORM
FOR USE WITH all F0RyS OF STANDARD BONDS ON A D'SCOVFPY '
I Y. r D0 N0T C0NTA,N A JOINT INSURED PARAGRAPHV\he ,[vER TV.O Ca MOPE ARE NAMED AS INSURED
RtViSEOTOSEPTEMBER 1954
SP 5S38 P- „;Mir ,_, s A
if 6«8 D' 4 71
1 ^H or rev m-FactSheila Diffiins
RIDER
To be attached to and form part of Blanket Bond, Standard Form No. 22, No. 19 F 3041 BCA
in favor of Home Savings & Loan
It is agreed that:
1. The attached bond is amended by inserting as part (c) in the Definitions Section, the following:
(c) "Forgery" (or "Forged") means the signing of the name of another with intent to deceive: it does
not include the signing of one's own name with or without authority, in any capacity, for any purpose.
2. The words "Forgery" and "Forged" shail be deemed to appear with an initial capiial throughout this
bond and attached riders.
3. This rider shall become effective as of 12:01 a.m. on June 21, 1982 standard time
as specified in the attached bond.
Accepted: Signature Waived
DEFINITION OF FORGERY
FOR USE WITH BLANKET BONDS. STANDARD FORMS NOS. 5 14 !5 20
AND 22 TO PROVIDE FOR A DEFINITION OF THE WORD FORGERY
ADOPTED DECEMBER. 1960.
SR 6090 Printed In U.S.A.
RIDER
To be attached to and form part of Bond No. 19 F 3041 B^A
in favor of Home Savings & Loan, et al
it is agreed that:
2. This rider is effective as of noon on 12-3-82
Signed, sealed and dated (enter belcw)
1-5-83
THE /ETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY
Sheila Diggins, Attorney-in-fai^
WELFARE AND PENSION PLAN RIDER
FOR USE WITH ALL FORMS OF STANDARD BONDS TO COVER niRFfTno<;
« TRUSTEES CF THE INSURED WHILE HANDLING eUNDS OH ^tSeIPROPERTY OF THE INSURED'S WELFARE OR P^ION PLANS AND TOP?ANS TRUSTEES' "^GERS, OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES 0* SUcS
REVISED TO JANUARY, 1963.
SR 5137b Pr.nted .n U S.A.
•.:-10'0i Ed 1-63
(SEAL)
RIDER
To be attached to and form part of Blanket Bond, Standard Form No. 22 , No. 19 F 3041 BCA
in favor of Home Savings & L0an
It is agreed that:
fmm l J** Unfherwnte;kshal'n0t be liable under the ^hed bond for any loss resulting directly or indirectlyfrom radmg, with or without the knowledge of the Insured. ,n the name of the Insured or otherwise whether
art" a T<en yry mdebtedness or balance shown <° be due the Insured on any customer's'account
actual or fictitious, and notwithstanding any act or omission on the part of any Employee in connection with
any account relating to such trading, indebtedness, or balance.
In regard to Blanket Bonds Nos. 5, 22 and 24, this sub-section shall not apply to Insuring Agreement (D)
or (E) if coverage is carried thereunder. d ccmicui iu,
2. This rider applies to loss sustained at any time but discovered after 12:01 a m on June 21 1982
standard time as specified in the attached bond. " '
Accepted: SignatureWaived
DELETE TRADING LOSS RIDER - DISCOVERY FORM CAT. NO. 036625
FOR USE WITH BLANKET BONDS. STANDARD FORMS NOS 5 22 74 AND 28
•DISCOVERY- FORMS. TO DELETE TRADING LOSS COVERAGE "
REVISED TO JUNE. 1978
SR 6030a Printed in U S.A.
RIDER
To be attached to and form part of Bond No 19 F 3041 BCA
in favor of HOME SAVINGS & LOAN
effective as of JUNE 21, 1983
In consideration of the premium charged for the attached bond, it is agreed that:
1. Theattached bond is herebyamended by canceling and terminating a certain rider (hereinafter called Canceled
Riderl dated June 21, 1982 , attached to the said bond and more fully described as follows-
SR-5876b - Delete Electronic Data Processing Coverage
so that from and after the effective date hereof, the anached bond shall continue in force without the amendment
contained in the said Canceled Rider,
2. The amendment of the anached bond effected hereby shall apply to loss or losses sustained at any time but
discovered on and after the effective date hereof.
3 The anached bond shall be subject to all its agreements, limitations and conditions except as herein expresslv
modified
noon4. This rider shall become effective as of u """" of the ?lst day of r,,nP
. 1984
Signed, sealed and dated (enter below)
4/6/84
THE £TNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY
HOME SAVINGS & LOAN
Accepted:
Signature Waived
RIDER CANCELING AN EXISnNG RIDER— DISCOVERY FORM
FOR USE WITH ALL FORMS OF STANDARD 80NDS ON A ' DISCOVERY
FORM TO CANCEL OP TERMINATE AN EXISTING ROER '
REVISED TO SEPTEMBER 1954.
SR 5531 Printed in U S A
[F-886-A) 3-73
Thomas S. Carpenter, IV/ A:TDrn3v.,rvFacl
CAT 4S4WJ
UDU
To be attached to and form part of BoncrNo. 19 F 3041 BCA
in favor of HOME SAVINGS & LOAN
It is agreed that:
1 At the request of the Insured, the Underwriter w^^^f™, th* ll$t of lniur«d under t,-»e attached
bond the following:
HOME SAVINGS SERVICE CORPORATION
2. This rider is effective as of noon on June 21, 1983
Signed, sealed and dated (enter below)
4/6/84
THE £TNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY
Accepted: Signature Waived
ADDING OR MDUCTtMQ INIUIIM R1DC1
FOB USE WITH ALL FORMS OF BONOS CONTAINING A JOINT INSURED
CLAUSE OR RIDER, TO ADO Oft OtDUCT JOINT INSUR£D$.
REVISED TO *AAV, 1957.
SR 5109a
.(F-7S4-C) 7-6*
L 22222*1 V imaZ^ J&1.rU-irt
Thomas S. Carpenter^ IV ai*™h**W
CAT 44569A
PRINTED IN UiA.
'• n
RIDER
To be attached to and form part of Blanket Bond, Standard Form No. 22 , No. 19 f 3041 BCA
in favor of Home Savings & Loan
It is agreed that:
1. The attached bond is hereby amended by deleting Section 12, "Rights After Termination or Cancela
tion' and substituting in lieu thereof the following:
"RIGHTS AFTER TERMINATION OR CANCELATION
Section 12, At any time prior to the terminat'on or cancelation of this bond as an entirety, whether by
tne Insured or the Underwriter, the Insured may give to the Underwriter notice that it desires under this bond
an adaitional period of 12 months within which to discover loss sustained by the Insured prior to the effective
date of such termination or cancelation and shall pay an aaditional premium therefor.
Upon receipt of such notice from the Insured, the Underwriter snail give its written consent thereto'
provided, however, that such additional period of time shall terminate immediately
(a) on the effective date of any other insurance obtained by the Insured, its successor ti business or any
other party, replacing in whole or in part the insurance afforded by this oond, whether or not such
other insurance provides coverage for loss sustained prior to its effective date, or
(b) upon takeover of the Insured's business by any State or Federal official or agency, or by any receiver
or liquidator, acting or appointed for this purpose
without the necessity of the Underwriter giving notice of such termination. In tne event that such additional
period of time is terminated, as provided above, the Underwriter shall refund any unearned premium.
The right to purchase such additional period for the discovery of loss may not be exercised by any
State or Federal official or agency, or by any receiver or liquidator, acting or'aopomtec to takeover the
Insured's business for the operation or for the liquidation thereof or for any other curpose. '
2. The attached bond is further amended by inserting the following as tne <>.ai paragraph of Section 4:
"Discovery occurs when the Insured becomes aware of facts whicn would cause a reasonaole
person to assume that a loss covered cy the bond has been or will be mcurreo even though the exact
amount or details of loss may not be then known. Notice to the insureo of an actuai or potential cla;m
by a third party which alleges that the Insured is liable under circumstances, which. :f true, would create
a loss under this bond constitutes such discovery,"
3. This rider shall become effective as of 12 01 a.m. on June 21, 1952 standard t:me
as specified in the attached bond.
Accepted: Signature Waived
DISCOVERY RIDER-RIGHTS AFTER TERMINATION OR CANCELATION
FOR JSE WIT" BLANKET BONDS STANDARD FORMS NCS 5 14 20 AND 22
•DISCOVERY" FORMS TO REVISE SECTIONS 12 AND 4.
ADOPTED DECEMBER, 1980
SR 6091 Printed in U.S.A.
This policy is not valid unless countersigned by our authorized representative.
Signed for the Company by:
Secretary
Prtitdint I
